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Abstract 
	
Emotion regulation consists of multiple processes that serve to modify emotional 
reactions. This thesis examines both implicit (automatic) and explicit (deliberate) 
processes and explores how their function and efficacy are modulated by 
individual differences in subtypes of aggressive behaviour. These questions are 
examined in both healthy adults and adolescents. Methods include cognitive 
testing, self-report, heart rate perception, skin conductance response and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging. 
Using a paradigm where emotion is task-irrelevant, Chapter 2 explores how 
attention is implicitly captured by emotional faces and shows that core 
psychopathic traits are associated with reduced attention capture by fearful faces 
in a community sample. Chapter 3 investigates the conditions under which 
emotion can, and cannot, implicitly capture attention by varying cognitive load in 
a series of experiments. 
From Chapter 4 onwards, explicit emotion regulation is investigated. In Chapter 4 
the efficacy of three subtypes of psychological distancing, a form of cognitive 
reappraisal, is examined. It is shown that interoceptive awareness of bodily states 
influences the ability to use distancing to regulate emotion effectively. Chapter 5 
focuses on the efficacy of one of these strategies, namely temporal distancing (e.g. 
‘this too shall pass’), across the transition from adolescence to adulthood. Using a 
novel experimental task, temporal distancing was shown to be effective across the 
age range studied, but was reduced with increasing reactive aggression. Neural 
correlates of temporal distancing are discussed in Chapter 6, which employs an 
fMRI-adapted version of the task used in Chapter 5. 
This thesis concludes that subtypes of aggression influence emotion regulation in 
different ways. It is therefore crucial to take aggression into account in order to 
understand individual differences in implicit and explicit emotion regulation.	  
 
	
	
	
4 
Publication of Findings 
 
Ahmed, S. P., Somerville, L. & Sebastian, C. L. (Revise & Resubmit). Using 
mental time travel to regulate emotion in adolescence: modulation by reactive 
aggression. Cognition & Emotion. (Chapter 5) 
 
Ahmed, S. P., Hodsoll, S., Dalton, P. & Sebastian, C. L. (2017). Emotional 
capture by fearful expressions varies with psychopathic traits. Cognition & 
Emotion. (Chapter 2) 
 
Ahmed, S. P., Bittencourt-Hewitt, A. & Sebastian, C. L. (2015). Neurocognitive 
bases of emotion regulation development in adolescence. Developmental 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 15, 11-25. (Parts of Chapter 1) 
 
Ahmed, S. P. & Sebastian, C.L. (in press). The neurobiology of emotion 
regulation. In A. Beech, A.J. Carter, R. Mann & P. Rotshtein (eds.) The Wiley 
Handbook of Forensic Neuroscience. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., West Sussex, UK. 
(Parts of Chapter 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
	
	
	
5 
Acknowledgments  
	
 First and foremost, I would like to thank my wonderful supervisor, 
Catherine Sebastian, for her endless support and encouragement over the past 
three years. I am forever grateful for all the time she has spent meticulously 
reading my work, be it day or night, and even meeting with me whilst she was on 
maternity leave. I have learnt so much from her advice, dedication, and the 
incredible opportunities she has provided me with. I am very thankful to Tamar 
Pincus, who encouraged me to pursue a PhD and suggested Cat as my supervisor. 
 
 Sincere thanks to Leah Somerville for welcoming me into her lab at 
Harvard University, training me in skin conductance recording and providing me 
with detailed feedback on the manuscript of Chapter 5. I would also like to thank 
Manos Tsakiris and Courtenay Norbury for helping me with grant applications 
and making the Harvard study visit possible. Thanks to Sara Hodsoll and Polly 
Dalton for their help and advice on Chapter 2, and also to Angelika Lingnau for 
sharing her expertise on fMRI design. Thanks also to Georgia Rankin for her help 
on Chapter 4 and proof-reading the thesis. Enormous thanks go to Nadine Lavan 
and Omar Hassan for always coming to my rescue and saving me from my Matlab 
woes. Without you both this PhD would have taken much longer. 
 
 Thank you to all my fellow PhD students: Jen (my best friend from day 
one), Hannah H, Gurpreet, Siu, Hannah B, Sophie, Travis, Katie and Charlotte, I 
could not imagine sharing this journey with anyone else. Thank you to all the new 
PhD students as well, who have made the last couple of years more enjoyable, 
particularly Rachel (my number 1 fan), who always puts a smile on my face. 
 
 I would also like to thank my close friends for helping me escape the 
stresses of PhD life with days filled with laughter and food. Last but not least, I 
want to thank my Mum and Dad, who have done everything they can to ensure 
that I have the best opportunities in life. I am eternally grateful for your 
unconditional love and belief in me.	  
 
	
	
	
6 
Contents 
Abstract                                                                                                                  3 
Publication of Findings                4 
Acknowledgments                 5 
Contents                  6  
List of Tables                 11 
List of Figures                12 
 
CHAPTER 1: General Introduction 14 
1.1 What is emotion regulation? 14 
1.2 Models of emotion regulation 14 
1.2.1 Neural circuitry involved in emotion regulation 18 
1.3 Implicit emotion regulation 20 
1.4 Explicit emotion regulation 23 
1.5 A role for individual differences in emotion regulation 31 
1.5.1 Aggression 32 
1.5.2 Interoceptive awareness 45 
1.5.3 Adolescence 48 
1.6 Methods Used in the Thesis 52 
1.6.1 Interoceptive awareness 52 
1.6.2 Skin conductance 54 
1.6.3 fMRI 56 
1.7 Summary and the Current Thesis 60 
 
CHAPTER 2: Emotional capture by fearful expressions varies with 
psychopathic traits 62 
2.1 Introduction 62 
2.2 Method 66 
2.2.1 Participants 66 
2.2.2 Stimuli and procedure 66 
2.2.3 Questionnaires 67 
 
	
	
	
7 
2.2.4 Data analysis 69 
2.3 Results 69 
2.3.1 Main task 70 
2.3.2 Relationships with psychopathic traits 71 
2.3.3 Anxiety 73 
2.4 Discussion 74 
 
CHAPTER 3: Modulation of emotional capture by varying cognitive load 79 
3.1 General Introduction 79 
3.2 Experiment 1 85 
3.2.1 Introduction 85 
3.2.2 Method 85 
3.2.3 Results 88 
3.2.4 Discussion 90 
3.3 Experiment 2 93 
3.3.1 Introduction 93 
3.3.2 Method 94 
3.3.3 Results 94 
3.3.4 Discussion 96 
3.4 Experiment 3 97 
3.4.1 Introduction 97 
3.4.2 Method 98 
3.4.3 Results 98 
3.4.4 Discussion 100 
3.5 Experiment 4 100 
3.5.1 Introduction 100 
3.5.2 Method 101 
3.5.3 Results 101 
3.5.4 Discussion 103 
3.6 General Discussion 104 
 
 
	
	
	
8 
CHAPTER 4: Distancing as a reappraisal strategy for emotion regulation: 
efficacy, ease of use, and modulation by interoception and affective variables
 107 
4.1 Introduction 107 
4.2 Method 112 
4.2.1 Participants 112 
4.2.2 Behavioural task and stimuli 112 
4.2.3 Interoceptive awareness and analysis 116 
4.2.4 Questionnaire measures 117 
4.3 Results 118 
4.3.1 Distancing efficacy 118 
4.3.2 Distancing: Ease of use 120 
4.3.3. Relationships between distancing and individual differences 121 
4.3.4 Interoceptive awareness 123 
4.3.5 Distancing and questionnaire measures 125 
4.4 Discussion 125 
 
CHAPTER 5: Using temporal distancing to regulate emotion in adolescence: 
modulation by reactive aggression. 131 
5.1 Introduction 131 
5.2 Method 134 
5.2.1 Participants 134 
5.2.2 Behavioural task and stimuli 135 
5.2.3 Skin conductance and analysis 139 
5.2.4 Developmental analysis 139 
5.2.5 Questionnaire measures 140 
5.3 Results 141 
5.3.1 Hypothesis 1: Distancing efficacy 141 
5.3.2 Hypothesis 2: Developmental effects 145 
5.3.3 Hypothesis 3: Distancing success and reactive aggression 147 
5.4 Discussion 150 
5.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Distancing efficacy 150 
 
	
	
	
9 
5.4.2 Hypothesis 2: Developmental effects 152 
5.4.3 Hypothesis 3: Distancing success and reactive aggression 153 
 
CHAPTER 6: Neural mechanisms of temporal distancing 155 
6.1 Introduction 155 
6.1.1 Regulation and reactivity 155 
6.1.2 Future thinking 156 
6.1.3 Current study 159 
6.2 Method 161 
6.2.1 Participants 161 
6.2.2 Experimental task and stimuli 161 
6.2.3 Questionnaire measures 164 
6.2.4 fMRI data acquisition 164 
6.2.5 Data analysis 164 
6.3 Results 167 
6.3.1 Behavioural data 167 
6.3.2 fMRI data 168 
6.4 Discussion 175 
6.4.1 Emotional responsivity 175 
6.4.2 Regulation 176 
6.4.3 Future thinking 178 
6.4.4 Individual differences 180 
6.4.5. Strengths, limitations and future directions 181 
 
CHAPTER 7: General Discussion 182 
7.1. Overview 183 
7.2 Chapter Summaries: main research questions and findings 184 
7.2.1 Implicit emotion regulation 184 
7.2.2 Explicit emotion regulation 186 
7.3 Main implications of the thesis 189 
7.3.1 What is the role of aggression in emotion regulation? 189 
 
	
	
	
10 
7.3.2 Implications for the Process Model 192 
7.4 Limitations and future directions 196 
7.5 Conclusions 199 
 
References               201	
	
Appendices               232 
 Appendix 1: Self-report questionnaires used in the thesis        232
 Appendix 2: Scenario stimuli used in Chapter 6         239 
 Appendix 3: Instructions given to participants in Chapter 6        241 
 Appendix 4: List of brain regions activated (p<.05 FWE corrected)          
 for exploratory contrasts in Chapter 6.                      244 
	
 
  
 
	
	
	
11 
List of Tables 
	
4.1 A selection of participants’ written answers during the manipulation 
checks. 
122 
4.2 Strategy use reported during manipulation check trials. 120 
4.3 Bivariate correlations between the individual differences measures. 123 
   
6.1 Peak cluster activations in brain regions from each contrast reaching 
significance at p<.05 (FWE-corrected). 
169 
6.2 Peak cluster activations in the regions of interest for the Distant Future 
> Read Negative contrast reaching significance at p<.05 (FWE-
corrected). 
171 
	
	
	 	
 
	
	
	
12 
List of Figures 
	
1.1 a) The Process Model (Gross & Thompson, 2007); b) The Extended 
Process Model of emotion regulation (Sheppes et al. 2015). 
17 
1.2 The processing steps (top) and neural systems (bottom) associated 
with the generation of emotion (pink boxes) and the cognitive control 
processes involved in regulating emotion (blue boxes). 
18 
   
2.1 Example displays for all-neutral, fearful distractor, and fearful target 
conditions (not to scale). 
67 
2.2 Mean reaction times (milliseconds) to correctly locate and indicate the 
tilt of the target face. 
71 
2.3 Graph showing that the relationship between mean reaction times 
during correct trials in the fearful distractor condition and affective-
interpersonal traits is moderated by levels of lifestyle-antisocial traits.  
74 
   
3.1 Example of the experimental task stimuli. 87 
3.2 Mean reaction times (RTs) in milliseconds (ms) for correct trials when 
all conditions are blocked. 
90 
3.3 Mean RTs (ms) for correct trials across all conditions when all trials 
were randomised. 
95 
3.4 Mean RTs (ms) for correct trials across all conditions when 
Compatibility was randomised and Emotion was blocked. 
99 
3.5 Mean RTs (ms) for correct trials across all conditions when 
Compatibility was blocked and Emotion was randomised. 
102 
   
4.1 Visual depiction of a Spatial Distancing trial. 115 
4.2 Average a) distress and b) arousal ratings across all conditions. 119 
4.3 Positive correlation between interoceptive awareness score and 
temporal distancing efficacy. 
124 
 
	
	
	
13 
5.1 Visual depiction of a Distant Future trial. 138 
5.2 Mean ratings for a) distress and b) arousal for all conditions. 143 
5.3 Scatterplots depicting the relationship between distance in time 
adopted during the Distant Future condition and distancing success 
relative to free viewing. 
144 
5.4 Mean peak skin conductance amplitude for each condition. 145 
5.5 Scatterplot showing that reactive aggression peaked during mid 
adolescence in the present sample. 
147 
5.6 a) Relationship between reactive aggression and distancing success; b) 
relationships between distress ratings for Distant Future and Read 
Negative conditions and reactive aggression. 
149 
   
6.1 Visual depiction of a Distant Future trial. 163 
6.2 Mean distress ratings. 167 
6.3 Top: Read Negative > Distant Future for a) left amygdala and b) right 
subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC). Bottom: Contrast 
estimates are shown relative to implicit baseline for the a) left 
amygdala ROI and b) sgACC ROI. 
172 
6.4 Left image: Right vlPFC cluster (Distant Future > Read Negative). 
Right: negative correlation between average distance in time adopted 
rating and right vlPFC activation (Distant Future > Read Negative). 
174 
Chapter 1 
	
	
	
14 
Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
1.1 What is emotion regulation? 
Emotions exert a powerful influence over our lives and serve a wide range 
of functions, from alerting us to a threat to helping us build relationships. They 
also serve an adaptive role by motivating us to take action to maximise our 
chances for functioning successfully in society. However emotions can become 
dysfunctional when they are exaggerated in intensity, last for long periods of time, 
occur unpredictably, or are evoked out of context. In these cases, emotions must 
be regulated to control our behaviour effectively. Emotion regulation is not a 
single process, but has been defined broadly as the monitoring, evaluation and 
modifying of emotional reactions in order to accomplish goals (Thompson, 1994). 
This can include both implicit emotion regulation, i.e. processes which occur 
automatically and largely outside conscious awareness and occur at very early 
stages of the emotion regulation process, and explicit emotion regulation, which 
involves using conscious strategies to down-regulate emotional responses. The 
current thesis will first focus on implicit emotion regulation processes followed by 
explicit emotion regulation, exploring how their function and efficacy are 
modulated by several factors including specific task demands, aggression, the 
ability to perceive internal bodily states, and age across the transition from 
adolescence to adulthood. This chapter will introduce these key topics covered in 
the thesis, and will provide an overview of emotion regulation processes and their 
neurocognitive underpinnings. 
 
1.2 Models of emotion regulation 
There are many strategies for regulating emotional responses, and the most 
prominent approach to organising these has been to focus on the time point at 
which regulatory processes are brought to bear on emotion-evoking situations. 
The Process Model of emotion regulation (Figure 1.1a) theorises that emotion 
generation and appropriate regulatory processes unfold in a particular sequence 
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over time (Gross, 1998; Gross, 2014). The first two processes – Situation 
Selection and Situation Modification – both help shape the situation to which an 
individual will be exposed. Situation Selection involves choosing to avoid an 
emotionally relevant situation in order to prevent the generation of an emotional 
response. This process is commonly seen in psychopathology, e.g. where an 
individual with social anxiety disorder avoids social situations to regulate their 
emotions (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998). If avoiding the situation is not possible, 
Situation Modification is employed, which involves efforts to modify the external 
features of the situation so as to change its emotional impact, such as shortening 
exposure time. Attention Deployment is then used to focus attention away from 
aspects of the situation that provoke undesired emotions. If this is not sufficient to 
regulate emotional responses, the emotional situation is then explicitly appraised 
and evaluated, either by engaging in Cognitive Change such as reappraisal (i.e. 
reinterpreting the meaning of the situation to reduce its negative impact, see 
section 1.4 for more detail) or Response Modulation, which refers to direct 
attempts to influence physiological, experiential or behavioural emotional 
responses once they have already been elicited. For example, exercise and 
relaxation techniques may be used to decrease physiological and experiential 
effects of negative emotions (Oaten & Cheng, 2006). One of the most researched 
forms of response modulation is expressive suppression, which entails inhibiting 
emotional expressions (Gross, 2002). The Process Model also contains a feedback 
loop, recognising that emotional responses can modify the situation that gave rise 
to the response in the first place, (e.g. a socially anxious individual may leave the 
social situation after experiencing intense anxiety during the situation), suggesting 
that the emotion generation process can occur recursively, is ongoing, and 
dynamic (Gross & Thompson, 2007). The processes identified in this model can 
be thought of as existing on a continuum from implicit to explicit emotion 
regulation: as awareness of emotional reactivity increases, regulation becomes 
more explicit. However, it is difficult to pinpoint the threshold at which regulation 
becomes explicit, as this likely varies between individuals and contexts. 
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It has been noted, however, that while the Process Model focuses mainly 
on implementation success (or failure) of particular emotion regulation strategies, 
adaptive emotion regulation actually involves a broader repertoire of skills, 
including flexible strategy selection (e.g. Bonanno & Burton, 2013). This has led 
to the recent development of an Extended Process Model (Gross, 2014; Sheppes, 
Suri, & Gross, 2015, see Figure 1.1b). This posits that emotion regulation occurs 
in three stages: (1) Identification, in which an emotional state is identified and the 
decision over whether or not to regulate this is made; (2) Selection, in which an 
appropriate regulatory strategy is selected and (3) Implementation, in which the 
strategy is implemented (corresponding to the original Process Model). Each stage 
involves perception of the state of the world, valuation as to whether this is 
positive or negative, and then action based on the valuation stage. For example, at 
the Identification stage, an individual might perceive that they are experiencing a 
negative emotion, evaluate that this exceeds a given threshold of negative affect 
and that regulation is required, and therefore decide to take action to select an 
appropriate strategy. This then feeds into the Selection stage, where the full range 
of regulatory strategies is perceived and evaluated, and appropriate action is 
taken. Such a procedure involves several cognitive control processes, which are 
underpinned by a broad network of brain regions, discussed in the following 
section.   
Chapter 1 
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Figure 1.1. (a) The Process Model (Gross & Thompson, 2007) suggests five 
different aspects of emotion regulation (situation selection, situation modification, 
attention deployment, cognitive change and response modulation) that correspond 
to the regulation of a particular point in the emotion generation process. Reprinted 
with permission from Guilford Press and J. Gross. (b) The Extended Process 
Model of emotion regulation (Sheppes et al., 2015). The World (W) gives rise to 
Perception (P). When valued as either negative or positive, these Valuations (V; 
known as emotions) give rise to Actions (A) that can change the state of the 
World. The model classifies three stages of emotion regulation: identification 
(which involves deciding whether to regulate emotions or not), selection (which 
involves deciding which strategy to use), and implementation (which involves 
implementing the chosen strategy). This may change the first-level Valuation 
system. Reprinted with permission from Annual Reviews and G. Sheppes. 
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Figure 1.2. The processing steps (top) and neural systems (bottom) associated 
with the generation of emotion (pink boxes) and the cognitive control processes 
involved in regulating emotion (blue boxes). Diagram from Ochsner, Silvers, & 
Buhle (2012). Reprinted with permission from K. Ochsner and Wiley Publishing. 
 
1.2.1 Neural circuitry involved in emotion regulation  
Numerous studies in both healthy human participants and animals have 
helped delineate the neural circuitry involved in emotion processing and 
regulation. Firstly, as shown in Figure 1.2, a stimulus is perceived in its 
situational context. The stimulus could be internal, such as a thought or feeling, or 
an external cue involving other people or events. If the stimulus is particularly 
salient, whether attended to or not, it gives rise to emotional reactivity. This 
reactivity has been found to be generated in subcortical regions (see pink boxes in 
Figure 1.2) such as the amygdala, which has been linked to determining saliency 
of emotional stimuli (Adolphs et al., 2005) and both the learning and expressing 
of the fear response (LeDoux, 2000). The ventral striatum has also been 
implicated in the generation of emotion. For example, this region has been 
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associated with emotional and motivational aspects of behaviour and learning 
which cues (e.g. social cues such as a smiling face), predict reinforcing or 
rewarding outcomes (Schultz, 2006, 2007). The insula, particularly the anterior 
insula, has been associated with negative affective experience in general (Craig, 
2009) and has also been implicated in the emotion generation process.  
 
As illustrated by the blue boxes in Figure 1.2, the cognitive control 
processes that underpin the stages defined by the Process Model engage several 
brain regions. To begin with, regions involved in selective attention and working 
memory, such as the dorsolateral (dlPFC) and posterior prefrontal cortex as well 
as inferior parietal lobe regions, direct attention to reappraisal-relevant features of 
the emotional stimulus and keep in mind reappraisal (or other regulatory strategy) 
goals (Miller, 2000; Wager, Jonides, & Reading, 2004). Following this, regions 
associated with performance monitoring, such as the dorsal anterior cingulate 
cortex (dACC), may help to detect the extent to which emotional responses are 
being changed in response to the regulatory strategy, and trigger adjustments to 
enhance performance (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). Then, the ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (vlPFC), which is thought to play a key role in selecting goal-
appropriate (and inhibiting goal-inappropriate) information, may be engaged to 
help in selecting a new appropriate regulatory strategy in favor of one’s initial 
appraisal of the emotional stimulus (Badre & Wagner, 2007; Thompson-Schill, 
Bedny, & Goldberg, 2005). Finally, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) 
may also be recruited. This region has been implicated in attributing mental states, 
and indeed the reinterpreting of one’s own (or others) emotional states is required 
for certain emotion regulation strategies, such as reappraisal. During all this, 
responses in subcortical regions, particularly the amygdala, are modulated 
(Ochsner & Gross, 2008).  
 
This neural circuitry is evident in both implicit and explicit emotion 
regulation; therefore, supporting neural evidence will be discussed in their 
respective sections below. 
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1.3 Implicit emotion regulation 
The earliest form of emotion processing and reactivity is implicit, with 
implicit emotion regulation generally defined as “any process that operates 
without the need for conscious supervision or explicit intentions, and aims at 
modifying the quality, intensity, or duration of an emotional response” (Koole & 
Rothermund, 2011, p.1). While this definition does encompass the automatic and 
habitual use of strategies generally considered explicit, as discussed above, this 
section will focus on regulatory processes that occur at the very earliest stages of 
emotion perception and processing, and which occur even when individuals are 
unaware of feeling a subjective emotional response.  
 
Emotional stimuli capture our attention (see Carretié, 2014 for a review), 
particularly via the activation of limbic regions such as the amygdala, which 
initiates an orienting response to salient stimuli (Gamer & Büchel, 2009). This 
can be adaptive as such stimuli are particularly likely to require swift action (e.g. 
to avoid a dangerous situation). However, emotional stimuli in the environment 
are also often irrelevant and can interfere with our current goals and responses, 
thus our responses to them need to be appropriately regulated.  
 
One of the most commonly used methods of demonstrating emotional 
attentional bias is to show that performance can suffer as a result of attending to 
emotional stimuli on tasks where the processing of such information would be 
disruptive. The dot probe task is a frequently used paradigm to investigate 
selective attention to threat (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). In the task 
participants are shown an emotional stimulus and a neutral stimulus that appear 
side by side for 500 milliseconds (ms), after which a dot probe appears either at 
the location of the emotional stimulus (congruent condition) or the neutral 
stimulus (incongruent condition). The allocation of attention is measured by the 
time needed to respond to the dot probe. If participants automatically allocate 
attention to emotional stimuli, it is reasoned that they will be quicker to respond to 
the dot probe on congruent than incongruent trials. Although the paradigm is 
primarily used to understand attentional bias in emotional disorders, (e.g. anxious 
Chapter 1 
	
	
	
21 
individuals were found to respond faster to congruent trials than to incongruent 
trials, Mogg & Bradley, 1998) there is evidence to suggest that this bias is also 
present in typical individuals. For example, Lipp and Derakshan (2005) found that 
probes that replaced fear-relevant stimuli (pictures of snakes and spiders) were 
identified faster than probes that replaced the non-fear-relevant stimuli (pictures 
of mushrooms and flowers), indicating an attentional bias. Thus, several lines of 
evidence show that emotional stimuli can capture our attention implicitly, outside 
of awareness. 
 
A derivation of the original go/no-go paradigm, the emotional go/no-go 
task is also used to study the effects of emotion of cognitive performance. 
Participants are asked to either respond (Go trials) or withhold response (No Go 
trials) to different affective stimuli. Because Go trials are more common, the task 
is able to measure one’s ability to inhibit a prepotent response under different 
emotional conditions. In a sample of 85 university students, Schulz et al. (2007) 
found significantly faster responses to happy than sad faces on Go trials, 
consistent with research demonstrating that healthy adults recognise facial 
expressions of positive emotions (e.g. happy) faster than expressions of neutral or 
negative emotions (e.g. sad, angry, and disgusted) (Grimshaw, Bulman-Fleming, 
& Ngo, 2004; Leppänen & Hietanen, 2004). However, it is not possible to tease 
apart whether faster reaction times were due to faster recognition, or a facilitation 
for happy caused by approach biases compared to avoidance biases for sad 
(Adams & Kleck, 2003). With a similar pattern of results, Hare, Tottenham, 
Davidson, Glover and Casey (2005) found that participants were slower to 
respond when Go targets were fearful faces, relative to neutral and happy Go 
trials. Additionally, this delay in response time was positively correlated with 
amygdala activity. Therefore the findings showed that negative expressions were 
able to disproportionately distract participants (or elicit an avoidance bias); and 
moreover that amygdala response was functionally relevant in this delay. 
Emotion regulation appears to be an ongoing and iterative process that 
involves the interplay of several specific networks of brain regions – from the 
detection of biases to identifying the way in which biases may be regulated. 
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Perhaps the most well-used task to study cognitive conflict is the Stroop task 
(Stroop, 1935) in which participants are required to name the colour of ink in 
which an item is printed, while attempting to ignore the item itself. Research has 
continuously found that it takes participants longer to name the colours when the 
base items are antagonistic colour names than when they are rows of meaningless 
stimuli. Moreover, several studies have shown that clinical patients are 
particularly slow to name the colour of a word associated with concerns regarding 
their clinical condition, relative to neutral control words, e.g. ‘dirty’ in obsessive 
compulsive disorder (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). To investigate 
heightened cognitive conflict caused by emotional stimuli, Etkin, Egner, Peraza, 
Kandel and Hirsch (2006) developed an emotional face version of the Stroop task. 
Participants were shown photographs of happy or fearful facial expressions with 
either the word “happy” or “fearful” superimposed.  Participants were asked to 
identify the emotional expression of the faces while ignoring the printed words, 
which were either of the same emotion (congruent) or of a different emotion 
(incongruent) as the facial expression. Incongruent stimuli were therefore 
associated with response conflict arising from an emotional mismatch between 
task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimulus dimensions (e.g., a fearful expression 
with the word “happy”). Consistent with this, reaction times to incongruent trials 
were longer than to congruent trials. However, the slowdown in reaction times 
was reduced when the previous image was also incongruent, demonstrating that 
an emotion regulatory process was already engaged to enable participants to react 
faster to the conflicting emotional information on subsequent incongruent trials. 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data additionally revealed brain 
regions which reflected the degree of emotional conflict. High-conflict trials were 
defined as those in which an incongruent trial was preceded by a congruent trial, 
meaning regulatory resources were required to be brought online specifically at 
the onset of that trial. On these trials (relative to low-conflict (congruent) trials), 
activity in the amygdala, dmPFC, and bilateral dlPFC was also predictive of 
rostral ACC (rACC) activity on the subsequent trial. In contrast, high control 
trials were defined as those in which an incongruent trial is preceded by another 
incongruent trial. On these trials, activation of the rACC was associated with a 
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reduction in amygdala activity and enhanced task performance. Etkin et al. (2006) 
concluded that the rACC is involved in resolving response conflict through top-
down inhibition of amygdala activity.  
A potential criticism of the above study is that a non-emotional control 
condition was not included to control for a general semantic mismatch, thus it was 
unable to demonstrate that the effect was emotion specific.  This was addressed in 
a follow-up study, where Egner, Etkin, Gale, and Hirsch (2008) had participants 
perform the same emotional Stroop task as well as a non-emotional variation of 
the task, where participants were asked to judge the gender of emotional faces 
while ignoring the word “male” or “female” written over them. The authors found 
that while dACC was activated during high conflict trials in both tasks, the rACC 
was activated only during conflict resolution (high control) trials in the emotional 
version. Connectivity analyses showed that rACC activity was associated with 
decreased amygdala activity only in the emotional Stroop task. Although this 
study did not support Etkin et al.’s (2006) findings that the amygdala detects 
conflicts arising from emotional stimuli, both studies did suggest that the rACC is 
involved in cognitive control in the presence of conflicting emotional information, 
through inhibition of amygdala activity.  In sum, it appears that the brain both 
implicitly processes emotion by directing attention to the emotion; in concordance 
with the Attention Deployment stage of the Process Model, and down-regulates 
neural responses to it, even when we are not consciously aware of doing so. 
Chapter 3 examines the interplay between top-down cognitive control and 
bottom-up processing of task-irrelevant emotion in more detail. 
 
1.4 Explicit emotion regulation 
Unlike implicit emotion regulation, explicit emotion regulation strategies 
require conscious effort during initiation, and some level of monitoring during 
implementation (Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011). According to the Process Model 
(Gross, 1998), instigating regulation relatively early on in the emotion-generative 
process is thought to be more effective in modifying the course of the response 
than applying regulatory strategies later on. The early explicit process which has 
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received the most empirical attention is cognitive reappraisal (see Figure 1.1a), 
i.e. reinterpreting an emotional situation in a more positive (or indeed negative) 
light (Gross, 2002). In contrast, expressive suppression is a response-focused 
explicit regulatory process that occurs once an emotional response has been 
generated, and which prevents emotional responses from being overtly expressed 
(Gross & Thompson, 2007).  
 
 Most studies investigating explicit emotion regulation experimentally have 
used very similar paradigms (e.g. Gross & Levenson, 1993; McRae et al., 2010; 
Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002). Typically, participants are asked to 
process affective stimuli (usually pictures, videos or written scenarios) under two 
conditions; one in which they are instructed to react naturally when viewing the 
stimuli (reactivity), and another in which they are instructed to regulate their 
emotions using a previously specified strategy (regulation). Performance on the 
task is indexed by contrasting emotional responding (e.g. self-reported valence 
ratings) in the reactivity and regulation trials, with a greater difference in 
emotional responding indicating more effective emotion regulation. 
 
 During explicit emotion regulation tasks, researchers have instructed 
participants to effortfully regulate their emotions at various points in the emotion 
generative timeline as outlined in the Process Model (Gross, 1998). Most of these 
studies have focussed on reappraisal, which involves effortful and conscious 
attempts to change the interpretation of an emotional stimulus or situation (e.g. an 
image of a woman crying can be reappraised by thinking that she is crying tears of 
joy, and fits within the Appraisal/Cognitive Change stage of the Process Model; 
Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011). Reappraisal targets the early stages of the 
emotion generation sequence, whereas expressive suppression, which is an 
explicit strategy involving inhibiting emotional expressions (e.g., facial 
expressions, verbal utterances, gestures) usually takes place after emotional 
responses have been generated, in the final stages of the sequence. One of the first 
studies to investigate the efficacy of reappraisal was by Gross (1998). Participants 
were instructed to either “think about what you are seeing in such a way that you 
Chapter 1 
	
	
	
25 
don't feel anything at all” (reappraisal), suppress any expression of emotion 
(expressive suppression), or passively watch (control) disgust-eliciting film clips. 
Reappraisal led to reductions in both subjective and behavioural (such as facial 
expressions and verbal utterances) signs of disgust, with no signs of increases in 
physiological responding. Suppression, by contrast, although effective at 
diminishing expressive behaviour, had no impact on subjective ratings of disgust 
and led to increases in multiple measures of sympathetic nervous system 
activation (finger pulse amplitude, finger temperature, and skin conductance 
responses). Therefore interjecting regulation relatively early on in the emotion-
generative process seems to be most effective in altering the course of the 
emotional response. Using reappraisal to regulate emotions in everyday life has 
also been associated with healthier patterns of affect, social functioning, and well-
being than using expressive suppression (Cutuli, 2014). 
 
 Several other explicit emotion regulation strategies have also been 
investigated. For example McRae et al. (2010) looked at the behavioural and 
neural effects of using distraction as an emotion regulation strategy. Participants 
were presented with photos taken from the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 2008) preceded by a 6-letter string (distraction 
condition), which they had to keep in mind during the picture presentation and 
were told that they would be probed for memory directly after the presentation of 
each picture. There was also a reappraisal condition in which participants were 
instructed to re-interpret the situation depicted in the picture in a way that made 
them feel less negative about it. Both types of emotion regulation were successful 
in reducing negative affect relative to the passive looking condition, however 
reappraisal led to a significantly greater reduction in negative affect than 
distraction. Additionally in a different study, reappraisal but not distraction was 
found to have long-lasting effects (7 days after experimental manipulations), with 
reappraisal participants experiencing fewer recurring thoughts compared to the 
distraction group (Kross & Ayduk, 2008). This may be because reappraisal (but 
not distraction) requires a change in how the affective meaning of the stimulus is 
represented, which is perhaps more adaptive in the long term than simply 
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reducing stimulus processing through distraction. However, it is worth noting that 
reappraisal may not always be the most appropriate strategy. Recent evidence 
suggests that the success of reappraisal is specific to moderate emotional 
intensity, whereas distraction is better in high emotional-intensity situations 
(Shafir, Thiruchselvam, Suri, Gross, & Sheppes, 2016). Distraction can attenuate 
intense emotional responses early on in the regulatory process before it escalates 
(Shafir, Schwartz, Blechert, & Sheppes, 2015; Sheppes & Gross, 2011). In 
contrast, reappraisal is better suited to low-to-moderate emotional-intensity 
situations as it is effective at attenuating mild emotional reactions, while also 
altering how emotional situations are perceived (Denny, Inhoff, Zerubavel, 
Davachi, & Ochsner, 2015). Therefore the ability to effectively use reappraisal 
also involves deciding if, or when, it is appropriate to deploy it, which is in line 
with the Extended Process Model (Sheppes et al., 2015). 
 
In the first study to investigate the neural bases of reappraisal, Ochsner 
and colleagues (2002) instructed participants to reappraise negative emotion-
eliciting photos to modify their emotional response. It was found that, relative to 
simply attending to the negative photos, reappraisal successfully diminished 
subjective negative affect. Effective reappraisal was also associated with 
increased activation in lateral and medial PFC, and decreased activation in 
amygdala and medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC). Furthermore, the magnitude of 
vlPFC activation during reappraisal was inversely correlated with activation in the 
amygdala and mOFC. Taken together, these findings suggest that engagement of 
cognitive control-related areas dampens activity associated with emotional 
reactivity. 
 
An influential study by Wager, Davidson, Hughes, Lindquist, & Ochsner 
(2008) investigated whether subcortical regions mediate the relationship between 
key PFC regions and reappraisal success. Using pathway-mapping analysis, the 
authors identified two separable pathways linking prefrontal activation with 
reductions in self-reported negative emotion during reappraisal. One path was 
through the nucleus accumbens, which predicted greater reappraisal success (i.e., 
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less negative emotion), and the other was through the amygdala, which predicted 
reduced reappraisal success. These results demonstrated that the vlPFC is 
involved in both the generation and regulation of emotion through different 
subcortical pathways, suggesting a general role for this region in appraisal 
processes. 
 
A related study by Kim and Hamann (2007) looked at whether the same 
neural circuitry used to reappraise pictures evoking negative emotions would be 
engaged in reappraising pictures evoking positive emotions. They also asked 
participants to either increase (up-regulate) or decrease (down-regulate) the 
intensity of their positive and negative emotional responses. Although there were 
small differences, the overall pattern of results revealed generally shared 
activations in prefrontal regions (dmPFC, left lateral PFC, left OFC, ACC) when 
participants engaged in both up- and down-regulation for both negative and 
positive pictures. These findings support the notion that reappraisal engages the 
same processes regardless of emotional valence or regulatory goal. 
 
The studies discussed above all used instructed reappraisal in an 
experimental setting. However, one recent study looked at the link between 
reappraisal use in everyday life and neural responses to facial expressions during 
an incidental face-matching task (Drabant, McRae, Manuck, Hariri, & Gross, 
2009). Participants who reported using reappraisal as an emotion regulation 
strategy in everyday life showed decreased amygdala activation and greater 
activity in prefrontal and parietal regions in response to viewing negative facial 
expressions. Thus, the findings suggest a link between explicit emotion regulation 
strategy use in everyday life, and basic emotional responses to affective stimuli in 
the lab, in the absence of explicit instructions to regulate these. More research is 
needed regarding the neural bases of habitual reappraisal, however several 
behavioural studies have established a link between reappraisal performance in 
the lab, the use of reappraisal in everyday life, and psychological wellbeing (e.g. 
Cutuli, 2014; Gross & John, 2003; Haga, Kraft, & Corby, 2009; McRae, Jacobs, 
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Ray, John, & Gross, 2012). While causality is unclear, data nonetheless suggest 
the importance of habitual reappraisal use in good mental health.  
 
While a wealth of research has examined the behavioural, physiological 
and neural effects of reappraisal, fewer studies have explored strategies within 
reappraisal. One strategy of particular interest is distancing, which involves 
mentally changing the interpretation of an emotional event by increasing or 
decreasing one’s psychological distance from it (Ochsner et al., 2012). This can 
be accomplished in multiple ways. For instance, in line with Construal Level 
Theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003; 2010), psychological distance can be changed 
by varying the perceived temporal or physical closeness of an emotional situation, 
or instead by viewing it from the perspective of an impartial observer. A number 
of studies have shown that distancing is adaptive in reducing the intensity of 
negative affect and blood pressure responses. For example, Ayduk and Kross 
(2008) instructed participants to recall an experience when they were angry and 
then assigned them to either the self-immersed condition in which participants had 
to relive the situation, or the self-distanced condition in which they were told to 
“Take a few steps back…Watch the conflict unfold as if it were happening all 
over again to the distant you”. Participants in the self-distanced group displayed 
significantly lower levels of blood pressure reactivity relative to baseline 
compared to the self-immersed group, both during the experiment and the 
recovery period after the experiment was over. The findings suggest that the 
beneficial effect of distancing is not limited to the brief amount of time during 
which participants are implementing the strategy; rather it has additional longer-
term implications.  
 
In a similar vein, Denny and Ochsner (2014) trained separate groups of 
participants in distancing and reinterpretation over a two-week period, using the 
standard reappraisal paradigm with negative photos as defined above. The 
distancing group were given an instruction similar to that given in the Ayduk and 
Kross (2008) study as well as “imagine that the pictured events happened far 
away or a long time ago”. Results showed that both distancing and 
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reinterpretation training resulted in reductions over a two-week period in self-
reported negative affect. Additionally, participants who used distancing also 
showed a longitudinal decrease in negative affect on baseline trials on which no 
strategy was used. This suggested that the effects of distancing training may 
extend beyond trials on which participants were explicitly instructed to regulate, 
in effect, “spilling over” to baseline trials where negative affect was also reduced. 
Only the distancing group showed such a reduction on baseline trials over and 
above the reduction seen in the no-regulation control group, suggesting that 
effects were not attributable to habituation. 
 
The neural basis of distancing has also been explored. Koenigsberg et al. 
(2010) found that taking a detached and distant observer perspective when 
viewing photos of negative social scenes reduced self-reported negative affect and 
amygdala activity, while engaging the dACC, medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), 
lateral prefrontal cortex, precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex, intraparietal sulci, 
and middle/superior temporal gyrus. Importantly these brain networks have been 
implicated in cognitive control, social perception and perspective taking 
(Koenigsberg et al., 2010). Similarly, using the same instruction, Dörfel et al. 
(2014) found activity in regions implicated in cognitive control such as the right 
dlPFC, right superior frontal cortex and bilateral inferior parietal cortex during 
distancing. Taken together the findings from the distancing literature suggest that 
it is an effective emotion regulation strategy at a behavioural, physiological and 
neural level, and importantly the adaptive effects seem to last beyond the 
experiment. 
 
Despite the clear effectiveness of distancing as an emotion regulation 
strategy, very few studies have moved beyond the umbrella term of distancing. 
Denny and Ochsner (2014) identified three distancing sub-strategies: thinking of 
oneself as an objective impartial observer (e.g. “I don’t know any of the people 
involved”), using spatial distancing (e.g. “it is happening far away”), and using 
temporal distancing (e.g. “it happened a long time ago”). Furthermore, temporal 
distancing can also be operationalised as thinking about how an emotion-inducing 
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event is likely to affect you in the future (Bruehlman-Senecal & Ayduk, 2015; e.g. 
“will this matter in 5 years time?”). However, previous studies have not directly 
compared the efficacy of these three types of distancing, or looked at whether 
specific strategies may be easier to implement than others.  This is an important 
research gap, which will be addressed in Chapters 4-6 of the thesis. 
 
 The Process Model postulates that individuals have a host of emotion 
regulation strategies in their repertoires, however it could be argued that most 
empirical studies have oversimplified this model by assuming that individuals use 
only one strategy during the regulatory process. Aldao and Nolen-Hoeksema 
(2013) aimed to address this issue by examining the extent to which individuals 
engage in spontaneous regulation and whether this type of regulation embodies 
one strategy or multiple emotion regulation strategies. Online participants viewed 
disgust-eliciting film clips and were asked retrospectively the extent to which they 
used a series of emotion regulation strategies to manage their affect. The findings 
showed that 87% of the participants spontaneously engaged in some form of 
regulatory strategy, with acceptance (i.e. allowing or accepting current feelings) 
being the most popular strategy, followed by reappraisal, suppression and 
distraction. Of these participants, 65% reported using two or more regulation 
strategies over the course of the film clip, suggesting that most people tend to use 
more than one strategy. However the forced-choice strategy option utilised by this 
study is not fully representative of the dynamic process of emotion regulation. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis aims to explore this further by investigating the ease with 
which instructed strategies are implemented and which strategies, if unable to 
implement the instructed one, people use instead.  
 
Explicit and implicit forms of emotion regulation are often framed as 
separate processes along a continuum of regulation. However evidence 
increasingly suggests that such a distinction may be too simplistic. Some 
researchers believe that the boundaries between explicit and implicit emotion 
regulation are porous, for example Gyurak et al. (2011) suggested that implicit 
emotion regulation might sometimes stem from the habitual use of specific 
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explicit strategies. For example, explicitly reminding oneself that an angry 
colleague had a bad day may over time lead to the same reappraisal process 
occurring implicitly, without awareness. The habitual use of reappraisal to down-
regulate emotions has been shown to be beneficial both behaviourally and in 
terms of physiological responding.   
 
However, sometimes for certain individuals, reappraisal and indeed 
several other strategies can be ineffective at down-regulating emotions. Therefore 
investigating individual differences in emotion regulation is important to 
understand why regulatory processes can sometimes fail. The following section 
discusses the role of individual differences in emotion regulation, particularly the 
individual differences that will be examined throughout this thesis.   
 
1.5 A role for individual differences in emotion regulation 
Individual differences play a significant role in how emotion is regulated. 
There are several points in the emotion regulation process that vary in efficacy as 
a result of certain individual differences. For example, taking Sheppes et al.’s 
(2015) Extended Process Model, during the Identification stage perception of the 
emotion can either be over-represented or underrepresented. Overrepresentation is 
often seen in attentional disengagement biases in anxiety disorders, specifically 
the delayed disengagement from threat (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007). This has been associated with limited 
ability to control attention and consequently overly representing threatening 
information. Overrepresentation is even apparent in more subtle individual 
differences. For example, young individuals at increased familial risk of 
depression, but with no personal history of depression, exhibited reduced 
responses in the left dlPFC when processing fearful faces, demonstrating 
abnormalities in the neural regulation of emotion (Mannie, Taylor, Harmer, 
Cowen, & Norbury, 2011). In contrast, underrepresentation of emotion can be 
seen in alexithymia, which is characterised by difficulty in identifying emotions, 
which can result in under-attending current emotional states (Sheppes et al., 
2015). As well as the identification of emotions, individual differences can also 
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impact the Selection stage of the regulatory process. For example, individuals 
with autism tend to be impaired in activating cognitive change-type emotion 
regulation strategies as they often involve adopting an alternative viewpoint and 
perspective taking, which are impaired in autism spectrum disorders (Gross, 
2014). Finally, the Implementation stage is also affected by certain individual 
differences. For example, research has found that recalling happy memories to 
regulate sad mood is impaired in depressed individuals (Joormann & Siemer, 
2004; Joormann, Siemer, & Gotlib, 2007). The same two studies also found that 
distraction via neutral thoughts was an equally effective strategy for depressed 
individuals and healthy controls. Therefore individual differences are extremely 
variable in the impact they have on the implementation of emotion regulation 
strategies. 
 
 I would argue that the role of individual differences needs to be taken into 
account more than is currently the case, given the varying ways they can influence 
regulatory processes. Consequently the current thesis focuses on three key 
modulating factors that are thought to influence emotion regulation, namely 
aggression, age (specifically adolescence) and awareness of bodily states 
(interoception). The following sections discuss each of these factors in relation to 
emotion regulation in detail, and highlight research gaps that will be addressed in 
the current thesis. 
 
1.5.1 Aggression 
The term aggression is typically defined as behaviour directed towards 
another individual where the immediate intention is to cause harm. The 
perpetrator must believe that they will cause harm and that the target is motivated 
to avoid the behaviour (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Motives 
for aggression have traditionally been divided into two: reactive and proactive. 
Reactive aggression generally refers to aggression that occurs as an angry 
response to a perceived provocation or threat (e.g., Berkowitz, 1993), whereas 
proactive aggression is a relatively non-emotional display of aggression that is 
unprovoked and is used for instrumental gain or dominance over others (Dodge & 
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Coie, 1987). Reactive aggression is thought to be associated with high affective-
physiological arousal and minimal cognitive processing (Chase, O’Leary, & 
Heyman, 2001). In contrast, proactive aggression entails forethought and 
planning, is associated with minimal autonomic arousal, and is often committed 
by those high in psychopathic traits (Blair, 2003). Earlier studies have shown that 
criminals identified as committing instrumental (proactive) offences scored higher 
on psychopathy measures compared to those with a history of reactive violence 
(Cornell et al., 1996; Dempster et al., 1996). Psychopathy will be discussed in 
more detail in section 1.5.1.2. Many people engage in both types of aggression, 
leading to the view of reactive and proactive aggression as (often correlating) 
dimensions rather than distinct categories (Poulin & Boivin, 2000). The following 
sections will summarise the literature on reactive aggression and the different 
facets of psychopathic traits, which consist of reactive and proactive forms of 
aggression, and their associations with emotional reactivity and regulation. 
 
1.5.1.1 Reactive aggression  
Studies investigating the effects of aggression on implicit emotion 
regulation have predominantly measured ‘trait anger’, which has been found to be 
a reliable predictor of reactive aggression (Bettencourt, Talley, Benjamin, & 
Valentine, 2006) and has strong conceptual overlaps with reactive aggression 
(Wilkowski & Robinson, 2010). Several studies have suggested that individuals 
high in trait anger have difficulty disengaging attention from hostile stimuli and 
thus are poor at implicitly regulating their emotions. For example, using a variant 
of the emotional Stroop task, individuals higher in trait anger are slower at colour-
naming when the stimulus involves angry facial expressions (van Honk, Tuiten, 
de Haan, vann de Hout, & Stam, 2001). This attentional bias has also been found 
for words relating to aggression, demonstrating specificity for aggression-related 
stimuli. Smith and Waterman (2005) found that verbal aggression predicted 
colour-naming bias for indirect aggression words (e.g., gossip, bitch), and that 
anger predicted bias for direct aggression words (e.g., slap, punch). Self-reported 
use of physical aggression, a key component of reactive aggression, was the best 
predictor for both sets of words (Smith & Waterman, 2005). Criminal convictions 
Chapter 1 
	
	
	
34 
for violent offending (Smith & Waterman, 2003) and previous self-reported 
aggressive experience (Smith & Waterman, 2004) have also significantly 
predicted attentional biases to stimuli that are either threatening or aggressively 
themed. This is further supported by studies using spatial cueing tasks, for 
example Wilkowski, Robinson and Meier (2006) found that individuals with 
greater tendencies toward anger were slower to disengage attention from hostile 
words (e.g., shoot, hit, stab, kill, kick). A problem with using aggressive words, 
however, is that participants can attribute either positive or negative valence to the 
words. For example, the word ‘hit’ can capture the attention of a sadist because 
they gain pleasure from the act rather than being threatened by it. Consequently it 
is difﬁcult to identify the valence of this attentional capture. Nonetheless, the 
findings of these studies suggest that individuals high in reactive forms of 
aggression have difficulty disengaging attention from anger-related stimuli, 
suggesting a reduced ability to regulate anger-specific implicit emotional 
responses and biases. 
 
 Neurally, individuals characterised by excessive bursts of anger and 
reactive aggression demonstrated exaggerated amygdala reactivity and diminished 
OFC activation to faces expressing anger relative to non-aggressive control 
participants (Coccaro, McCloskey, Fitzgerald & Phan, 2007). Additionally 
Coccaro et al. (2007) found that while control participants showed an inverse 
relation between amygdala and OFC response to angry faces, this association was 
not apparent in reactively aggressive participants. These findings suggest that 
dysfunction in frontal-limbic networks are implicated in the poor emotion 
regulation abilities of those characterised by aggression. Human and animal 
studies indicate that the amygdala is part of the neural circuitry that modulates 
reactive aggressive behaviour (Blair, 2004). For example animal models reveal 
that electrical stimulation of the medial amygdala can potentiate reactive 
aggression (Siegel, Bhatt, Bhatt, & Zalcman, 2007). Other studies have also 
implicated relative amygdala hyper-activity in reactive aggression but not 
proactive forms of aggression (Sebastian et al., 2014; Viding et al., 2012; Blair, 
2010). Proactive forms of aggression, such as those commonly exhibited in 
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individuals high in psychopathic traits, will be discussed in detail in section 
1.5.1.2.  
 
 Surprisingly, research exploring the effects of reactive aggression on 
explicit forms of emotion regulation is scarce. In older child and adolescent 
studies (aged 10 to 17) reactive aggression has been associated with low 
frustration tolerance and poorly regulated emotion and anger to perceived 
provocation (Marsee & Frick, 2007; Vitaro, Brendgen, & Tremblay, 2002). Using 
self-report questionnaires, Sullivan, Helms, Kliewer and Goodman (2010) found 
that 13-year olds’ difficulty regulating anger was associated with increased 
physical aggression. Moreover in a longitudinal study, it was found that reactive 
aggression in childhood and early adolescence (aged 9 to 12) was uniquely 
associated with negative emotionality, specifically anxiety, in adulthood (Fite, 
Raine, Stouthamer-Loeber, Loeber, & Pardini, 2010). In contrast, proactive 
aggression was uniquely associated with measures of adult psychopathic features 
and antisocial behaviour in adulthood. Similarly other longitudinal studies have 
found that emotion dysregulation in childhood and adolescence is predictive of 
later aggressive behaviour (Roll, Koglin, & Petermann, 2012). These longitudinal 
studies provide useful evidence concerning the causal and potentially bidirectional 
relationships between aggression and emotion regulation. 
 
In adult samples, questionnaire studies have found that less adaptive 
emotion regulation strategies, such as blaming others, rumination and 
catastrophising are positively associated with trait anger, anger arousal and anger-
eliciting situations (Besharat, Nia, & Farahani, 2013; Martin & Dahlen, 2005). 
Rumination in particular has been found to increase the internal experience of 
anger (Bushman, 2002) and aggression (Borders, Earleywine, & Jajodia, 2010). 
Relatedly, in a recent study by Roberton, Daffern and Bucks (2014) maladaptive 
emotion regulation, which was operationalised as a lack of emotional awareness 
and difficulty refraining from impulsive reactions, significantly predicted lifetime 
history of violence in an offender sample. Some studies have also looked at the 
role of emotion regulation in more specific types of aggression. For example, 
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Gratz and Roemer (2004) found that frequency of intimate partner abuse was 
positively correlated with difficulties inhibiting impulsive behaviours and 
engaging in goal-directed behaviours when distressed, as well as limited access to 
emotion regulation strategies in a sample of undergraduate students. Parallel 
effects were also found in a sample of violent offenders attending intervention 
programs; those who reported more difficulties with emotion regulation had more 
frequent perpetration of abusive behaviour towards their partner (Tager, Good, & 
Brammer, 2010). Overall these findings suggest that those characterised by 
reactive aggressive behaviours tend to have difficulty regulating their emotions 
using explicit strategies, or use maladaptive strategies, such as rumination. 
 
Studies using experimental tasks have also found evidence for poor 
emotion regulation in those high in reactive aggression. For example, with an 
undergraduate sample, Cohn, Jakupcak, Seibert, Hildebrandt and Zeichner (2010) 
used the Response Choice Aggression Paradigm (Zeichner, Frey, Parrott, & 
Butryn, 1999), a competitive reaction time task where electric shocks are received 
from and administered to a ﬁctitious opponent. They found that self-reported 
emotion dysregulation, particularly low emotional awareness and inability to 
tolerate emotional experiences, was associated with reactive aggression, as 
measured by the average intensity of shocks delivered.  
 
There have also been studies experimentally manipulating aggression 
using anger provocation tasks. For example, Gerin, Davidson, Christenfeld, Goyal 
and Schwartz (2006) found that self-reported ruminative tendencies predicted 
delayed recovery from an anger induction (recalling an anger-provoking event), 
indicated by prolonged levels of cardiovascular (blood pressure and heart rate) 
arousal following the induction. These results suggest that tendencies to use 
maladaptive emotion regulation strategies can predict objective measures of 
prolonged tendencies toward anger and reactive aggression. A few studies have 
also investigated more specific adaptive and maladaptive emotion regulation 
strategies in relation to aggression. Mauss, Cook, Cheng and Gross (2007) used a 
lab-based anger-provocation task in which participants received critical and 
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negative evaluation during a difficult counting task. They found that participants 
who reported using reappraisal more often in everyday life experienced 
significantly less anger and negative emotions, and demonstrated more adaptive 
cardiovascular responses in comparison to low reappraisers. Similarly, 
Memedovic, Grisham, Denson and Moulds (2010) conducted a lab-based 
provocation task in which participants were insulted by a fictitious participant and 
found that reappraisal use was associated with reduced self-reported anger and 
blood pressure, even when controlling for negative emotionality (i.e. depression, 
anxiety and stress), whereas suppression use was not. Therefore these studies 
demonstrate that those who use more adaptive emotion regulation strategies in 
day-to-day life, such as reappraisal, are more adept at down-regulating and 
controlling their anger, at subjective and objective levels. 
 
The studies mentioned above, however, assessed reappraisal using 
questionnaire measures. In the first study to examine the differential effects of 
instructed reappraisal on anger, Szasz, Szentagotai and Hofmann (2011) 
instructed participants to recall a recent anger-provoking situation and directed 
them to use reappraisal, emotional suppression or acceptance in response to 
emotions elicited by the recollection. They found that participants instructed to 
use reappraisal were more effective at reducing subjective anger relative to 
participants in the suppression and acceptance conditions. Additionally, those in 
the reappraisal condition persisted longer with a computerised frustration-
inducing task than those in the remaining two conditions, suggesting that they 
were better able at regulating their frustration. Likewise, using a similar anger-
provoking method, Denson, Moulds and Grisham (2012) found that while 
instructed rumination maintained anger, reappraisal and distraction were both 
effective at significantly reducing self-reported anger. The authors concluded that 
reappraisal facilitates adaptive processing of anger-inducing recollections, whilst 
distraction facilitates rapid reductions in anger experience. Taken together these 
findings suggest that instructed reappraisal is effective at regulating anger. 
However, a limitation of these studies is that they average across individual 
differences, rather than explicitly taking them into account. For example, neither 
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study measured participants’ levels of reactive aggression to see whether this 
would have an influence on: a) how likely they are to be provoked, and b) how 
effective they are at implementing the strategy. 
 
Germain and Kangas (2015) employed the same anger-provoking 
recollection task as Szasz et al. (2011) and Denson et al. (2012), but only 
examined participants scoring high on trait anger. Unexpectedly both reappraisal 
and suppression reduced self-reported anger and systolic blood pressure, while 
participants in the acceptance group did not experience such reductions. While the 
findings suggest that reappraisal and suppression are effective strategies for 
down-regulating the affective and physiological consequences of anger for 
individuals with elevated levels of trait anger in the short-term, a low trait anger 
comparison group was not included in the study. Consequently it is not possible to 
examine whether those high in trait anger are more or less effective at 
implementing these strategies relative to those low in trait anger.  
 
So far the studies discussed in this section have demonstrated a correlation 
between reactive aggression and both implicit and explicit emotion regulation. 
There is also some evidence of causality in both directions, with bidirectional 
relationships being reported where high levels of reactive aggression cause poor 
emotion regulation abilities, and poor emotion regulation causes reactive 
aggressive behaviour (e.g. Besharat et al., 2013; Cohn et al., 2010; Gerin et al., 
2006; Robertson et al., 2014; Roll et al., 2012). Given the lack of research on 
whether the efficacy of instructed reappraisal varies with levels of reactive 
aggression, Chapters 4 – 6 of the present thesis aim to address this by using 
experimental tasks to assess different forms of reappraisal and whether their 
efficacy varies with individual differences in aggression across the full continuum 
seen in the general population. As well as reactive aggression, there is a growing 
literature suggesting that proactive forms of aggression, such as psychopathic 
traits, also influence emotion regulation abilities. The following section 
summarises some of the research published on this subtype of aggression.  
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1.5.1.2 Psychopathic traits 
Psychopathy is typically categorised into two separate facets involving 
aﬀective-interpersonal and behavioural components (Frick, O’Brien, Wootton, & 
McBurnett, 1994; Hare, 2003; Harpur, Hare, & Hakstian, 1989). The aﬀective-
interpersonal dimension of psychopathy includes traits such as shallow affect, 
deceptiveness, lack of guilt and empathy, whereas the lifestyle-antisocial facet 
includes a predisposition towards antisocial behaviour, impulsivity, 
irresponsibility and criminal versatility (Hare, 2003; Hare & Neumann, 2008). 
There is evidence to suggest that the two dimensions of psychopathy are 
differentially related to emotional reactivity. The affective-interpersonal 
dimension has been found to be negatively correlated with negative emotional 
reactivity; individuals high on this dimension appear to experience negative 
emotions as less aversive than those scoring low on this dimension. On the other 
hand, the lifestyle-antisocial dimension has been found to be positively associated 
with negative emotional reactivity; similar to reactive aggression, those high in 
this dimension are particularly sensitive to negative emotions and experience them 
as more aversive than others with lower reactivity (Hicks & Patrick, 2006).  
 
Neuroimaging work has contributed to our understanding of emotional 
deficits associated with psychopathy. Amygdala reactivity has been found to be 
reduced in individuals with psychopathy during a range of affective tasks, such as 
aversive conditioning tasks (Birbaumer et al., 2005; Veit et al., 2002) and during 
emotional memory tasks (Kiehl et al., 2001). Adults with psychopathy have also 
been found to show poor performance in recognition of and automatic responding 
to fearful and sad facial and vocal expressions and in tasks that require reversal 
learning (Blair et al., 2002; Blair et al., 2004; Blair, Colledge, & Mitchell, 2001; 
Blair, Monson, & Frederickson, 2001).  Emotion recognition is thought to involve 
the amygdala and reversal learning is thought to involve the ventrolateral/ 
orbitofrontal cortex, suggesting that a network including amygdala and 
ventrolateral/ orbitofrontal cortex is compromised in psychopathy (Blair, 
Mitchell, & Blair, 2005). Moreover, studies have shown that psychopaths, 
compared to non-psychopaths, show increased lateral and superior prefrontal 
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activity (Gordon, Baird, & End, 2004; Kiehl et al., 2001; Müller et al., 2003) and 
diminished limbic activity (Birbaumer et al., 2005; Gordon et al., 2004; Kiehl et 
al., 2001) to emotional stimuli, including unpleasant words or facial expressions, 
suggesting blunted reactivity and/or increased emotional control under certain 
conditions. 
 
To explain these differences between psychopaths and non-psychopaths, 
two theoretical accounts have been posited. One account suggests that 
psychopathy can be explained in terms of a general information processing deficit 
(Hiatt & Newman, 2006; Newman & Lorenz, 2003), whereas the other postulates 
a specific emotional deficit (Blair & Mitchell, 2009; Blair et al., 2005; Frick & 
Viding, 2009; Kiehl, 2006; Lykken, 1995; Patrick, 1994). According to the 
Response Modulation Theory (Newman & Lorenz, 2003), individuals high in 
psychopathic traits have difficulty shifting attention from goal-relevant 
information in order to monitor and potentially use other important information. 
Specifically, they have a deficit in shifting attention to salient, bottom-up cues, 
especially when the cues are not relevant to the present task.  While this model 
has been influential in the field, several experimental findings have failed to 
support its theory. For example, studies using Stroop paradigms have shown that 
individuals with psychopathy seem to be sensitive to task irrelevant information 
(Blair et al., 2006; Dvorak-Bertsch, Curtin, Rubinstein, & Newman, 2007; Hiatt, 
Schmitt, & Newman, 2004). Further, one of the main limitations of the Response 
Modulation theory is that it does not account for some of the specific affective 
processing deficits commonly seen in psychopathy, such as a difficulty processing 
some emotions (e.g. fear) but not others. 
 
Indeed, in one of the first studies to investigate expression recognition in 
adult psychopathic individuals, Blair et al. (2004) found that relative to a 
comparison group, the psychopathic group showed greater impairment in their 
expression recognition scores for fearful expressions. However, there were no 
differences in the recognition of happy, surprised, disgusted, angry or sad 
expressions suggesting that psychopathic individuals are impaired in the 
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processing of fear-related stimuli. The strongest evidence for this fear deficit 
comes from studies that assess emotion-modulated startle using the picture-
viewing paradigm. While viewing unpleasant pictures, non-psychopathic 
individuals display startle potentiation to noise probes and, in contrast, startle 
inhibition while viewing pleasant pictures. However, the startle potentiation to 
unpleasant pictures appears to be absent or reduced in psychopathic participants 
(Levenston, Patrick, Bradley, & Lang, 2000; Patrick, Bradley, & Lang, 1993; 
Patrick, 1994; Veit et al., 2013). This effect is particularly evident in individuals 
high on the affective-interpersonal dimension of psychopathy (Patrick, 1994; 
Vaidyanathan, Hall, Patrick, & Bernat, 2011). Such findings are generally 
interpreted as evidence that psychopathic individuals have a fundamental fear 
deficit that undermines their reaction to threatening or unpleasant images in an 
experimental context (Lykken, 1995; Patrick, 1994) as well as their sensitivity to 
the affect of other individuals, yielding a callous and aggressive interpersonal 
style (Patrick, 2007). 
 
As well as individual differences in psychopathic traits being associated 
with differences in the processing of emotional stimuli, there is also some 
evidence suggesting that those high in psychopathic traits tend to perform better at 
implicit emotion regulation tasks, often showing reduced automatic orienting of 
attention to task-irrelevant stimuli. In one of the few studies to date, Mitchell, 
Richell, Leonard and Blair (2006) presented adult participants with a very rapid 
stream of images among which was a target image that had to be responded to. 
The authors found that while presenting an emotional image either before or after 
the target image interfered with performance in non-psychopathic individuals, 
those with psychopathy were unaffected. In an event-related potential (ERP) 
study, Verona, Sprague, and Sadeh (2012) used a Go/No-Go task consisting of 
affective words and found reduced reactivity in psychopathic offenders to 
negative words, independent of whether a response was required (Go trials), or a 
response needed to be inhibited (NoGo trials), relative to criminals with antisocial 
personality disorder (ASPD) and to a criminal control group (i.e. without 
psychopathy or ASPD). In contrast, the ASPD group showed greater processing 
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of negative emotional versus neutral words regardless of trial type. These findings 
suggest that psychopathic individuals are less sensitive to emotional contexts, 
enabling them to ignore emotional distractors when performing inhibitory control 
tasks. On the other hand, individuals characterised by antisocial and more reactive 
forms of aggression are unable to suppress negative emotional processing and are 
therefore poorer at implicitly regulating their emotional reactivity (e.g. van Honk 
et al., 2001; Verona et al., 2012; Wilkowski et al., 2006).  
 
Research has shown that psychopathic traits occur on a continuum, are 
continuously distributed throughout the population (Paulhus, Neumann, & Hare, 
in press), and that emotional processing varies with levels of these traits (e.g. 
Seara-Cardoso, Neumann, Roiser, McCrory, & Viding, 2012). However, few 
studies have investigated whether bottom-up attentional emotional processing 
varies continuously with these traits in an adult community sample. One study 
found electroencephalography (EEG) evidence showing decreased emotional 
capture in those with high levels of psychopathic traits relative to those with low 
psychopathic traits, however no behavioural differences were found (Carolan, 
Jaspers-Fayer, Asmaro, Douglas, & Liotti, 2014; see section 2.1 for more detail). 
Thus it is unclear whether behavioural effects reported with individuals sampled 
from the extreme end of the continuum extend continuously throughout the 
population. Chapter 2 aims to address this by looking at whether the ability to 
implicitly regulate bottom-up attentional processing of emotion varies with 
psychopathic traits in a general non-pathological sample. 
 
Very few studies have investigated individual differences in psychopathic 
traits in the general population in relation to explicit emotion regulation. In one 
neuroimaging study, Harenski, Kim and Hamann (2009) looked at regional brain 
activation, both during passive viewing of unpleasant pictures and during active 
down-regulation of emotional responses to unpleasant pictures. They found that 
individuals who scored high in the affective-interpersonal dimension of 
psychopathy showed reduced amygdala activation during passive viewing of 
unpleasant pictures relative to those low in psychopathy. During emotion 
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regulation, there was a positive correlation between total and affective-
interpersonal psychopathic traits and vlPFC activity, indicating that psychopathic 
traits are associated with increased prefrontal activity during emotion regulation. 
One interpretation is that individuals higher in psychopathic traits are more easily 
able to regulate emotional responses to unpleasant stimuli, relative to those lower 
in psychopathic traits, possibly because their initial emotional response is already 
reduced. 
 
A critique of many of the studies in this section is that they rarely account 
for other individual differences that are often highly correlated with both reactive 
and proactive aggression, one of which is anxiety (Ali, Amorim, & Chamorro-
Premuzic, 2009). Similar to aggression, anxiety is also characterised by 
heightened emotional reactivity and difficulty disengaging from threatening cues 
(Fox, 2002; Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2005), consequently it is 
important to take anxiety into account when investigating the relationship 
between aggression and emotion regulation.  
 
1.5.1.3 A note on aggression and anxiety 
Although this thesis is mainly concerned with how the different subtypes 
of aggression modulate emotional reactivity and regulation, evidence suggests 
that there are underlying similarities in the behavioural manifestations and the 
neural underpinnings of anxiety and (particularly reactive) aggression. Like 
reactive aggression and antisocial behaviour, anxiety is also characterised by high 
emotional reactivity (Richards, Benson, Donnelly, & Hadwin, 2014) and several 
previous studies have highlighted that failures in the ability to down-regulate 
negative emotions are the core substrate of anxiety disorders (Cloitre, Koenen, 
Cohen, & Han, 2002; Mennin et al., 2005). Thus, it is important to try to establish 
whether findings relating aggression and poor emotion regulation reflect unique 
mechanisms specific to aggression, or shared substrates between aggression and 
anxiety. 
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Research has considered that trait anxiety may moderate the relationship 
between aggression and threat-related amygdala reactivity. Using a face-
processing task displaying angry and fearful faces, Carré, Fisher, Manuck and 
Hariri (2012) found that trait anger was positively correlated with bilateral dorsal 
amygdala reactivity to angry facial expressions, but only among men with high 
trait anxiety. These findings add to the growing body of evidence indicating that 
variability in aggression and anxiety in non-clinical samples contribute to 
individual differences in threat-related amygdala reactivity. 
 
In terms of psychopathy, two variants characterised by anxiety have been 
posited. Compared to "primary" psychopaths, "secondary" psychopaths have been 
characterised as being more anxious, fearful, impulsive, and with more reactive 
anger and aggression (Skeem, Polaschek, Patrick, & Lilienfeld, 2011). Individuals 
with psychopathic traits who are high and low on measures of anxiety seem to 
show differences in their emotional and cognitive processing. For example, 
studies have shown that only low-anxious (primary) psychopaths show deficits in 
passive avoidance learning (Arnett, Smith, & Newman, 1997; Newman & 
Schmitt, 1998), modulation of responses to emotional and neutral stimuli (Hiatt, 
Lorenz, & Newman, 2002; Lorenz & Newman, 2002), and fear-potentiated startle 
response (Sutton, Vitale, & Newman, 2002). High-anxious (secondary) 
psychopaths do not show these etiological markers. Using a picture version of the 
dot-probe task, Kimonis, Frick, Cauffman, Goldweber and Skeem (2012) found 
that adolescent offenders who were characterised as primary low-anxious 
psychopaths were not attentionally engaged by stimuli depicting distress in others, 
whereas those characterised as high-anxious psychopaths were more attentive to 
stimuli depicting distressing emotional content.  
 
Given that several aspects of aggression and anxiety are related to each 
other, anxiety will also assessed alongside aggression across the implicit and 
explicit emotion regulation experiments in the thesis, and will be used as a control 
variable where appropriate. 
 
Chapter 1 
	
	
	
45 
Aggression and emotion regulation are the key themes running throughout 
the current thesis. However, in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively, two important 
modulators of both emotion regulation ability and aggression will also be 
investigated, namely interoceptive awareness and age, specifically adolescence. 
These will be introduced in the following sections.  
 
1.5.2 Interoceptive awareness  
Theories of emotion suggest that a prerequisite of successful emotion 
regulation is the awareness of one’s emotional state (Craig, 2004; Damasio, 1994; 
James, 1884). According to Damasio (1999), conscious awareness of emotion is 
related to upgrades in the self-representational maps emerging from the feedback 
of bodily states. In line with this, Barrett’s Constructed Theory of Emotion 
suggests that the brain uses bodily feedback to categorise and predict instances of 
emotion (Barrett, 2017). Interoception has been defined as “sense of the 
physiological condition of the entire body” (Craig, 2002, p.655), and it has been 
suggested that individual differences in emotional awareness are related to 
differences in the capacity for interoceptive feelings (Craig, 2004, 2009). Indeed, 
in a student sample, interoceptive awareness was found to be inversely associated 
with alexithymia, which is characterised by impairments in emotional awareness 
(Herbert, Herbert, & Pollatos, 2011). This awareness of one’s internal bodily 
signals has been postulated by Füstös, Gramann, Herbert and Pollatos (2013) and 
others (e.g. Craig, 2004; Damasio, 1994), to facilitate the regulation of emotional 
responses as the ability to detect bodily responses more accurately may in turn aid 
in the discrimination of emotional states and therefore aid the deployment of 
appropriate strategies to regulate these emotional states.   
 
Indeed there are several studies demonstrating that those higher in 
emotional awareness are better able to regulate their emotions in an adaptive 
manner. For example, Gohm and Clore (2002) found that greater emotional clarity 
(i.e. identifying and distinguishing specific emotions) was associated with 
adaptive forms of emotion regulation, such as positive reinterpretation, which 
involves construing a stressor in positive terms, and active coping (i.e. actively 
Chapter 1 
	
	
	
46 
trying to remove or avoid the stressor or to ameliorate its effects). Additionally in 
an experimental study, individuals high in emotional clarity were better able at 
implicitly down-regulating the influence of aggressive word primes (Wilkowski & 
Robinson, 2008). This suggests that those with higher awareness of their emotions 
may be more capable at detecting when early precursors to negative emotions, 
such as anger, start to escalate into more extreme forms of emotion, and 
consequently initiate emotion regulation operations at an early stage before strong 
emotional arousal is elicited. Further to this, emotional awareness has been found 
to be associated with attenuated arousal at the neural level. Herwig, Kaffenberger, 
Jäncke and Brühl (2010) found that when participants were asked to be aware of 
their current emotions and bodily feelings, amygdala activity significantly 
decreased in comparison to awaiting a photo (neutral condition) or thinking about 
personal goals. Therefore making oneself aware about one's own emotions can 
attenuate emotional arousal as it may lead to an inner distancing from the 
affective feelings in question.  
 
These studies demonstrate that emotional awareness is positively 
associated with adaptive emotion regulation and a reduction of emotional arousal. 
However, in these studies emotional awareness was measured explicitly, either by 
using subjective questionnaires or asking participants to be aware of their current 
emotions. Given that it has been predicted that individual differences in emotional 
awareness are directly related to differences in the capacity for interoceptive 
feelings (Craig, 2004, 2009), interoceptive awareness may provide a less 
subjective and more direct predictor of emotional awareness. The most commonly 
used method to assess interoceptive awareness is the ability to perceive one’s 
heartbeats accurately (Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman, & Dolan, 2004; Dunn, 
Dalgleish, Ogilvie, & Lawrence, 2007). This ability is quantified by using 
heartbeat perception tasks (Schandry, 1981; Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jiménez, & 
Costantini, 2011), in which participants are instructed to perceive their own 
heartbeats without feeling for their pulse (see section 1.6.1 for more detail). Using 
this heartbeat perception task, Werner, Kerschreiter, Kindermann and Duschek 
(2013) investigated whether interoceptive awareness moderates the effects of 
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social exclusion, which reliably induces a range of negative affective responses 
(e.g. Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000). In their study participants took part in a 
discussion round, and then after a certain time were excluded from the discussion. 
Participants with high interoceptive awareness (i.e. those who were more accurate 
in counting their heartbeats) indicated a smaller increase of negative affect and 
perceived rejection when comparing an inclusion phase with a subsequent 
exclusion phase than did participants with low interoceptive awareness. Werner et 
al. (2013) suggested that physiological signals are more easily accessible for 
individuals high in interceptive awareness and therefore they are better able to 
regulate negative affect in stressful situations by using this somatic information 
for self-regulation. However, this causal hypothesis cannot be conclusively 
confirmed as the study was correlational. 
 
In an EEG study, Füstös et al. (2013) used a more explicit emotion 
regulation task in which participants were presented with negative pictures. They 
found that interoceptive awareness, measured using the heartbeat perception task 
as mentioned above, was positively correlated with the down-regulation of 
subjective negative affect when using reappraisal. This was accompanied by a 
reduction of electrophysiological responses (P3 and slow-wave amplitudes), with 
the difference in potentials between the reappraisal and no regulation conditions 
being positively correlated with interoceptive awareness. The findings of Füstös et 
al. (2013) show that a more accurate perception of interoceptive signals associated 
with emotional reactions to affective stimuli seems to facilitate effective emotion 
regulation, both behaviourally and physiologically.  
 
 Taken together, these findings suggest that interoceptive awareness is 
associated with emotion regulation abilities. However, as discussed above (see 
section 1.4) and throughout the thesis, there are a whole host of different types of 
emotion regulation strategies and it is unknown whether interoceptive awareness 
is equally important for all types of emotion regulation. In Chapter 4 evidence is 
presented suggesting that interoceptive awareness may be more strongly related to 
certain sub-strategies within the broad definition of reappraisal than others.  
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Finally, a key modulating factor that has been investigated in relation to 
emotion regulation over the past couple of decades is age, particularly 
development over the period of adolescence. Adolescence is often characterised 
by heightened emotional reactivity and is also a time of increasing vulnerability to 
internalising and externalising psychopathologies associated with poor emotion 
regulation, including depression, anxiety and antisocial behavior (Ahmed, 
Bittencourt-Hewitt, & Sebastian, 2015). It is therefore of particular interest to 
understand how emotion regulation develops over this time, and whether age and 
aggression may interact to influence emotion regulation success. 
 
1.5.3 Adolescence 
There is a growing literature to suggest that the structural and functional 
development of brain regions subserving emotion regulation is relatively 
protracted over the lifespan (Paus, Keshavan, & Giedd, 2008), and thus it is 
crucial to examine how emotion regulation abilities may consequently develop 
and change with age. The period of adolescence is of particular interest and will 
be the focus of Chapter 5 for several reasons. Adolescence begins at the onset of 
puberty, roughly spanning the ages of 10 to 19 (Sawyer et al., 2012) and is 
characterised by an increasing incidence of internalising and externalising 
symptoms and emotional volatility (Lee et al., 2014; Paus et al., 2008; Spear, 
2000). Developmentally, this period is associated with significant biological and 
physical changes, a growing need for independence, academic and employment 
pressures and fluctuating social relationships (Casey, Duhoux, & Cohen, 2010). 
These challenges are often accompanied by increased emotional reactivity and 
stress. Cognitively, high-level executive and social processes needed for emotion 
regulation, including working memory, inhibitory control, abstract thought, 
decision making and perspective taking, all undergo development during 
adolescence (e.g. Blakemore & Robbins, 2012; Dumontheil, 2014;  Sebastian, 
Viding, Williams, & Blakemore, 2010; Somerville & Casey, 2010). Development 
of these cognitive processes appears to be underpinned by structural and 
functional development at the neural level, particularly in the protracted 
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development of parts of prefrontal cortex and the remodelling of connections 
between prefrontal and limbic regions.  
 
Adolescence emerges as a critical phase of reorganisation of regulatory 
systems and neural development in brain regions underpinning emotional 
processing. Grey matter volume gradually declines during adolescence (Giedd et 
al., 1999), particularly the PFC (Shaw et al., 2008). Subcortical emotion-
processing structures, such as the amygdala, however, have been found to 
substantially increase in volume between the ages of 7.5 and 18.5 years 
(Schumann et al., 2004). One prominent set of theories posits a ‘developmental 
mismatch’, such that during adolescence the development of prefrontal regions 
lags behind that of the limbic structures such as the amygdala and ventral 
striatum, (e.g. Casey, Jones, & Hare, 2008; Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure, & Pine, 
2005). At the same time, connectivity between brain regions involved in emotion 
regulation is still developing (Gee et al., 2013). As a result, during the time lag in 
functional maturity between prefrontal and limbic regions, adolescents are less 
effective at regulating their own emotions. 
 
Behavioural and neuroimaging studies have supported this notion with 
implicit emotion processing showing differences across development, particularly 
during adolescence.  For example a recent behavioural study showed that younger 
adolescents (aged 11-12 years), but not older adolescents (aged 17-18 years) 
exhibit more difficulties with attentional disengagement in the presence of 
emotional faces on a go/no-go task indicated by longer reactions times (Cohen 
Kadosh, Heathcote, & Lau, 2014). Also using a go/no-go task, Hare et al. (2008) 
found that children (aged 7–12) and adolescents (aged 13–18) were slower than 
adults when responding to fearful target (‘go’) faces, implying that they were less 
efficient at overriding affective interference compared with adults, particularly 
when asked to override what might be considered a prepotent response to avoid 
(as opposed to approach) fearful faces. Neurally, adolescents showed exaggerated 
amygdala activity relative to both children and adults across target and non-target 
expressions (although this exaggerated response habituated with repeated 
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exposure to the stimuli), providing evidence of a non-linear developmental 
trajectory of amygdala response, possibly in line with ‘developmental mismatch’ 
accounts.  
 
Despite the abundance of implicit emotion regulation studies across 
adolescence (see Ahmed et al., 2015, for a review) there have been relatively 
fewer studies on explicit forms of emotion regulation. In a longitudinal study of 
1128 adolescents, Gullone, Hughes, King and Tonge (2010) found that self-
reported suppression use decreases between the ages of 9 and 15. Suppression is 
generally considered a maladaptive strategy, with reliance on this strategy 
associated with reduced ability to repair negative moods and decreased experience 
of positive affect (Gross & John, 2003). Therefore, this reduction in use in this 
age range makes theoretical sense, as individuals gain the experience and 
underlying executive and social skills to develop alternative strategies (John & 
Gross, 2004). By the same logic, we would predict that use of the more adaptive 
reappraisal strategy would increase over this time; however, evidence to date has 
been mixed. Contrary to predictions, Gullone et al. (2010) found an overall 
decrease in the self-reported use of this strategy in everyday life between the ages 
of 9 and 15. However, results using a lab-based reappraisal paradigm suggest 
development in the ability to successfully use reappraisal, at least when instructed 
to do so (Silvers et al., 2012). Participants aged 10–23 were instructed to ‘look’ at 
negative and neutral pictures and give their natural response, or ‘decrease’ 
negative pictures, i.e. use a reappraisal strategy (in this case distancing) as trained 
prior to the experiment. Regulation success was defined as percentage decrease in 
self-reported negative affect on ‘decrease’ trials relative to ‘look’ trials for 
negative stimuli, and was found to improve with age, following both linear and 
quadratic trends (Silvers et al., 2012). It is worth noting significant 
methodological differences between these two studies that could explain the 
discrepant findings, including different age ranges, sample sizes and 
operationalisations of reappraisal (frequency vs. success). Studies that combine 
self-reported and experimental measures of reappraisal use and success across the 
adolescent age range are therefore needed. While there is research on adults 
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investigating this, there are still many confounds involved, such as the different 
methods used and the timescales in which frequency and success are measured.  
 
Neuroimaging studies of reappraisal efficacy also suggest development 
may be protracted. In a study by McRae et al. (2012) participants aged 10–22 
years completed a reappraisal task similar to that reported by Silvers et al. (2012), 
whilst undergoing fMRI. A linear increase in cognitive reappraisal ability was 
found with age (in line with Silvers et al., 2012) and this was accompanied by a 
concomitant age-related increase in left vlPFC. As discussed above, this brain 
region has been implicated in cognitive control processes in both emotional and 
non-emotional contexts, and is also associated with cognitive reappraisal in adults 
(Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Ochsner & Gross, 2008). When participants were not 
specifically asked to reappraise (i.e. during an unregulated emotional response) 
adolescents (aged 14–17 years) showed less activation in brain areas associated 
with social cognition, such as medial prefrontal, posterior cingulate and temporal 
regions than did either children (aged 10–13 years) or emerging adults (aged 18–
22 years). However, these regions were activated to a greater extent during 
reappraisal (i.e. a regulated emotional response) in adolescents compared to the 
other age groups. The authors interpreted this as suggesting that adolescents may 
not automatically engage in these social cognitive processes during unregulated 
responding, but are able to do so when specifically instructed. 
 
As is the case for adult emotion regulation research, the majority of 
explicit emotion regulation studies in adolescents have focused on general 
strategies, such as reappraisal. In Chapter 5, I investigate the development of 
explicit emotion regulation in adolescence using a more specific strategy with 
both behavioural and physiological methods.  
 
So far this chapter has discussed the models used to delineate the 
processes involved in emotion regulation and the underlying neural mechanisms 
of these processes, as well implicit and explicit forms of emotion regulation. 
Furthermore, modulating factors, namely, aggression, interoceptive awareness and 
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age, have been discussed in relation to emotional reactivity and regulation. The 
next section describes some of the methodological approaches used throughout 
the thesis. Predominantly, standard quantitative behavioural psychological 
measures will be used, such as reaction time, error rates, questionnaires and Likert 
responses in both adults and adolescents. However, the more specialist techniques 
used will be discussed in more detail below, specifically interoceptive awareness, 
skin conductance and fMRI brain imaging.  
 
1.6 Methods used in the thesis  
While detailed methods are reported in each experimental chapter, there 
are a number of wider methodological issues concerning specialist techniques 
used in this thesis which will be discussed here.  
 
1.6.1 Interoceptive awareness  
The experimental study presented in Chapter 4 uses a variant on a classic 
behavioural reappraisal paradigm (e.g. Gross & Levenson, 1993; McRae et al., 
2010; Ochsner et al., 2002) but also explores how interoceptive awareness 
influences emotion regulation abilities. As mentioned in section 1.5.2, 
interoceptive awareness is often measured using heartbeat tracking tasks in which 
participants are asked to silently count, and later report, the number of heartbeats 
they feel within a given time interval (e.g., Schandry, 1981). Participants’ 
subjective reports are then are compared to their actual cardiac measurements to 
determine perception accuracy (see below for more details). This procedure is a 
widely-used method to assess interoceptive awareness (e.g., Herbert & Pollatos, 
2014; Ferri, Ardizzi, Ambrosecchia, & Gallese, 2013; Füstös et al., 2013; Koch & 
Pollatos, 2014; Michal et al., 2014; Penton, Thierry, & Davis, 2014; Pollatos et 
al., 2008; Pollatos, Füstös, & Critchley, 2012; Schaefer, Egloff, Gerlach, & 
Witthöft, 2014) and has high test-retest reliability (Mussgay, Klinkenberg, & 
Rüddel, 1999), therefore it is often considered to be stable trait variable 
(Cameron, 2001). 
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However this task has faced some criticism, with some suggesting that the 
number of heartbeats counted may be based on the rate at which individuals 
believe their hearts to be beating, rather than on the real-time processing of 
heartbeat sensations (Brener, Knapp, & Ring, 1995; Ring & Brener, 1996). 
Heartbeat tracking accuracy may also be influenced by individuals’ expectancies 
pertaining to how activities such as exercise can influence their heart rate (Ring, 
Brener, Knapp, & Mailloux, 2015). Thus, it has been argued that heartbeat 
tracking tasks may not be very sensitive in differentiating between individuals 
who are more accurate at perceiving heartbeat sensations and individuals who 
simply have accurate beliefs about their heart rate (Brener et al., 1995).  
 
It should be taken into account, however, that these criticisms are 
predominantly based on studies investigating the effects of heart rate feedback on 
heartbeat tracking accuracy. Heart rate feedback can influence heartbeat tracking 
accuracy by priming participants to count their heartbeats at a specific temporal 
frequency. If participants are given false feedback, they will update the temporal 
frequency with which they count their heartbeats at (i.e. slower or faster 
counting), leading to low heartbeat tracking accuracy. In contrast, if participants 
are given correct feedback, they are able to correctly update temporal frequency to 
closely match their heart rate and therefore show increased heartbeat tracking 
accuracy as the task progresses (as was observed in the above studies). As the aim 
of Chapter 4 is to assess how accurately participants perceive their own 
heartbeats, it is important that participants are not provided with feedback about 
their performance during the task so that they cannot update the temporal 
frequency they count at.  
 
As mentioned briefly above and in section 1.5.2, interoceptive awareness 
is measured using the Mental Tracking Method (Schandry, 1981), which is a 
standard method and has high test–retest reliability of 81% (Mussgay et al., 1999). 
This method is used in Chapter 4 using the POLAR RS800CX heart rate monitor 
(Polar Electro Oy, Kempele, Finland; sampling rate of 1000 Hz) to monitor actual 
(as opposed to estimated) heart rate. Signals are analysed by the Polar ProTrainer 
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5 software (version 5.40.172). The POLAR heart rate monitor has excellent 
construct validity and instrument reliability, measuring heart rate data on par with 
electrocardiogram recorded data (e.g., Kingsley, Lewis, & Marson, 2005; Nunan 
et al., 2008; Quintana, Heathers, & Kemp, 2012; Weippert et al., 2010). During 
the task, participants are instructed to place their wrists on the H3 POLAR heart 
rate sensor that is attached to the table in front of them and mentally count their 
heartbeats when they hear an audio tone signalling the start of the trial until they 
receive an identical tone signalling the end of the trial. The experiment in Chapter 
4 consisted of three trials of different time intervals; 25s, 45s and 60s, separated 
by 10s resting periods, presented in the same order across participants. Following 
each interval, participants are asked to verbally report the number of counted 
heartbeats. Throughout the heartbeat task, participants’ true heart rate is 
monitored with the sensor under their wrists. During the task, participants are not 
allowed to take their pulse or use any other strategy, and no information regarding 
the length of the individual time intervals or feedback regarding performance is 
given. Interoceptive awareness score is calculated as the difference between 
recorded heartbeats and counted heartbeats for each interval, which is then 
averaged (see section 4.2.3 for the equation used). 
 
1.6.2 Skin conductance  
Chapter 5 investigates the development of an explicit emotion regulation 
strategy across adolescence whilst measuring skin conductance. Skin conductance 
is a measure of electrodermal activity and a well-known method in the field of 
psychophysiology. When exposed to certain types of events or stimuli, the 
automatic nervous system signals sweat glands in the skin to produce sweat. This 
increase in sweat changes the skin’s moisture content, which ultimately affects 
how electrically conductive the skin is. This change in conductivity can be 
measured by applying a small electric current through the skin (Boucsein, 2012).  
Events or stimuli that are novel, intense or significant in nature typically elicit a 
sharp increase in skin conductivity (Picard & Scheirer, 2001). Importantly, 
individuals are normally incapable of controlling their levels of skin conductance, 
therefore changes in conductance are likely to arise from unconscious processes in 
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the brain and body (Gale, 1988). Furthermore skin conductance is not affected by 
the normal, at-rest functions of the body, thus it is one of the most valuable 
indicators of arousal within the autonomic nervous system (Braithwaite, Watson, 
Robert, & Mickey, 2013) and has been found to be a good index of emotional 
arousal (e.g., Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 2008; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, 
& Hamm, 1993).  Several explicit emotion regulation studies have demonstrated 
reduced skin conductance response patterns during regulation relative to control 
conditions (e.g., Feeser, Prehn, Kazzer, Mungee, & Bajbouj, 2014; Matejka et al., 
2013; Urry, van Reekum, Johnstone, & Davidson, 2009), making it a good 
accompaniment to ratings of subjective affect. 
 
There are a variety of ways in which skin conductance during 
experimental conditions of interest is quantified. Firstly a latency onset window 
needs to be defined to locate skin conductance responses (SCRs) that are viewed 
as being elicited directly from the stimuli of interest. A typical criterion is that the 
onset of an SCR has to be between 1 and 4 seconds after stimulus onset (Boucsein 
et al., 2012). One method of quantification is to use the frequency of discrete SCR 
peaks elicited within the latency period; however this can limit the analysis as 
SCRs of any ‘size’ are given equal weight in the analysis regardless of their 
amplitude (Bach, Friston, & Dolan, 2010). For instance, an individual with 
several SCR responses low in amplitude would be classed as having the same 
levels of skin conductance as an individual with the same number of SCR 
responses all high in amplitude. One way of attributing greater weight to ‘larger’ 
SCRs is by measuring amplitude instead of frequency. Using peak amplitude is 
perhaps the most commonly employed method and this is quantified by 
computing the difference between skin conductivity before the SCR onset and the 
skin conductivity at the peak of the SCR (Boucsein, 2012). As peak amplitude is 
the most widely used indicator of skin conductance (Figner & Murphy, 2011), and 
is also more commonly used in the emotion regulation literature (Feeser et al., 
2014; Kinner et al., 2017; Matejka et al., 2013; Urry et al., 2009), Chapter 5 of the 
current thesis employs this measure.  
 
Chapter 1 
	
	
	
56 
1.6.3 fMRI  
Finally, Chapter 6 utilises functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). 
fMRI is a non-invasive tool that has the capacity to demonstrate the entire 
network of brain areas engaged during a particular task (Logothetis, 2008). It 
records on a spatial resolution in the region of 1 to 6 millimeters, higher than any 
other non-invasive technique available for use with humans, and has a temporal 
resolution on the order of a few seconds. fMRI works by detecting changes in 
blood oxygenation and flow (the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal), 
and relies on the fact that cerebral blood flow and neuronal activation are coupled. 
When a brain region becomes more active, it requires more oxygen and as a result 
more oxygenated blood flows towards the active region. Therefore brain regions 
involved in certain cognitive functions can be inferred, as they are assumed to 
require the greatest increase in oxygen levels during task performance, relative to 
an appropriate control condition (see Huettel, Song, & McCarthy, 2014, for a 
comprehensive overview of fMRI).  
 
Conducting an fMRI study involves several key stages, each of which 
requires careful consideration. The first stage is designing the experimental 
paradigm. Conditions must be well matched in terms of psychological processes. 
For example, previous emotion regulation studies tend to contrast the reappraisal 
condition with a no-regulation condition (e.g. McRae et al., 2012; Ochsner et al., 
2002), however this does not control for the wealth of cognitive processes 
involved in reappraisal (e.g. selective attention, working memory, inhibitory 
control and updating goals; Ochsner et al., 2012). Ideally the task should be 
designed so that there is only one well-defined difference between the two 
conditions that are being compared, which will only ‘activate’ those brain regions 
responsible for the process of interest. Another key consideration is that 
regressors should be orthogonal (uncorrelated). If events of interest occur in close 
proximity, the corresponding regressors in the general linear model (GLM) will 
be highly correlated. If they are correlated, the variance attributable to an 
individual regressor may be confounded with another regressor. This may lead to 
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misinterpretations of activations in certain brain areas and a loss of statistical 
power (Poldrack, Mumford, & Nichols, 2011).  
 
Once the experimental design has been finalised, data must be collected. 
This entails selecting an appropriate sequence that is optimised to prevent dropout 
(i.e. signal loss and distortion caused by non-uniformities in the static magnetic 
field) in regions of interest. For emotion perception and regulation studies, regions 
of interest such as the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex can be susceptible to 
dropout. Guidelines such as those provided by Weiskopf, Hutton, Josephs and 
Deichmann (2006), can be followed to maximise the BOLD sensitivity of these 
areas. This includes choosing an appropriate slice tilt and phase-encoding polarity, 
helping to reduce BOLD sensitivity loss due to susceptibility-induced gradients in 
the phase-encoding direction.  
 
When the data has been collected it must then be analysed. The first stage 
of fMRI data analysis is the pre-processing of the data. During pre-processing, 
several image and signal processing techniques are applied to the raw MRI data to 
align and warp the data to a standard space so that data are comparable a) across 
time within an individual, and b) across individuals. Participant head movement 
during the experiment is a key problem, with even the slightest movement 
changing pixel intensity at the edges of the brain. Therefore the first step of pre-
processing is usually realignment, which involves aligning all images with the 
first image so that scans from each participant are aligned (Huettel et al., 2014). In 
addition to spatial realignment, temporal realignment is often required as well. 
Functional MRI volumes are normally acquired one slice at a time with the timing 
of the slice acquisition evenly spread over the repetition time (TR), which is 
usually a few seconds. In effect, there is a slight time difference between 
acquisition of the first and the last slice in the volume. Analysis of fMRI data 
assumes all slices are acquired at the same time, therefore without correction, the 
relative timing of the stimulus and response will not be matched and consequently 
the statistical model which is used to describe the data will fit with less than 
optimal accuracy. To compensate for the difference in acquisition time between 
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slices in a volume, slice timing correction is often applied during the pre-
processing stage. Slice timing correction temporally adjusts the voxel time series 
so that a common reference timing (often the first slice) exists for all voxels. 
During this step, the time-series of each voxel in a slice is shifted slightly forward 
or backward in time to temporally align data (Sladky et al., 2011). Another 
important issue for fMRI analysis is that across participants, brains differ in size 
and shape. Therefore spatial normalisation is a crucial step during pre-processing 
in order to perform group level analysis. Normalisation is typically performed by 
warping each brain to a standard template. As a result, one location in one 
participant’s brain scan corresponds to the same location in another participant's 
brain scan. As a final pre-processing step, the fMRI data are spatially smoothed. 
This involves averaging data points with neighbouring data points. The approach 
of spatial smoothing is commonly used in fMRI studies as it may improve inter-
participant registration and overcome potential limitations in the spatial 
normalisation step by blurring any remaining anatomical differences. Smoothing 
also decreases random noise in individual voxels and increases the signal-to-noise 
ratio within the region (Lindquist & Wager, 2008). The mentioned pre-processing 
steps are essential in making the statistical analysis of the fMRI data valid and 
improving the power of the subsequent analyses. There are many possible 
variations in terms of the pre-processing pipeline, but to maximise chances of 
replicability, a very standard pipeline will be used in Chapter 6 of the thesis. 
 
Statistical inference is the final stage in analysing an fMRI study. Chapter 
6 utilises the subtraction method, which involves subtracting the recorded neural 
response of one condition (e.g. control) from the other (e.g. experimental). 
Accordingly, this method relies on identifying conditions that are in minimal 
contrast with one another, where the minimal contrast corresponds to the 
cognitive process of interest. While the subtraction method is the most commonly 
used form of analysis, it is not without criticism. Fundamental to this method is 
the assumption of ‘pure insertion’ – the idea that a cognitive process can be added 
to a preexisting set of cognitive processes without any effect on them (Donders, 
1969). For example, according to this assumption, when subtracting the activation 
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associated with looking at a neutral face from looking at a fearful face, the 
activation that is isolated is purely activation associated with processing fear. 
Even if it were the case that cognitive processes can be added without affecting 
preexisting processes, pure insertion assumes that there are no interactions among 
the cognitive components of the task, e.g. the processing of fear and other 
cognitive processes, such as inhibiting a prepotent response during the cognitive 
task (Friston et al., 1996). 
 
In addition to the pure insertion problem, more generally it is difficult to 
know whether activity in a particular region is necessary and/or sufficient for a 
given cognitive function (Poldrack, 2008), as fMRI data are correlational. This is 
particularly problematic when the specific cognitive processes involved in a task 
are not well known as this can lead to reverse inference (Poldrack, 2006). Reverse 
inference involves observing the pattern of brain activation resulting from a given 
task, and inferring the cognitive processes involved, e.g. “activation of the 
amygdala was significant, suggesting a fear response.” These deductive 
interpretations are often invalid, as there is rarely a one-to-one mapping between 
brain activation in a particular region and a cognitive process. 
 
A common method of analysing fMRI data which somewhat circumvents 
these issues involves the extraction of signal from specified regions of interest (or 
ROIs). A combination of both ROI and whole brain analyses will be used in 
Chapter 6 as these have different purposes; ROI analysis can confirm specific 
predictions regarding the role of particular brain areas, whereas whole brain 
analysis is exploratory - showing activations across the entire brain. Since the 
whole brain consists of thousands of voxels, correction for multiple statistical 
comparisons becomes an issue. To account for this, familywise error correction 
will be applied across all analyses, as it is the most conservative type of correction 
with respect to Type I errors (Lieberman & Cunningham, 2009). 
 
As it is a correlational method, fMRI alone can never address the causal 
role of a particular brain region in a particular task. However, despite this and the 
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issues raised above, fMRI is one of the few techniques that provides information 
about the broad networks of brain regions involved in a task. fMRI can be used to 
arbitrate between competing hypotheses at the behavioural level. For example, it 
could help determine whether aggressive behaviour is driven by increased 
response in limbic regions, decreased response in cognitive control regions 
associated with regulation, poor connectivity, or a combination of these. The 
current thesis will use fMRI to investigate which neural systems underlie temporal 
distancing, an emotion regulation strategy that has yet to be examined using 
neuroimaging; and introduces a more stringent control condition than is typically 
used in fMRI studies of reappraisal.  
 
1.7 Summary and the current thesis 
 As demonstrated in this chapter, the past two decades have seen exciting 
new developments in the field of emotion regulation. The research described so 
far has given an overview of the current state of the literature on implicit and 
explicit emotion regulation, as well as key individual differences that are believed 
to influence these regulatory processes. The present thesis first examines implicit 
emotion regulation processes followed by explicit emotion regulation; in line with 
the framework provided by the Process Model (Gross, 1998), and explores how 
their function and efficacy are modulated by several factors including specific 
task demands, aggression, interoceptive ability, and age across the transition from 
adolescence to adulthood. 
 
 Chapter 2 employs a paradigm in which emotion is task-irrelevant in order 
to explore how attention is implicitly captured by emotional faces. While the 
extent of ‘emotional capture’ has been found to vary with psychopathic traits in 
antisocial samples, this chapter aims to address whether this variation extends 
throughout the continuum of psychopathic traits in a community sample. Using a 
similar paradigm where emotion is still task-irrelevant, Chapter 3 explores 
whether emotional capture effects vary with the level of cognitive load involved 
in the task, in order to better understand the conditions under which emotion can, 
and cannot, implicitly capture attention. Four behavioural experiments are 
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conducted in order to investigate the task conditions under which load-dependent 
effects hold. 
 
 Chapters 4-6 investigate explicit emotion regulation strategies using 
adapted versions of paradigms commonly used in the explicit emotion regulation 
literature, extending them by utilising more relatable stimuli such as commonly 
occurring ‘everyday’ scenarios, and investigating more clearly delineated emotion 
regulation strategies than in previous studies. Chapter 4 examines the efficacy and 
ease of use of three distancing sub-strategies within the broad family of 
reappraisal processes, as discussed in section 1.4. This study also investigates 
whether aggression and interoceptive awareness influence the ability to use 
distancing to regulate emotion effectively. Chapter 5 focuses on the efficacy of 
one of these strategies, namely temporal distancing (e.g. ‘this too shall pass’), 
using a novel experimental task across the transition from adolescence to 
adulthood. This chapter will also investigate whether the ability to use this 
strategy is influenced by aggression and/or an interaction between aggression and 
age, since adolescence is associated with an increase in externalising behaviours 
such as reactive aggression (Moffitt, 1993). In the final experimental chapter 
(Chapter 6), an fMRI-adapted version of the task used in Chapter 5 is employed to 
investigate in healthy adult participants, for the first time, the neural processes 
underpinning temporal distancing and whether these processes are modulated by 
aggression.  
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Chapter 2: Emotional capture by fearful expressions varies with 
psychopathic traits 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 1 section 1.3, there is now a large body of 
research showing that threat-related stimuli have a tendency to attract visual 
attention (e.g. Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009). Recent work has shown that 
attentional capture by emotion (‘emotional capture’) occurs in response to task-
irrelevant facial expressions (see Carretié, 2014 for a review), and occurs 
irrespective of whether emotion is presented in a target location or as a peripheral 
distractor (Hodsoll, Viding, & Lavie, 2011). Thus, emotional capture occurs both 
when attention is allocated endogenously during search, and when attention is 
automatically reoriented by an emotional distractor. 
 
 Individuals high in psychopathic traits show atypical processing of 
affective stimuli. Psychopathy is typically conceptualised as comprising two 
correlated but separable facets: affective-interpersonal traits include shallow 
affect, deceptiveness, low guilt and empathy; while lifestyle-antisocial traits 
include antisocial, impulsive and irresponsible behaviour (Blair & Viding, 2008; 
Hare, 2003). High levels of affective-interpersonal psychopathic traits have been 
repeatedly associated with fearlessness and diminished reactivity to others’ 
emotions; particularly fear (Blair, 2015, see section 1.5.1.2). Thus individuals 
high in these traits are often characterised as having a fundamental fear deficit 
(Blair et al., 2004; Veit et al., 2013). An alternative line of enquiry suggests that 
these individuals are characterised by a more general information processing 
deficit. According to the Response Modulation Theory (Newman & Lorenz, 
2003), individuals high in psychopathic traits have difficulty shifting attention 
from goal-relevant information in order to monitor and potentially use other 
important information. More recently, affective and attention-based theories of 
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psychopathy have been integrated in the Impaired Integration Model (Hamilton, 
Hiatt-Racer, & Newman, 2015), which proposes that abnormalities in neural 
connectivity lead to difficulties in binding different stimulus features into a 
unified percept. As a consequence, fewer attentional resources are available to be 
‘captured’ by complex, peripheral or less relevant stimuli. 
 
 According to this formulation, psychopathic traits should be associated 
with emotion-specific deficits if emotional stimuli are multidimensional or 
secondary to the current attentional focus (Hamilton et al., 2015). Recent work is 
in line with this account. For example, a study in adolescents with high levels of 
callous-unemotional traits (similar to adult affective-interpersonal traits) 
demonstrated reduced emotional capture in this group by task-irrelevant emotional 
expressions, regardless of whether the emotion appeared as target or distractor 
(Hodsoll, Lavie, & Viding, 2014). This suggests a deficit in automatic or ‘bottom-
up’ allocation of attention to emotion in a sample at the extreme end of the 
antisocial/callous-unemotional continuum, regardless of whether the spatial focus 
of attention is oriented towards the affective stimulus. This is in line with several 
recent studies suggesting that individuals high in affective-interpersonal/callous-
unemotional traits show reduced automatic orienting to emotional stimuli (e.g. 
Sylvers, Brennan, & Lilienfeld, 2011; Verona, Sprague, & Sadeh, 2012). For 
example, using a Go/No-Go task in an ERP study, Verona et al. (2012) found 
reduced processing of negative emotional words regardless of inhibitory control 
demands in psychopathic offenders compared to control offenders, who only 
showed suppressed negative emotional processing under conditions requiring 
inhibitory control (i.e., less emotional processing in No-Go vs. Go trials). 
 
 Research has shown that psychopathic traits are continuously distributed 
throughout the population (Paulhus et al., in press), and that emotional processing 
varies with levels of these traits (e.g. Seara-Cardoso et al., 2012). However, few 
studies have investigated whether bottom-up attentional emotional processing 
varies continuously with these traits in an adult community sample. Carolan et al., 
(2014) compared community samples selected for high and low levels of 
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psychopathic traits using EEG during an emotional Stroop task. No behavioural 
differences were found between the groups, but EEG evidence was suggestive of 
decreased emotional capture in the group with high levels of psychopathic traits. 
Relatedly, Anderson and Stanford (2012) found reduced emotion-dependent 
effects on ERPs on an emotional picture-viewing task as a function of 
psychopathic traits. However, it is unclear whether behavioural (as opposed to 
neural) effects reported with individuals sampled from the extreme end of the 
continuum extend continuously throughout the population in addition to in pre-
selected groups.  
 
 In contrast to aﬀective-interpersonal traits, lifestyle-antisocial traits are 
associated with increased emotional reactivity to negative stimuli in both clinical 
(Hicks & Patrick, 2006) and general (Seara-Cardoso et al., 2012) samples. 
Psychopathic traits also often co-occur with trait anxiety, with anxiety levels 
particularly associated with antisocial behaviour dimensions of psychopathy (e.g. 
Ali et al., 2009). Relatedly, some researchers distinguish between ‘primary’ and 
‘secondary’ psychopathy. Compared to primary psychopaths, secondary 
psychopaths have been characterised as more anxious, fearful, impulsive, and 
reactively aggressive (Ali et al., 2009). Although these high-anxious secondary 
subtypes show equivalent levels of affective-interpersonal traits to low-anxious 
primary subtypes, they show hypervigilant attentional orienting to negative 
emotion, while primary psychopaths show reduced orienting (e.g. Zeier & 
Newman, 2013). Studies investigating anxiety in isolation generally find it to be 
associated with a hypervigilant attentional system, including an increased tendency 
to orient attention towards fearful and angry expressions (Capitão, Underdown, 
Vile, Yang, Harmer, & Murphy, 2014; Richards et al., 2014).  
 
 Thus, both trait anxiety and lifestyle-antisocial traits are associated with 
hypervigilant attention and emotional hyperreactivity, while affective-
interpersonal traits are associated with emotional hyporeactivity, particularly to 
fear (Blair et al., 2004). Several recent studies have revealed distinct, opposing 
contributions of affective-interpersonal and lifestyle-antisocial components to 
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emotional reactivity within the same individuals, particularly when unique 
variance associated with each trait is inspected after controlling for the other. 
Effects have been seen both in clinical/subclinical (Hicks & Patrick, 2006;. 
Sebastian et al., 2012) and community (Carré, Hyde, Neumann, Viding, & Hariri, 
2013; Hodsoll, unpublished thesis; Seara-Cardoso et al., 2012) samples. For 
example, Seara-Cardoso et al. (2012), found that unique variance associated with 
affective-interpersonal traits was associated with lower propensity to feel 
empathic concern, whereas unique variance associated with lifestyle-antisocial 
traits was associated with greater propensity to feel concern for the distress of 
others within the same individuals. Moreover, one recent study in a community 
sample found an interaction between these traits on a decision-making task in the 
presence of emotional pictures, such that reduced distraction by emotion was 
associated with higher aﬀective-interpersonal traits (specifically ‘fearlessness’) 
only when participants scored low on ‘carefree non-planfulness’, related to 
impulsivity (Maes & Brazil, 2015).  
 
  We extend this literature to explore relationships between emotional 
capture (i.e. variation in reaction times (RTs) attributable to attention capture by 
emotional stimuli) and affective-interpersonal, lifestyle-antisocial and anxious 
traits in an adult community sample. Based on previous research we predicted that 
affective-interpersonal traits would be negatively associated with emotional 
capture (across distractors and targets). Given previous work suggesting reduced 
automatic orienting of attention to emotion, particularly fear, in individuals high in 
affective-interpersonal psychopathic traits (Sylvers et al., 2011), we predicted that 
effects would be strongest in the presence of fearful faces. We additionally 
predicted that lifestyle-antisocial and anxious traits would be independently and 
positively associated with emotional capture. In line with recent preliminary 
evidence suggesting an interaction between psychopathic traits in their effects on 
emotional distraction (Maes & Brazil, 2015), we also predicted that affective-
interpersonal traits would only be associated with emotional capture where 
lifestyle-antisocial traits and/or anxiety are low. 
Chapter 2 
	
	
	
	
66 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants 
 Eighty-five university students (33 males) aged 18-35 (M=20.86, SD=3.05) 
were recruited from Royal Holloway University of London, and received course-
credit or £3 for participation. The study was approved by the departmental ethics 
committee and there were no exclusion criteria. A power analysis indicated that 82 
participants were needed to have 80% power for detecting an effect size of .30 
(based on the average effect size attained by Hodsoll et al., 2014) when employing 
the traditional α=.05 criterion of statistical significance.  
 
2.2.2 Stimuli and procedure 
Task procedures and design followed Hodsoll et al. (2011). The experiment 
was conducted using a 15-inch Windows laptop. Viewing distance (60cm) was 
maintained with a chin-rest; this was to ensure that emotion captured attention 
without participants needing to make exploratory saccades. Stimuli consisted of 12 
grey-scale faces of six (three female, three male) identities from the NimStim 
(http://www.macbrain.org/resources.htm). Each face measured 2.1cm by 1.7cm. 
Faces were presented on a black background in a virtual triangle with the centre of 
each image placed at 1.3cm from the central fixation cross. Fixation was presented 
for 500ms followed by the search displays, presented until the participant 
responded or for up to 3 seconds. 
 
On each trial participants saw three faces, and searched for one target face 
among two distractors (see Figure 2.1). The target was either male amongst female 
distractors or vice versa: target gender was randomly allocated across participants. 
Participants indicated with a key press whether the target tilted (15°) to the left or 
right. Error feedback was given by a short tone. Participants completed three 
blocks (angry, fearful and happy, with order counterbalanced across participants) 
of 96 trials, preceded by 24 practice trials. Within each block, an emotional face 
was present on 72 trials. Of these, 24 contained an emotional target and 48 
contained an emotional distractor. The remaining 24 trials consisted of all-neutral 
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faces. Trial order, location of specific identities, and stimulus orientation were 
randomised. Facial identities were also randomised, with the constraint that target 
faces did not repeat on two successive trials. The task was presented using Delosis 
Psytools (http://www.delosis.com) and was on average 8 minutes long (time varied 
due to the self-paced nature of the task). Reaction times (RTs) and error rates were 
measured; RTs 2.5 standard deviations above and below each participant’s mean 
were removed. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Example displays for all-neutral, fearful distractor, and fearful target 
conditions (not to scale). Please note that the female face in the top right corner of 
each of the three images was not used in the current experiment, but is included 
here to comply with NimStim publishing guidelines.  
 
2.2.3 Questionnaires 
2.2.3.1 Assessment of psychopathic traits 
The Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-III Short Form (SRP-III-SF; Paulhus 
et al., in press) is a 29-item measure assessing psychopathic traits in non-
incarcerated populations (Appendix 1a). The SRP-III-SF uses 29 of the 64 items 
from the SRP and is correlated .92 with the full version (Paulhus et al., in press). 
Like the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), the SRP-III-SF is organised 
into four facets – interpersonal, affective, lifestyle, and antisocial, which are 
modelled into two factors; core interpersonal and affective features of 
psychopathy (‘affective-interpersonal’) and antisocial traits and impulsive 
lifestyle (‘lifestyle-antisocial’). Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale, with total 
             All-Neutral     Fearful Distractor               Fearful Target 
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score indicating overall levels of psychopathic personality traits.  The maximum 
possible SRP-III-SF total score is 145. The SRP has shown evidence of good 
construct validity and reliability in community samples (Carré et al., 2013; 
Paulhus et al., in press; see Gordts, Uzieblo, Neumann, Van den Bussche, & 
Rossi, 2015, for a discussion on the psychometric properties of the SRP) and 
strongly correlates with the PCL-R (Paulhus et al., in press). In the present 
sample, SRP-III-SF total scores ranged between 29 and 101 (M=52.50; 
SD=14.03), affective-interpersonal scores ranged between 14 and 49 (M=24.78; 
SD=8.89), lifestyle-antisocial scores varied between 14 and 47 (M=24.02; 
SD=6.54), thus presenting a similar distribution to a previously reported 
distribution from a larger sample of adults from the general population (Seara-
Cardoso et al., 2012).  Cronbach’s alpha for the total SRP scale was .88, 
comparable to that found in a larger sample (α=.84; Gordts et al., 2015). For the 
subscales, alpha coefficients were .86 for affective-interpersonal facet and .75 for 
the lifestyle-antisocial facet, demonstrating good internal consistency. For the 
calculation of the lifestyle-antisocial facet, the item ‘I was convicted of a serious 
crime’ was not included in the score as this was directed at offenders (Paulhus et 
al., in press).  
 
2.2.3.2 Assessment of anxiety 
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, 
Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) was used, which comprises of two subscales containing 20 
items each, rated on a four-point scale (Appendix 1b). The State Anxiety scale 
evaluates the current state of anxiety, asking how respondents feel “right now”, 
whereas the Trait Anxiety scale evaluates relatively stable aspects of anxiety, 
asking respondents how they feel ‘”generally”. Internal consistency coefficients 
has been high for the scale; ranging from .86 to .95 (Spielberger et al., 1983). 
Analyses focused on trait anxiety as the study hypotheses concerned dispositional 
anxiety.  
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2.2.4 Data analysis 
All analyses were conducted using SPSS version 21.0 (here and throughout 
the thesis). For the behavioural task results, mean RTs on correct trials for each 
participant were entered into repeated measures ANOVAs with the following 
factors and levels: Emotion (angry, fearful, happy) and Condition (target, 
distractor, all-neutral). To clarify, the ‘target’ condition comprised emotional 
targets among neutral distractors, the ‘distractor’ condition comprised neutral 
targets among emotional distractors, and the ‘all-neutral’ condition comprised 
neutral targets among neutral distractors. Pairwise comparisons between the 
conditions were also performed, with Bonferroni correction applied for the number 
of comparisons within each independent variable or interaction term.   
 
We then conducted bivariate correlations between reaction time variables 
(mean RT differences between emotion and neutral conditions, as well as RTs for 
individual conditions) and psychopathic traits/anxiety, with our strongest a priori 
hypothesis regarding a relation between RTs to fearful stimuli and affective-
interpersonal traits. Partial correlations between RTs and each SRP-III-SF factor 
after controlling for the other were also conducted in order to investigate the 
contributions of unique variance associated with each facet.  To examine whether 
the lifestyle-antisocial traits moderated the association affective-interpersonal traits 
and fear-related RTs, a moderation analysis was conducted using Hayes' (2012) 
PROCESS macro (Model 1) for SPSS to obtain bias-corrected 95% confidence 
intervals. Bonferroni correction was not used for the individual difference analyses 
(correlations and moderation), given our strong a priori hypotheses regarding fear, 
and the total number of possible analyses which would render this correction over-
conservative. 
 
2.3 Results 
One participant was excluded due to error rates greater than 50%. Overall 
error rates were low (M=4.98%, SD=4.61) and did not significantly differ across 
trials and conditions. Missed trials were also low (M=.89%, SD=1.88).  
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2.3.1 Main task 
A 3x3 Condition (target, distractor, neutral) x Emotion (angry, fearful, 
happy) repeated-measures ANOVA on mean correct RTs (Figure 2.2) revealed a 
main effect of Condition (F(2,168)=4.04, p=.019, partial η2=.05). RTs were 
significantly slower in emotional distractor trials (M=930ms, SD=189) compared 
with all-neutral trials (neutral trials interspersed within emotion blocks) (M=913, 
SD=198: t(84)=3.01, p=.01). There were no differences between emotional 
distractor and target trials (p=.63) and target and all-neutral trials (p=.42).  
 
There was also a main effect of Emotion (F(2,168)=14.37, p<.001, partial 
η2=.15). RTs in the happy condition (M=894, SD=186) were significantly faster 
than the angry (M=947, SD=196, t(84)=5.59, p<.001) and fearful (M=925, 
SD=205, t(84)=2.85, p=.016) conditions. 
 
The Condition x Emotion interaction was significant (F(4, 336)=2.87, 
p=.023, partial η2 =.03). Within the angry block, there was a main effect of 
Condition (F(2,168)=4.97, p=.008, partial η2=.06), with pairwise comparisons 
showing longer RTs on angry distractor trials (M=963, SD=198) compared with 
all-neutral (M=935, SD=216; t(84)=2.94, p=.013) and angry target (M=942, 
SD=190; t(84)=2.63, p=.031) trials. RTs on angry target and all-neutral trials did 
not differ. There was also a main effect of Condition in the fearful block 
(F(2,168)=3.56, p=.031, partial η2=.04). RTs were significantly longer on fearful 
target (M=936, SD=213) than all-neutral trials; (M=911, SD=214; t(84)=2.50, 
p=.044), but there was no significant difference between fearful distractor (M=927, 
SD=205) and all-neutral trials (t(84)=1.77, p=.24). Target and distractor conditions 
did not differ. There was no main effect of Condition for happy trials 
(F(2,168)=.87, p=.42, partial η2=.01). 
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Figure 2.2. Mean reaction times (milliseconds) to correctly locate and indicate the 
tilt of the target (male or female) face which was either emotional (target), neutral 
in the presence of an emotional distractor (distractor) or neutral in the presence of 
other neutral faces (all-neutral) (p<.05, Bonferroni corrected). Here and throughout 
the thesis error bars represent the standard error of the mean of each individual 
condition. 
 
2.3.2 Relationships with psychopathic traits 
To investigate relationships between the task and psychopathic traits we 
first looked at correlations between the SRP-III-SF scores and RT differences 
between the emotional and all-neutral conditions, however there were no 
significant findings. Consequently, we explored the raw RT variables. No 
significant relationships were seen in in any of the angry, happy or all-neutral 
conditions, but we did find significant correlations for fear. There was a significant 
negative correlation between total SRP-III-SF score and mean RTs in the presence 
of fearful distractors (r(83)=-.22, p=.046). There were also significant negative 
correlations between affective-interpersonal traits and mean RTs to fearful target 
Chapter 2 
	
	
	
	
72 
(r(83)=-.22, p=.045) and distractor (r(83)=-.23, p=.038) trials, i.e. as predicted, 
higher affective-interpersonal scores were associated with faster RTs, suggesting 
reduced interference by fearful stimuli as these traits increased.  
 
No hypothesised positive relationships were found between lifestyle-
antisocial traits and RTs during emotional conditions (across fearful, angry, happy 
distractors and targets, and difference RTs), nor were there significant associations 
between emotional capture and unique variance associated with either facet after 
controlling for the other. However, it was hypothesised that reactivity associated 
with lifestyle-antisocial traits might moderate the effect of affective-interpersonal 
traits; such that reduced RT interference by fearful distractors and targets with 
increasing affective-interpersonal traits (detailed above) would hold only when 
lifestyle-antisocial traits were low, i.e. when there was no competing source of 
emotional reactivity. Moderation analysis showed that lifestyle-antisocial scores 
moderated the relationship between RTs during the fearful distractor condition and 
affective-interpersonal traits (b=2.62, 95% CI [0.25, 4.99], t=2.30, p=.03; Figure 
2.3). As predicted, the negative relationship between RTs and affective-
interpersonal scores held only when lifestyle-antisocial scores were low (b=-19.74, 
95% CI [-35.84, -3.64], t=-2.44, p=.017), and was not significant when these traits 
were moderate or high.  
 
However, when lifestyle-antisocial scores were high, RTs were uniformly 
fast (regardless of affective-interpersonal score), whereas it was predicted that 
emotional capture in these participants would render RTs universally slow, as such 
traits are generally associated with high emotional reactivity which would be 
predicted to impair performance via interference effects. We explored whether a 
speed-accuracy trade-off specific to participants with high lifestyle-antisocial 
scores might underlie this finding, since one feature of the lifestyle-antisocial facet 
of psychopathy is heightened impulsivity. Participants in the top tertile for 
lifestyle-antisocial traits showed a negative correlation between error rates and 
RTs in the fearful distractor condition (r(40)=-.40, p=.008), i.e. those with faster 
RTs also made more errors; while there was no correlation for the lowest tertile 
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(r(41)=.09, p=.58). These correlation coefficients were significantly different 
(Z=2.29, p=.022). This suggests a tendency to trade accuracy for speed in those 
with the highest levels of lifestyle-antisocial traits, potentially contributing to 
relatively fast mean RTs in this group.   
 
No moderation was seen when RTs in the fearful target condition was the 
dependent variable (p=.12) nor when RTs for the all-neutral trials presented within 
the fearful block was the dependent variable (p=.11). Relatedly, there were no 
moderation effects seen in any of the conditions in the angry block (all ps>.10) or 
the happy block (all ps>.44).  
 
2.3.3 Anxiety 
It was predicted that anxiety would positively be associated with emotional 
capture. However no significant correlations were found between trait anxiety and 
difference RTs or RTs for individual conditions in the predicted direction. There 
were negative correlations between trait anxiety and RTs for happy distractor trials   
(r(83)=-.231, p=.033), all-neutral trials during the happy block (r(83)=-.218, 
p=.045) and all-neutral trials during the fearful block (r(83)=-.218, p=.045). The 
negative correlation with fearful distractor RTs was marginal (r(83)=-.211, 
p=.053). Trait anxiety was not significantly correlated with any of the angry 
conditions (ps>.069). No interactions between anxiety and psychopathic traits 
were found. 
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Figure 2.3. Graph showing that the relationship between mean reaction times 
(milliseconds) during correct trials in the fearful distractor condition and 
affective-interpersonal traits is moderated by levels of lifestyle-antisocial traits. 
The negative relationship between RTs and affective-interpersonal traits only held 
when lifestyle-antisocial traits were low.  
 
2.4 Discussion 
In line with predictions, emotional capture by fearful faces varied with 
psychopathic traits in a community sample, with a similar pattern of results to 
those found in an antisocial sample using the same task (Hodsoll et al., 2014). 
Most importantly, emotional capture by fearful stimuli (both target and distractor 
faces) was reduced in those with higher levels of affective-interpersonal 
psychopathic traits, associated at the extreme end of the continuum with low 
affective reactivity and empathy. Additionally, when fear was presented as a 
distractor, this effect held only when lifestyle-antisocial traits were low.  However, 
hypothesised effects were not significant when using RT differences (between the 
emotional and all-neutral conditions), which would have been the strongest 
evidence in favour of predictions. 
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Task main effects and interactions replicated many of the effects 
demonstrated by Hodsoll et al. (2011). As found previously, mean RTs to angry 
distractors were significantly longer compared to all-neutral and angry target faces. 
We also found emotional capture by fearful stimuli relative to all-neutral faces, 
although the effect for distractor stimuli relative to neutral was at trend, and 
longest RTs in the fearful condition were seen in response to fearful target faces. 
One explanation for our findings comes from evolutionary accounts of threat 
processing (Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). Compared to angry facial 
expressions which depict direct threat, fearful expressions indicate indirect threat; 
thus an adaptive action would be to rapidly shift attention away from a fearful face 
and into the local visual environment in order to locate the source of the threat. 
Consistent with this notion, it could be that RTs were longer when identifying the 
target face in the present study as attention was directed first to the fearful target, 
then elsewhere in the environment, reflecting a ‘bottom-up’ shift in attention, 
followed by a ‘top-down’ shift back to the target. Another possibility is that effects 
for fearful distractors appeared weaker because they were more strongly 
modulated by individual differences, discussed below. Similar to Hodsoll et al. 
(2011), we also found that emotional capture (specifically slower RTs) occurred 
only for negative stimuli; however, we did not replicate their finding of a 
facilitatory effect (i.e. faster RTs) for happy faces. 
 
As predicted, the extent of emotional capture by fearful faces (both as 
distractors and targets) decreased with increasing affective-interpersonal traits. 
This supports previous studies showing reduced attention to emotional stimuli in 
extreme samples (e.g. Hodsoll et al., 2014; Sylvers et al., 2011; Verona et al., 
2012), and extends these findings to show a continuous effect in a general sample. 
It further supports the notion that those high in affective-interpersonal traits have 
specific difficulties in fear processing (Blair et al., 2004; Veit et al., 2013), as the 
psychopathy findings did not extend to the angry condition, despite anger 
capturing attention in the task. This reflects meta-analytic findings showing that 
the processing of angry expressions remains intact while fear and sadness are 
impaired in individuals with psychopathy (Dawel, O’Kearney, McKone, & 
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Palermo, 2012; Marsh & Blair, 2008). The mechanism by which attention is 
captured by fear, perhaps through differential amygdala activation by fear (Moul, 
Killcross, & Dadds, 2012), may be different to that of anger and this is what varies 
with affective-interpersonal traits. If affective-interpersonal traits were related to a 
more general attention-processing deficit as suggested by the Response 
Modulation theory, it would have been expected that faster RTs would have been 
observed across all three emotions. As the findings were specific to fearful faces, it 
suggests that the effects are being driven by emotion processing, rather than an 
attentional deficit. Furthermore, the Response Modulation theory states that 
individuals with psychopathic traits have difficulty shifting attention to non-task 
relevant stimuli, however we found emotion capture by target faces as well, 
suggesting that emotion may be being processed to a lesser extent even when it 
appears in a task-relevant location. 
 
Contrary to previous findings (e.g. Seara-Cardoso et al., 2012), the 
lifestyle-antisocial facet did not correlate positively with RTs in the angry and 
fearful conditions, and there were no associations between emotional capture and 
unique variance associated with either facet after controlling for the other. 
However, moderation analysis showed that the negative relationship between 
affective-interpersonal traits and RTs in the presence of fearful distractors held 
only when lifestyle-antisocial traits were low. This is in line with Maes and 
Brazil’s (2015) findings of differential relationships between affective-
interpersonal traits and emotional distraction depending on levels of lifestyle-
antisocial traits.  
 
One possible interpretation is that, if lifestyle-antisocial psychopathic traits 
are high, greater reactivity associated with antisocial behaviour counteracts 
diminished reactivity associated with affective-interpersonal traits (Maes & Brazil, 
2015). Faster RTs in participants high in lifestyle-antisocial traits regardless of 
affective-interpersonal trait scores may well have resulted from a speed-accuracy 
trade-off (Wickelgren, 1977) specific to these participants. This may reflect greater 
impulsivity, which is strongly associated with lifestyle-antisocial aspects of 
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psychopathy (Hare, 2003).  This moderation effect was not found for the fearful 
target condition, and the only previous study to report a similar effect (Maes & 
Brazil, 2015) also found it in the presence of emotional distractor stimuli 
(emotional pictures), although no equivalent target condition was included. The 
specificity of this effect requires further investigation.  
 
It is worth noting that the range of SRP-III-SF scores seen in the present 
study are very similar to those previously seen in seen in community samples, 
enabling comparisons across studies (e.g. Seara-Cardoso et al., 2012). However, 
while a strength of this study is that it extends findings from the clinical range to a 
community sample, future research could use a broader sample, including 
participants across the typical and atypical range of psychopathic traits.   
 
A key limitation of the present study is that we did not see the hypothesised 
relationships with psychopathic traits when looking at RT difference scores 
(fearful - neutral), which would have represented the strongest evidence for 
individual differences in emotional capture. However, relationships between RTs 
and affective-interpersonal scores were only found in the presence of fearful 
distractors/targets, and not all-neutral trials presented within the same block. This 
suggests some specificity for diminished emotional capture by fear, as opposed to 
a more general speeding effect across the entire fear block in those with higher 
affective-interpersonal traits. The predicted moderation effect was also only seen 
in response to fearful distractors, and not for any other condition or emotion.  
Another potential limitation is that our individual difference findings would not 
survive multiple comparison correction across all correlations conducted. 
However, it is worth noting that significant results were seen only for analyses for 
which we had the strongest a priori hypotheses (i.e. those involving fear), and in 
the predicted direction. 
 
Regarding anxiety, we predicted that trait anxiety would be associated with 
increased RTs, particularly in response to negative stimuli. However, this 
relationship was not seen, either for individual conditions or difference scores 
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relative to neutral. For some individual conditions, anxiety was associated with 
faster RTs. A potential explanation is that trait anxious individuals rapidly scan the 
environment (Eysenck, 1992) which may result in faster performance on aspects of 
visual search. Given that reaction time measures as implemented in the current 
task cannot fully delineate the time course and components of attentional bias, this 
explanation is speculative. A more direct and continuous measurement of overt 
visual attention, such as eye tracking, may provide an important supplement to 
these measures, particularly in the characterisation of specific effects concerning 
emotional distractors vs. targets.  
 
In sum, this study replicates the majority of the emotional capture effects 
observed by Hodsoll et al. (2011), and demonstrates that attentional capture by 
fearful faces is reduced with increasing levels of affective-interpersonal 
psychopathic traits in a community sample. This effect was moderated by lifestyle-
antisocial traits, but not by commonly co-occurring trait anxiety. Overall, variation 
in emotional capture across the normative continuum of psychopathic traits 
appears in line with findings at the clinical end of the spectrum. 
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Chapter 3: Modulation of emotional capture by varying cognitive 
load 
 
3.1 General Introduction 
 Following on from Chapter 2, which looked at implicit emotion regulation 
in the context of emotional capture, this study further investigates what influences 
the tendency for emotion to capture attention and interfere with task performance. 
In line with previous studies, we demonstrated that emotion can capture attention 
even when it is task-irrelevant, and further showed that these effects may be 
modulated by individual differences in aggressive traits. However, a key question 
is to establish whether this task-irrelevant information can be filtered out under 
different task conditions. In this study, four behavioural experiments are 
conducted in order to investigate the task conditions under which levels of 
cognitive load influence emotional capture effects. 
 
According to attentional load theory (Lavie, 1995), increasing attentional 
load, for example by increasing the difficulty of a task, reduces the capacity for 
processing extraneous cues, as processing resources are occupied by the main task 
(Murphy, Groeger, & Greene, 2016). This concept also applies to situations in 
which the extraneous cue is affective in nature. For example, Erthal et al. (2005) 
asked participants to determine whether two peripheral bars were oriented in the 
same direction while ignoring unpleasant or neutral photos, which were 
positioned in between the bars. When the task was simple, task-irrelevant 
unpleasant photos slowed reaction times relative to neutral photos, however when 
the bar angles were changed and the task difficulty increased, there was no 
difference in reaction times between unpleasant and neutral photos, suggesting 
that the processing of affective stimuli depends on the availability of sufficient 
attentional resources. This finding is noteworthy as it demonstrates that 
emotionally salient cues do not have privileged attentional access and are 
susceptible to load effects, as are non-emotional stimuli.  
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This pattern of effects does not seem to be limited specifically to 
perceptual load tasks such as the bar orientation task above, as might be predicted 
by attentional load theory (Lavie, 2005), but also seems to occur when cognitive 
load (e.g. executive demands such as cognitive conflict) is manipulated. For 
example, in a priming study (Hart, Green, Casp, & Belger, 2010), participants had 
to indicate the number of items presented in congruent (i.e. the digit 4 in an array 
of 4) or incongruent (i.e. the digit 4 in an array of 3) arrays during a number Stoop 
task. They found that when task-irrelevant unpleasant photos preceded Stroop 
trials, processing of emotional stimuli affected cognitive control task performance 
only under low cognitive demand (congruent trials). When cognitive demand 
increased (incongruent trials), the adverse effect of emotional stimulation on 
cognitive function was counteracted.  
 
 This pattern of results is in line with several neuroimaging studies which 
have found that amygdala response to task-irrelevant emotional stimuli can be 
attenuated by increasing either perceptual or cognitive load via task demands (e.g. 
Bishop, Jenkins, & Lawrence, 2007; Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 
2002; Mitchell et al., 2007; see Murphy et al. 2016, for a review). For instance, 
when participants performed a demanding bar-orientation task in which they had 
to indicate whether the bars were of similar orientations (i.e., both close to 
horizontal or both close to vertical) or of dissimilar orientations in the presence of 
fearful and neutral faces, no differential amygdala activation was observed for 
(unattended) fearful relative to neutral trials (Pessoa et al., 2002). In contrast, 
when the task was less demanding (determining the sex of the emotional faces) 
the amygdala responded differentially to (attended) fearful faces relative to 
neutral. A similar effect was shown by Mitchell et al. (2007), but using a 
cognitive load manipulation (gender decision vs. case and syllable decision task, 
using letters superimposed on emotional or neutral faces). However, in both 
studies, the emotional stimuli (i.e. faces) were task-relevant in the attended 
condition but task-irrelevant in the unattended condition. Such task-related 
differences make the interpretation of findings less straightforward as the decision 
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type varies among conditions (e.g. determining sex versus determining bar 
orientation) (Compton, 2003). Using a task where conditions were matched more 
similarly, Bishop et al. (2007) conducted a letter search task of low (search for an 
X or N among an array of only Xs and Ns) or high (search for an X or N among 
an array of several non-target letters) load superimposed on fearful or neutral face 
distractors. They found increased right amygdala activation to fearful faces on low 
load trials relative to high load trials, replicating the findings of Pessoa et al. 
(2002). 
 
Taken together, these studies all show that as task demands increase, 
emotional interference effects are reduced, both behaviourally and neurally. 
However, in all of the studies mentioned, there have been differences between the 
task-relevant stimuli and emotional distractors (e.g. letters, bars and numbers as 
task-relevant stimuli, and faces and photos as emotional distractors). Therefore it 
is possible that high attentional load only decreases processing of the emotional 
distractor if there is some degree of separation between the target and the 
distractor. Under these conditions, there could be subtle differences in the 
perceptual processing of the emotional stimuli under low vs. high load that gives 
rise to the effect, as opposed to the effect being due to varying load per se.  
 
To investigate whether reduced interference by emotion under high (vs. 
low) cognitive load occurs using a paradigm where perceptual inputs were 
matched across conditions, Sebastian, McCrory, De Brito and Viding (2017) 
developed a cognitive conflict task based on the Simon effect of spatial 
compatibility (Simon & Wolf, 1963). The Simon effect represents the very robust 
finding that responses where the stimulus location and the response location 
correspond (compatible trials, e.g. a dot appears on the left hand side of the screen 
and a left button-press responses is required) are generally faster than responses 
where the location of the stimulus and the response key do not correspond 
(incompatible trials). In the study participants were presented with pairs of male-
female faces that were either emotional or calm in expression, and were instructed 
to identify the target gender (e.g. male) and indicate whether it was tilted to the 
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left or right (see Figure 3.1). In compatible trials, the target face was located on 
the same side to which it was tilted (e.g. on the left and tilting left), and was 
therefore classed as low load, since location and response were the same; while on 
incompatible trials the target face was on the opposite side (e.g. on the right and 
tilting left) and thus classed as high load, since location and response were 
opposed. Crucially, task-relevant information (gender) and task-irrelevant 
emotion were co-localised to the same stimulus, and in order to identify the 
target’s gender, the facial stimuli needed to be scanned to the same degree and in 
the same way on both compatible and incompatible trials. Therefore the 
perceptual processing of task-irrelevant emotion was matched across conditions. 
The findings from this task were in line with previous studies showing that there 
is reduced interference from emotion under high cognitive load. Specifically, 
response to fearful facial expressions was attenuated under high (vs. low) 
cognitive load conditions, as indexed by both reaction times (relatively faster 
under high load) and reduced right amygdala response. In contrast, fear 
processing under low load was associated with reaction time interference, 
increased amygdala response, and increased functional coupling between the 
amygdala and the middle frontal gyrus, a prefrontal region commonly associated 
with emotion regulation.  
 
This finding suggests that the load effect seen in previous studies is not 
solely the result of differing perceptual inputs. However, it is still unclear what 
exactly is driving the effect. Even though perceptual inputs remained constant in 
Sebastian et al.’s study, there are still other factors that can be manipulated to 
better understand the conditions under which the effect is elicited. In the above 
study, stimulus presentation was blocked by both emotion and load. This leads to 
the possibility that top-down effects could be contributing to the findings, such 
that participants “expect” the same trial type (i.e., high or low load) to be 
repeated. Thus top-down control could be being imposed in a prospective manner 
across the whole block, with the greatest level of control implemented on high 
load fear blocks (leading to reduced interference).  
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If this is the main mechanism driving the observed effects in the above 
study, then we would predict that the effect would not hold if high and low load 
trials were intermixed. In this case, expectancies would be generated on a trial-by-
trial basis, making it difficult to impose a top-down cognitive prediction or ‘set’ 
that could be applied to several trials of the same type. Instead we might predict 
that there would be RT interference effects on both low and high load emotional 
trials. Indeed, using a non-emotional visual search task, Theeuwes, Kramer and 
Belopolsky (2004) found that when conditions were presented in separate high 
and low load blocks, distractor interference was greater under low load relative to 
high load conditions, in line with the perceptual load theory. In contrast, when 
high and low load trials were intermixed within blocks this effect disappeared; 
participants were just as likely to show interference from the distractor in both 
conditions. Therefore under high load, expectancies appear to play an important 
role in determining the extent of processing of task-irrelevant distractors.  
 
 Given these findings, we investigated whether Sebastian et al.’s (2017) 
results showing reduced emotional capture under high cognitive load replicates 
and generalises across different experimental conditions. In Experiment 1 we used 
the same blocked design as Sebastian al., however in Experiments 2, 3 and 4 we 
randomised stimulus presentation across emotion and load conditions in different 
configurations to understand under which conditions emotional capture and load 
effects held.  
 
 A second aim of the present study was to investigate the role of individual 
differences, specifically sub-types of aggression, as they are associated with 
variation in emotional capture effects (See Chapter 1 section 1.5.1 and Chapter 2). 
To date there has been no research on the influence of aggression on the 
processing of emotion under differing cognitive load. There have been studies, 
however, looking at trait anxiety – an individual difference that has shown to have 
similar underlying neural mechanisms to reactive aggression (Coccaro et al., 
2007; Davis & Whalen, 2001; See Chapter 1.5.1.3). For example, using an N-back 
task, Vytal, Cornwell, Arkin and Grillon (2012) found that anxiety impaired task 
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performance (i.e. longer RTs) under low but not high cognitive load. Several other 
studies have found similar behavioural and neural effects (e.g. Bishop et al., 2007; 
Dvorak-Bertsch et al., 2007; Shackman et al., 2006). According to Bishop (2009), 
anxiety has a greater impact on low load conditions as cognitive resources are 
divided between the task and trait anxiety. The continuous low level diversion of 
resources (e.g. monitoring the environment for threats, Eysenck, 2013) associated 
with trait anxiety may lead to poor recruitment of attentional control processes 
required to prevent distractors from competing for further attentional resources. In 
contrast, during high load conditions, cognitive resources are predominantly 
focussed on task demands, thus reducing the impact of anxiety. 
 
Based on the findings by Theeuwes et al. (2004), we hypothesised that 
task-irrelevant emotion will interfere with reaction times only during compatible 
trials (i.e. low load) when conditions are blocked (Experiment 1) but when 
conditions are inter-mixed (Experiments 2, 3 and 4) this interference will be 
apparent during both compatible and incompatible trials. Furthermore based on 
the anxiety findings above, and building on the results of Chapter 2, we predicted 
that when conditions are blocked (Experiment 1) high levels of reactive 
aggression (indexed by lifestyle-antisocial traits on the Self-Report Psychopathy 
Scale, and the Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire) would be associated with 
increased distraction by emotional faces only in the compatible trials, where 
cognitive load is low. In contrast, proactive aggression, (indexed in this study by 
affective-interpersonal psychopathic traits), tends to be associated with opposing 
levels of emotional reactivity (Blair et al., 2004; Veit et al., 2013; see Chapter 2) 
and therefore we predicted that affective-interpersonal traits would be associated 
with reduced distraction by threatening stimuli (i.e. angry and fearful faces), 
regardless of load. For the purposes of comparison with previous studies and as a 
control variable, anxiety is also measured and is predicted to have the same effects 
as reactive aggression. Predictions regarding aggression and anxiety for the 
following experiments will depend on whether the predictions for Experiment 1 
are supported. 
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3.2 Experiment 1 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 As discussed above, in Experiment 1 we aimed to replicate the effects of 
reduced emotional capture under high cognitive load found by Sebastian et al. 
(2017), using the same task in which individual emotion conditions of high and 
low cognitive load were presented in separate blocks of trials. Moreover, the role 
of individual differences in aggression and anxiety in relation to emotional 
capture were investigated as previous studies have found that such individual 
differences only influence task performance under low cognitive load (e.g. Vytal 
et al., 2012). 
 
3.2.2 Method 
	
3.2.2.1 Participants 
Forty-two university students were recruited from Royal Holloway 
University of London, and received course-credit or £3 for participation. This 
sample size was comparable to previous similar studies investigating individual 
differences in anxiety (e.g. 39 participants in Vytal et al.’s study) and double that 
of Sebastian et al.’s original study (20 participants), partly to maximise the chance 
of detecting the hypothesised effect if present (Simonsohn, 2015), and partly as 
greater power was needed to detect potentially small individual difference effects. 
Six were excluded due to error and missed trial rates that were greater than 2.5 
standard deviations above the group mean. Data from a final sample of 36 
participants (15 males, mean age 19.92, SD=2.82, range=18-30) were analysed.  
 
3.2.2.2 Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of 48 grey-scale faces of two male and two female 
identities each with different facial expressions depicting three emotions: fear, 
anger and calm. The expressions were chosen from the standardised NimStim face 
set (Tottenham et al., 2009). The calm faces are a distinct set in the NimStim from 
neutral; while perceptually similar to neutral expressions, calm expressions tend 
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to be perceived as having a less negative valence as there is less overall muscle 
tension in the face. The current study used the same calm expressions (as opposed 
to the neutral expressions used in Chapter 2) as Sebastian et al.’s (2017) study. An 
oval cut-out was placed on each face to remove gender specific information, such 
as hair. Each face oval measured 6x4cm. All faces were presented in male and 
female pairs with identical expressions and were tilted 35° to the left or 35° to the 
right (see Figure 3.1). There were eight possible pairs (each male with each 
female) for each facial expression at each level of cognitive load (high or low i.e. 
compatible or non-compatible), with 64 images in total. Face pairs were presented 
on a white background measuring 606 x 349 pixels. 
 
3.2.2.3 Task design and procedure 
Task procedures and design followed Sebastian et al. (2017). The task 
consisted of six blocks of trials, one block for each emotion (calm, anger and fear) 
x load (low, high) condition (8 trials per block), in order to replicate the original 
task which was set up as an fMRI block design. These six blocks (48 trials in 
total) were presented three times in a pseudorandomised order each time (144 
trials). Randomisation was constrained so that no more than two of the same block 
type (e.g. fear/compatible) were presented sequentially. Within each block, 
randomisation was constrained so that all left (or right) response trials were not 
presented sequentially. Participants completed two runs of the task (288 trials in 
total).  
 
Each trial was presented for 2000ms, followed by a fixation cross 
presented for 500ms. After every 48 trials a fixation cross was displayed for 10 
seconds as a short break. Participants were given clear instructions beforehand to 
search for the target face (either male or female; counterbalanced across 
participants and stratified by gender) and indicate on the keyboard using their 
dominant hand whether the target face was tilting left or right. On compatible 
trials, the target face was located on the same side to which it was tilted (e.g. on 
the left and tilting left); while on incompatible trials the target face was on the 
opposite side (e.g. on the right and tilting left). This set up a spatial 
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incompatibility between the required response and its location. Participants 
viewed the task on monitor of 1920 x 1090 pixels. The task was presented and 
responses were recorded using Cogent 2000 for Matlab (version R2015a). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Example of the experimental task stimuli. Each stimulus consisted of 
two faces; one male, one female. Participants were instructed to identify the face 
of the target gender (counterbalanced across participants) and indicate with a 
button press whether it was tilted to the left or right.  Facial identities are those for 
which permission is given to publish from the NimStim, and differed from the 
identities used in the study. 
 
3.2.2.4 Individual differences measures 
Aggression was assessed using The Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire 
(Buss & Perry, 1992), which is a 29-item scale that measures four aspects of 
human aggression: Physical Aggression, Verbal Aggression, Hostility, and Anger 
(Appendix 1c). These aspects map onto reactive aggression, as discussed in 
Chapter 1 (section 1.5.1.3). Participants are asked to rate each item using a 5-point 
Likert scale (1 = uncharacteristic of me, 5 = very characteristic of me). The Self-
Report Psychopathy Scale-III Short Form (SRP-III-SF; Paulhus et al., in press) 
and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983) were also 
administered, as in Chapter 2 (see section 2.2.3 for more details) to measure both 
proactive and reactive aggression, and anxiety, respectively. 
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3.2.2.4 Data analysis 
Behavioural data were analysed using repeated measures ANOVAs on 
mean correct reaction times (RTs) after removing missed trials and extreme 
individual RTs (<200ms or >1500ms), and error rates. Pairwise comparisons were 
Bonferroni corrected. Individual differences data were correlated with the 
difference in RTs between the negative emotional conditions (fear and anger) and 
calm. 
3.2.3 Results 
 Missed trials were low overall (0.72%). For errors, a 2x3 Compatibility 
(compatible, incompatible) x Emotion (fear, anger, calm) repeated measures 
ANOVA on error rates revealed a main effect of Compatibility: F(1, 35)=17.03, 
p<.001, partial η2=.33, with significantly fewer errors made on compatible 
(M=1.12%, SD=1.65) than incompatible trials (M=4.71%, SD=6.17 p<.001). The 
difference in error rates between incompatible and compatible trials was 
significant for all three emotion face types (ps<.005). There was no main effect of 
Emotion, or interaction between Compatibility and Emotion. 
 
A 2x3 Compatibility (compatible, incompatible) x Emotion (fear, anger, 
calm) repeated measures ANOVA on mean correct RTs revealed a main effect of 
Compatibility: F(1, 35)=96.10, p<.001, partial η2=.73, with RTs significantly 
faster on compatible (M=762ms, SD=112) than incompatible trials (M=834, 
SD=110 p<.001). The difference in RTs between incompatible and compatible 
trials was significant for all three emotion face types (ps<.001). There was also a 
significant main effect of Emotion: F(2, 70)=11.53, p<.001, partial η2=.25, with 
RTs significantly slower for anger trials (M=816, SD=113) relative to calm 
(M=791, SD=111, p<.001) and fear (M=785, SD=110, p=.001), however there 
was no significant difference in RTs between fear and calm (p>.99). 
 
 There was also a significant interaction between Compatibility and 
Emotion: F(2, 70)=6.13, p=.004, partial η2=.15 (Figure 3.2). We ran post-hoc t-
tests to further investigate the interaction effect by determining whether the 
difference in RTs between compatible and incompatible trials for fear and anger 
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significantly differed from that of calm by computing difference variables. Indeed 
this was the case, with the difference in RTs between compatible and 
incompatible trials for calm (calm compatible: M=741, SD=110; calm 
incompatible: M=841, SD=112; difference: M=100, SD=50) being significantly 
greater than the difference for fear (fear compatible: M=754, SD=116; fear 
incompatible: M=816, SD= 103; difference: M=61, SD=68; t(35)=3.28, p=.007) 
and anger (anger compatible: M=790, SD=109; anger incompatible: M=844, 
SD=116; difference: M=54, SD=77; t(35)=3.11, p=.011). There was no difference 
between anger and fear (t(35)=.49, p>.99) (see Figure 3.2). 
 
Pairwise comparisons of simple effects (see Figure 3.2) further revealed 
that during the compatible blocks RTs for anger trials were significantly longer 
relative to fear trials (p=.001) and calm trials (p<.001), however fear trials were 
not significantly different from calm trials (p=.44). In contrast, during the 
incompatible block RTs for anger trials were not significantly different from fear 
(p=.10) or calm trials (p>.99), however fear trials were faster than calm trials 
(p=.015).  
 
Individual differences 
 There were no significant correlations between any of the questionnaire 
measures and the difference in RTs between the negative emotional conditions 
(fear and anger) and calm.  
 
There were no significant differences in RTs between males and females 
(ps>.05) thus for the following experiments we used a convenience sample which 
were predominantly female.  
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Figure 3.2. Mean RTs (ms) for correct trials across all conditions, showing a 
significant interaction between Compatibility and Emotion. The difference 
between Compatibility conditions was significantly greater for calm than for fear 
or anger, as indicated by *{ (p<.05). Within Compatibility conditions, differences 
between emotions were also seen. Main effects of both Compatibility and 
Emotion were found. **p<.001, *p <.05.  
 
3.2.4 Discussion  
 As would be expected due to the relative difficulty of the task, reaction 
times for incompatible trials were longer compared to compatible trials. We also 
found a main effect of Emotion, driven by slower RTs to angry faces relative to 
both calm and fearful faces, with no difference between fear and calm trials. In 
line with Sebastian et al.’s (2017) study, the interaction between Compatibility 
and Emotion was significant; however while the original study found an effect for 
only fear, we also found it for anger. For both fear and anger, RTs were 
disproportionately slow in the compatible relative to the incompatible condition, 
with a significantly larger RT difference seen between the two calm conditions. 
This suggests that attention was captured disproportionately by emotion on less 
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demanding (compatible) trials, replicating and extending the original effect found 
by Sebastian et al. using a larger sample. 
 
 However, some differences were also seen. For example, Sebastian et al. 
(2017) found no significant differences between RTs on fear, anger and calm 
conditions during the incompatible blocks (i.e. attention was not captured by task-
irrelevant emotional stimuli (relative to calm) under high cognitive load). 
However, while there was no difference between anger and calm incompatible 
trials in the present study, reaction times to incompatible fear trials were 
significantly faster compared to incompatible calm trials, suggesting if anything a 
facilitation effect for this condition. Findings have shown that fearful expressions 
gain preferential access to awareness (Yang, Zald, & Blake, 2007), which may 
explain the faster reaction times; albeit speculatively since this result was not in 
line with predictions. Regarding compatible trials, the previous study found 
slower RTs on fear compatible trials relative to calm compatible trials (another 
line of evidence suggesting increased emotional capture specifically on 
compatible trials), whereas the current study found this effect for anger but not 
fear. Overall however, the evidence of a smaller difference between compatible 
and incompatible RTs for fear and anger relative to calm replicates and extends 
(to anger) the previous pattern of results. 
 
These findings are in line with previous studies (e.g. Bishop et al., 2007; 
Hart et al., 2010; Pessoa et al., 2002) that have shown that interference from 
distractors (e.g. emotional faces) is decreased under high load. Since perceptual 
inputs were matched across conditions, a ‘bottom-up’ explanation, i.e. that 
perceptual inputs differ in some way, is unlikely (although without eye-tracking 
measures, this cannot be conclusively shown). Therefore it can be hypothesised 
that a top-down mechanism is involved whereby a cognitive ‘set’ or prediction is 
created as a result of the blocked nature of the design. On incompatible (high 
load) conditions, processing resources may be ‘pre-allocated’ to resolving the 
cognitive conflict, thereby reducing the capacity for processing the emotional 
information, or even actively suppressing this processing. However, during 
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compatible (low load) trials, greater attentional capacity is available, leading to 
processing of the emotional information which then interferes with task 
performance relative to calm trials (i.e. emotional capture).  In support of this 
explanation, Etkin et al. (2006, see section 1.3 for study details) found that the 
repetition of high load stimuli in an emotional Stroop task, engaged an 
anticipatory top-down mechanism likely implemented by the rostral anterior 
cingulate cortex, which facilitated performance. Thus while the task was different 
to the current experiment, the mechanism underlying the effect is likely to be 
similar.  
 
 Finally, despite predictions, there were no significant individual difference 
findings.  It is possible that the task is not sensitive to the individual differences of 
interest, at least in the general population. While previous studies (e.g. Bishop et 
al., 2007; Dvorak-Bertsch, et al., 2007; Shackman et al., 2006; Vytal et al., 2012) 
have found that trait anxiety affects performance during low but not high load 
conditions, it is possible that aggression does not interact with the task in the same 
way. While we also measured trait anxiety and did not replicate previous effects, 
this may be because the top-down mechanisms likely underlying the basic task 
effects in the current study are not the same as those underlying task effects in 
these previous studies, in which perceptual inputs also differed across conditions. 
The lack of individual difference results gave us limited scope to formulate 
hypotheses for the following experiments, therefore the following experiments 
focus solely on task effects.   
 
 The findings of the current experiment broadly replicate the effects 
reported by Sebastian et al. (2017). As perceptual inputs were matched across 
conditions, a likely explanation of the key interaction effect is that the blocked 
nature of the task led to top-down control being imposed prospectively across the 
block. Therefore it can be predicted that removing the blocked structure would 
eliminate the effect found. This is addressed in Experiment 2 where all trials 
(compatible/incompatible, fear/anger/calm) are intermixed and randomised. In 
order to systematically investigate the conditions under which the effect of 
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interest is found, in Experiment 3 emotion is blocked while load is randomised, 
and in Experiment 4 load is blocked while emotion is randomised. This will allow 
us to uncover what the most important factor is in the reduced interference effect 
from emotion seen under high (vs. low) cognitive load. 
 
3.3 Experiment 2 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 Experiment 1 found that under high load, emotional capture by angry and 
fearful faces appears comparatively reduced, as indicated by disproportionately 
slow RTs on compatible trials relative to incompatible trials. However, as 
demonstrated in the (non-emotional) study by Theeuwes et al. (2004), when high 
and low load trials are randomised this interference effect can disappear: 
participants were just as likely to show interference from the distractor in both 
high and low load conditions. The findings of Theeuwes et al. suggest that when 
high and low load trials are randomised, expectancies must be generated on a 
trial-by-trial basis, making it difficult to impose a top-down cognitive set that 
could be applied to several trials of the same type. Therefore if this is indeed the 
case, it would be predicted that an inability to make use of this strategy when 
trials are randomised would lead to interference from emotion in both high and 
low load trials in the present experiment. 
 
 If cognitive load per se determines whether or not emotion is processed, 
presenting high and low load conditions in mixed (current experiment) or in 
blocked (Experiment 1) conditions should result in the same pattern of findings. 
In contrast, if expectation of a high or low load trial influences the extent to which 
task-irrelevant emotion is processed, then mixed trial blocks that make it difficult 
to anticipate trial type in advance might be expected to result in emotion 
interference or ‘capture’ effects on both low and high load trials. Thus, we would 
not expect to see either a) a smaller difference between RTs on compatible vs. 
incompatible trials on emotional relative to calm trials or b) increased RTs on 
emotional compatible trials relative to calm compatible trials in the absence of 
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such effects for incompatible trials, both of which were observed in Experiment 1 
and by Sebastian et al. (2017). Consequently in Experiment 2, trials were fully 
randomised across Compatibility and Emotion. 
   
3.3.2 Method 
3.3.2.1 Participants 
 A total of 41 (3 males, mean age=18.68, SD=1.46, range=18-27) 
participants were recruited in the same manner as for Experiment 1 and data for 
all participants were analysed.  
 
3.3.2.2 Stimuli and procedure 
The stimuli, design, and procedure were exactly the same as in Experiment 
1. However the presentation of the six different trial types (fear compatible, fear 
incompatible, anger compatible, anger incompatible, calm compatible and calm 
incompatible) was randomised. Randomisation was constrained so that no more 
than two of the same trial type were presented sequentially. 
 
3.3.3 Results 
 Missed trials were low overall (0.43%). For errors, as with Experiment 1, 
there was a main effect of Compatibility: F(1, 40)=41.71, p<.001, partial η2=.51, 
with significantly fewer errors made on compatible (M=1.24%, SD=2.37) than 
incompatible trials (M=5.34%, SD=5.28, p<.001). The difference in error rates 
between incompatible and compatible trials was significant for all three emotion 
face types (ps<.001). There were no other significant effects.  
 
Replicating the results of Experiment 1, there was a significant main effect 
of Compatibility (F(1, 40)=98.32, p<.001, η2=.71) with RTs significantly faster 
for compatible trials (M=803, SD=115), compared to incompatible trials (M=868 , 
SD=119; p<.001). There was also a significant main effect of Emotion (F(2, 
80)=18.61, p<.001, partial η2=.32) with RTs significantly slower for anger trials 
(M= 853, SD=116) relative to calm (M=828, SD=118, p<.001) and fear (M=827, 
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SD=118, p<.001); however there was no significant difference in RTs between 
fear and calm (p>.99). 
 
 There was, however, no significant interaction between Compatibility and 
Emotion (F(2, 80)=1.36, p=.26, partial η2=.03). As with Experiment 1, we ran 
post-hoc tests and found that there were no significant differences in the RT 
difference between compatible and incompatible trials for calm (calm compatible: 
M=791, SD=118; calm incompatible: M=864, SD=117; difference: M=73, SD=50) 
and fear (fear compatible: M=798ms, SD=118; fear incompatible: M=856, SD= 
118; M=58, SD=57; t(40)=1.56, p=.38) or calm and anger (anger compatible: 
M=822, SD=109; anger incompatible: M=884, SD=123; difference: M=62, 
SD=54; t(40)=1.08, p=.85), in contrast to the findings of Experiment 1. There was 
also no difference between fear and anger (t(40)=-.48, p>.99) (Figure 3.3). 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Mean RTs (ms) for correct trials across all conditions when all trials 
were randomised. Brackets indicate main effects of Emotion, **p<.001. For every 
Emotion there was also a main effect for Compatibility (ps<.001). 
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3.3.4 Discussion 
 Similar to the findings of Experiment 1, RTs for incompatible trials were 
longer compared to compatible trials, and RTs to angry faces were longer relative 
to calm and fearful faces. The interaction between Compatibility and Emotion, 
however, was not significant and similar patterns were observed across both 
compatible and incompatible trials. Therefore, despite individual trials being 
identical to those in Experiment 1, we did not see disproportionately slow RTs on 
fear and anger (emotional) compatible trials when presentation of all trial types 
was randomised. If cognitive load had been the only factor determining the extent 
to which emotion interfered with task performance, the effects of Compatibility 
should have been the same in the two experiments. It is likely that in randomising 
stimulus presentation, participants were unable to engage differential anticipatory 
top-down cognitive control processes for high vs. low load trials, leading to 
equivalent interference effects on both low and high load trials.  
 
Previous studies which have used event-related designs and manipulated 
cognitive load have found similar behavioural effects as the present experiment. 
For example, Mitchell et al. (2007) asked participants to indicate the gender of an 
emotionally valenced face (low cognitive load), or judge superimposed words 
based on case (mid load) or judge words based on syllable number (high load). 
While they found that RTs were slower with increasing load, there was no 
significant interaction between emotion and cognitive load (although as 
mentioned above in the General Introduction of this chapter, an interaction was 
seen in amygdala response). Thus it could be that manipulating cognitive load on 
a trial-by-trial basis is not sufficient to elicit an interaction effect in the RT data.  
 
In the current study the possibility of a perceptual load effect is removed, 
as participants have to attend to the emotion-containing stimulus on both high and 
low load trials equally in order to perform the gender decision part of the trial 
correctly. Thus when perceptual inputs are matched and it is impossible to use 
anticipatory cognitive mechanisms, as in the current experiment, the effect of 
cognitive load disappears. The involvement of a top-down longer-term 
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mechanism was suggested as the likely explanation underpinning the effect found 
in Experiment 1, and the findings of Experiment 2 show that this is likely to be 
the case. Therefore cognitive load alone (as implemented in the present task) does 
not seem to elicit the load effects seen in previous studies and it is possible that 
anticipatory top-down control is what is driving the effects. It is possible that 
anticipatory top-down effects could also have contributed to the RT results seen in 
previous studies using both cognitive and (possibly) perceptual load tasks, many 
of which have blocked the presentation of load and/or emotion (Bishop et al., 
2007; Pessoa et al., 2002). Indeed, to our knowledge no study has been published 
that has found the predicted cognitive load effect in RTs with a fully randomised 
design (although some studies have found the equivalent effect in amygdala 
activation e.g. Mitchell et al., 2007).  
 
 However, based on Experiment 2 and these previous studies, it is unclear 
which aspects of block structure are most important. In Experiment 2, two aspects 
of the task were varied relative to Experiment 1; randomised load, and 
randomised emotion. Thus in the following studies we systematically investigate 
whether it is the load randomisation that is the key factor in eliminating the 
interaction effect, or whether predictability of the emotion is also important. 
 
3.4 Experiment 3 
 
3.4.1 Introduction  
 As demonstrated in Experiment 2, when high and low load trials are 
intermixed expectancies seem to be generated on a trial-by-trial basis, making it 
difficult to predict and switch from different trial types, resulting in interference 
effects on both low and high load trials. But do we still see this effect if load is 
intermixed but emotions are blocked? It would be predicted that, like in 
Experiment 2, randomising load would make it difficult to prepare an anticipatory 
cognitive set in advance and thus we would see interference effects during both 
high and low load trials. Therefore in Experiment 3 compatible and incompatible 
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trials were randomised, while emotion was blocked as in Experiment 1. 
Predictions were as for Experiment 2. 
 
3.4.2 Method 
3.4.2.1 Participants 
A total of 40 participants were recruited in the same manner as for 
Experiment 1 and 2. Two participants were excluded due to error and missed trial 
rates 2.5 standard deviations above the group mean. Data from a final sample of 
38 participants (3 males, mean age 18.97, SD=3.77, range=17-41) were analysed.  
 
3.4.2.2 Stimuli and procedure 
The stimuli, design, and procedure were identical to that of Experiment 1 
and 2 except the presentation of stimuli was blocked by Emotion but 
Compatibility was randomised. For example, an anger block consisted of 8 anger 
trials, 4 of which were compatible and the remaining 4 were incompatible. Within 
each block, randomisation was constrained so that no more than two of the same 
trial type (e.g. compatible) were presented sequentially. 
 
3.4.3 Results 
Missed trials were low overall (0.42%). For the error rates, as with 
Experiment 1 and 2 there was a main effect of Compatibility: F(1, 37)=52.29, 
p<.001, partial η2=.59, with significantly fewer errors made on compatible 
(M=1.24%, SD=2.68) than incompatible trials (M=5.15%, SD=5.69, p<.001). The 
difference in error rates between incompatible and compatible trials was 
significant for all three emotion face types (ps<.001). There were no other 
significant effects. 
 
 Replicating the results of Experiment 1 and 2, there was a significant main 
effect of Compatibility (F(1, 37)=119.39, p<.001, η2=.76) with RTs significantly 
faster for compatible trials (M=758, SD=85), compared to incompatible (M=821, 
SD=87) trials (p<.001). There was also a significant main effect of Emotion (F(2, 
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74)=37.40, p<.001, partial η2=.50) with RTs significantly slower for anger trials 
(M=817, SD=90) relative to calm (M=781, SD=81, p<.001) and fear (M=770, 
SD=88, p<.001), however there was no significant difference in RTs between fear 
and calm (p=.092). 
 
 As with Experiment 2, there was no significant interaction between 
Compatibility and Emotion: F(2, 74)=2.27, p=.111, partial η2=.06. As with the 
previous experiments, we ran post-hoc tests and found that there were no 
significant differences between the difference in RTs between compatible and 
incompatible trials between calm (calm compatible: M=748, SD=81; calm 
incompatible: M=815, SD=80; difference: M=67, SD=43) and fear (fear 
compatible: M=744, SD=88; fear incompatible: M=797, SD=87; difference: 
M=53, SD=44; t(37)=2.17, p=.11) and calm and anger (anger compatible: M=783, 
SD=85; anger incompatible: M=850, SD=94; difference: M=67, SD=45; 
t(37)=.077, p>.99) in line with the findings of Experiment 2. There was no 
difference between fear and anger (t(37)=-1.60, p=.36) (Figure 3.4).   
 
Figure 3.4. Mean RTs (ms) for correct trials across all conditions when 
Compatibility was randomised and Emotion was blocked. **p<.001. Brackets 
indicating main effects of Emotion **p<.001. For every Emotion there was also a 
main effect for Compatibility (ps<.001). 
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3.4.4 Discussion 
 Similar to the findings of Experiment 1 and 2, RTs for incompatible trials 
were longer compared to compatible trials and RTs to angry faces were longer 
relative to calm faces and fearful faces, but there were no differences in RTs 
between fear and calm trials. As with Experiment 2 the interaction between 
Compatibility and Emotion was not significant and similar patterns were observed 
across both compatible and incompatible trials. This supports the findings of 
Experiment 2 and previous studies (Etkin et al., 2006; Theeuwes et al., 2004), 
suggesting that when high and low load trials are intermixed, similar emotional 
interference effects (in this case limited to anger) occur on both low and high load 
trials. Further, it suggests that this result is not affected by whether emotion is 
predictable (blocked) or randomised. In the final experiment we randomise 
emotion but block high and low load trials in order to investigate whether 
engaging an anticipatory top-down cognitive set by blocking load is solely 
responsible for the effects found in Experiment 1. 
 
3.5 Experiment 4 
 
3.5.1 Introduction 
 So far all predictions have been confirmed, showing that when load is 
blocked, emotional interference is only seen in low load trials but when load is 
randomised, the Compatibility x Emotion interaction disappears. In this final 
experiment load was blocked but emotion was randomised. In theory this blocked 
load would still enable anticipatory cognitive mechanisms to differentiate between 
high and low load blocks, and therefore we might expect to see the same results as 
Experiment 1, regardless of emotion.  In line with this, Erthal et al. (2005, see 
section 3.1 for task details) blocked load but randomised emotion and still found 
the effect (albeit on a perceptual load task as opposed to a cognitive load task, and 
only when the bar orientation task was very difficult (experiments 2 and 3)). 
However, it could be that both load and emotion need to be predictable in order to 
see the pattern of results in Experiment 1, in which case in the present iteration we 
would expect results more in line with Experiments 2 and 3. 
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3.5.2 Method 
3.5.2.1 Participants 
A total of 40 participants were recruited in the same manner as for 
Experiment 1, 2 and 3. One participant was excluded due to error rates 2.5 
standard deviations above the group mean. Data from a final sample of 39 
participants (6 males, mean age 18.97, SD=1.37, range=18-26) were analysed.  
 
3.5.2.2 Stimuli and procedure 
The stimuli, design, and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1, 2 
and 3. However the presentation of the stimuli was blocked by Compatibility 
(load) but Emotion was randomised. Within each block, randomisation was 
constrained so that no more than three of the same emotion type were presented in 
the same block. For example, a compatible block consisting of 8 compatible trials 
could consist of 3 fear trials, 3 calm trials and 2 anger trials, all of which were 
randomised within that block.  
 
3.5.3 Results 
 Missed trials were low overall (0.28%). For the error rates, as with 
Experiment 1, 2 and 3 there was a main effect of Compatibility: F(1, 38)=43.82, 
p<.001, partial η2=.54, with significantly fewer errors made on compatible 
(M=1.10%, SD=1.67) than incompatible trials (M=4.88%, SD=4.14, p<.001). The 
difference in error rates between incompatible and compatible trials was 
significant for all three emotion face types (ps<.001). There were no other 
significant effects. 
 
Replicating the results of Experiment 1, 2 and 3, there was a significant 
main effect of Compatibility (F(1, 38)=135.7, p<.001, η2=.78) with RTs 
significantly faster for compatible trials (M=729, SD=120), compared to 
incompatible trials (M=801, SD=120; p<.001). There was also a significant main 
effect of Emotion (F(2,76)=18.69, p<.001, partial η2=.33) with RTs significantly 
slower for anger trials (M=784, SD=121) relative to calm (M=758, SD=120, 
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p<.001) and fear (M=754, SD=118, p<.001), however there was no significant 
difference in RTs between fear and calm (p>.99).  
 
As in Experiment 2 and 3, the interaction between Compatibility and 
Emotion was non-significant (F(2, 76)=1.90, p=.16, partial η2=.05). As with the 
previous experiments, we ran post-hoc tests and found that there were no 
significant differences between the difference in RTs between compatible and 
incompatible trials between calm (calm compatible: M=717, SD= 116; calm 
incompatible: M=798, SD=125; difference: M=82, SD=52) and fear (fear 
compatible: M=720ms, SD=122; fear incompatible: M=787, SD= 114; difference: 
M=67, SD=48; t(38)=1.58, p=.37) and calm and anger (anger compatible: M=750, 
SD=123; anger incompatible: M=818, SD=120; difference: M=67, SD=48; 
t(38)=1.59; p=.36) in line with the findings of Experiments 2 and 3. There was 
also no difference between fear and anger (t(38)=-.06, p>.99) (Figure 3.5). 
 
Figure 3.5. Mean RTs (ms) for correct trials across all conditions when 
Compatibility was blocked and Emotion was randomised **p<.001. Brackets 
indicating main effects of Emotion **p<.001. For every Emotion there was also a 
main effect for Compatibility (ps<.001). 
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3.5.4 Discussion  
 As with the previous experiments, RTs for incompatible trials were longer 
compared to compatible trials and RTs to angry faces were longer relative to calm 
faces and fearful faces, but there were no differences in reaction time between fear 
and calm trials. As with Experiments 2 and 3 the interaction between 
Compatibility and Emotion was not significant and surprisingly similar patterns 
were observed across both compatible and incompatible trials, despite load being 
blocked. Therefore there was no disproportionate effect of Emotion on low load 
trials, as was found in Experiment 1. 
 
 The findings suggest that the interference effect found in Experiment 1 
was not solely due to high and low load trials being blocked but both load and 
emotion being blocked. The lack of an interference effect in the present 
experiment is in line with the behavioural findings of Pessoa, Padmala and 
Morland (2005), where facial expression (fearful and neutral) was also 
randomised within each block of high, medium and low load trials, and no RT 
effect was found (though the predicted pattern was seen in amygdala response). 
Therefore it appears that trials within a block need to be the same in all aspects for 
an anticipatory top-down emotion-specific mechanism to be implemented. If there 
is a single change, i.e. an emotional face being followed by a non-emotional face, 
it may be that that this breaks the continuous ‘expectancy set’. As with 
Experiments 2 and 3, this result could be interpreted as showing that expectancies 
(this time regarding emotion only) were generated on a trial-by-trial basis, making 
it difficult to predict whether a specific control strategy would be required on 
subsequent trials. This therefore resulted in similar interference effects on both 
low and high load trials.  It is worth noting, however, that Erthal et al. (2005) did 
find an RT effect in their last two experiments. Although task difficulty may have 
been a factor in explaining their results, their task differed from the current study 
in terms of stimuli and task demands (error rates were much higher than the 
current experiment, and load was manipulated by varying the difficulty of a 
perceptual decision rather than manipulating executive demands by varying 
Chapter 3 
 
	
	
104 
stimulus-response compatibility); therefore it is difficult to make a direct 
comparison. 
 
3.6 General Discussion  
 
 In the current study four experiments were conducted to investigate the 
conditions under which interference from emotional distractors can either be 
elicited or eliminated. In Experiment 1 we found that while RTs were 
disproportionately slowed by the presence of angry and fearful faces in the low 
cognitive load condition, they did not appear to be modulated by these emotional 
faces in the high cognitive load condition, in line with the findings of Sebastian et 
al. (2017). This finding, however, raised the question of whether the blocked 
nature of the task led to a top-down anticipatory strategy being imposed across the 
block and whether removing the blocks would eliminate the effect. We addressed 
this in a series of three experiments. In Experiment 2 all trials were randomised, 
and as predicted we found no disproportionate effect of emotion on low load 
trials. For the following experiments we intended to systematically investigate 
whether it is the load randomisation that was most responsible for this finding, or 
whether predictability of the emotion was also important. For Experiment 3 we 
kept emotion in blocks but randomised high and low load trials and again found 
the same pattern of results as Experiment 2. Finally, in Experiment 4 cognitive 
load was blocked but emotion was randomised. Although we predicted that we 
might see similar results to Experiment 1, as load was blocked, we found RT 
interference on both low and high load trials. We concluded that trials within a 
block need to be the same in all aspects (i.e. blocked by load and emotion) for 
top-down control to be imposed in a prospective manner and thus for interaction 
effects to be elicited, at least when perceptual inputs are also closely matched as 
in the present task. This is perhaps because a single difference from one trial to 
the next means that it is impossible to predict whether and how anticipatory top-
down mechanisms should be engaged. 
 
Chapter 3 
 
	
	
105 
 A key finding from this study is that when all trials were randomised the 
interaction effect disappeared. This was in line was the findings of Theeuwes et 
al. (2004), who used a non-emotional paradigm. They found that when all trial 
types were randomised, distractors were processed similarly during both high and 
low perceptual load conditions. They also found that processing of task-irrelevant 
stimuli for high load trials did occur in this context, but only when the previous 
trial was a low load trial. When a high load trial was preceded by another high 
load trial, little interference was observed, and overall no difference between load 
conditions was seen.  An analysis of sequential effects would have been 
interesting to conduct for Experiment 3, where load was randomised but emotion 
was still blocked, as the extent to which top-down cognitive sets or strategies are 
carried over from one trial to the next could have been explored. However this 
analysis would have resulted in a three-way interaction (Compatibility x Emotion 
x Trial Type), which we likely did not have enough power for in the present 
study. Conducting this analysis in future research of this kind using a larger 
sample size would be beneficial to further understand the conditions under which 
interference by task-irrelevant stimuli is observed. 
 
Our findings from Experiment 1 support Sebastian et al.’s (2017) data, 
however one difference was that while their interaction effect was driven by the 
fear condition, the interaction in Experiment 1 also showed an effect for anger, 
and there were significant main effects of anger in all four experiments. A large 
body of literature suggests that there is a bias towards fearful facial expressions 
relative to neutral and other emotional expressions with some suggesting that the 
early discrimination of fearful faces is due to signs of threat which rapidly activate 
neural circuits specialised for detecting danger (e.g. Esteves, Parra, Dimberg, & 
Öhman, 1994; Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Öhman, 2005). Indeed, experimental 
behavioural studies have shown that when categorising emotional faces, 
participants respond more quickly to fear than to anger expressions (Marsh, 
Ambady & Kleck, 2005). Marsh et al. (2005) suggested that the fear expression 
may give rise to a facilitatory effect as perceivers are easily primed by the 
saliency of fear (Yang et al., 2007). On the other hand, anger may make the 
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expresser appear more aversive thus leading to avoidance-related behaviours. 
Although this is not direct evidence for our findings, it does suggest an 
explanation for the current findings, in which anger interfered with task 
performance to a greater extent than fear across all four experiments. 
 
 Taken together, the experiments in the present study demonstrate that top-
down anticipatory control mechanisms are an important factor in the extent to 
which cognitive load impacts on emotional processing. This suggests that when 
perceptual inputs are matched, cognitive load per se does not reduce emotional 
capture. This finding is in line with Lavie's (2005) formulation of attentional load 
theory, which proposes that cognitive load may not always have the same effect as 
perceptual load. While perceptual load is commonly manipulated in the visual 
domain (e.g. varying number of items in the display), cognitive load pertains to 
altering executive demands (e.g. varying cognitive conflict). When cognitive load 
is high, it is more probable that distractor inhibition will fail and distractor 
interference effects will be observed, which is the opposite effect of perceptual 
load (see Murphy et al., 2016, for a review). Therefore future work should 
establish whether removing the possibility of using a top-down anticipatory 
strategy would also eliminate effects previously attributed to perceptual load (e.g. 
Erthal et al., 2005; Pessoa et al., 2005). Based on Lavie (2005) we might predict 
that we would see effects of perceptual but not cognitive load. In sum, the existing 
literature in this area has been somewhat disorganised; perceptual and cognitive 
load are often used interchangeably, studies have used a mixture of fully blocked, 
partially blocked, and fully randomised designs; tasks have included design 
confounds; and some studies find reaction time effects while others find effects in 
the amygdala but not reaction time. The present study has tried to address several 
of these issues, and in doing so, clarifies the circumstances under which cognitive 
load modulates the effects of emotion on task performance.  
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Chapter 4: Distancing as a reappraisal strategy for emotion 
regulation: efficacy, ease of use, and modulation by interoception 
and affective variables 
	
4.1 Introduction 
Chapters 2 and 3 focussed on implicit emotion processing and regulation. 
Here the focus is shifted onto more explicit emotion regulation. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, according to the Process Model (Gross, 1998), as awareness of 
emotional reactivity increases, regulation becomes more explicit. Ultimately, the 
emotional situation is deliberately appraised and evaluated. This can be achieved 
by engaging in cognitive change such as reappraisal, which involves cognitively 
reframing the meaning of the situation to reduce its emotional impact (Gross, 
1998) or response modulation, which refers to direct attempts to influence 
physiological, experiential or behavioural emotional responses once they already 
have been elicited (e.g. expressive suppression; Gross, 2002). Several 
behavioural, physiological and neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that 
reappraisal is effective at down regulating negative affect, and is more flexible 
and adaptive compared to other emotion regulation strategies such as expressive 
suppression, which involves merely hiding the outward expression of an 
emotional response (Ochsner & Gross, 2008; Ochsner et al., 2012; Ray, McRae, 
Ochsner, & Gross, 2010; Schartau, Dalgleish, & Dunn, 2009).  
  
However, reappraisal as an emotion regulation strategy is extremely broad, 
and refers to various ways in which one can change the meaning of an emotion-
eliciting situation. One important criticism of many existing studies of reappraisal 
efficacy is that participants can choose from any number of possible strategies 
(e.g. McRae, Ochsner, Mauss, Gabrieli, & Gross, 2008). For example, reappraisal 
can be operationalised as thinking “what’s happening is not real” or “things aren’t 
as bad as they appear to be” or imagining that injured individuals will be fine and 
help is on the way (i.e. situational reinterpretation). There are also strategies 
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within reappraisal, one of which is psychologically distancing oneself from the 
emotional situation, such as thinking that “things will improve with time” (i.e. 
temporal distancing) or “it’s not happening here” (i.e. spatial distancing) (McRae 
et al., 2008; Ochsner et al., 2004). Given the wide option of strategies, the strategy 
participants have actually implemented often remains unknown and may differ 
from trial to trial. This makes it difficult to know which aspects of reappraisal 
may be most effective and why. Thus recent studies have sought to more precisely 
delineate the efficacy of specific strategies encompassed by this definition.  
 
A recent study by Denny and Ochsner (2014) compared two different 
types of reappraisal, namely reinterpretation and distancing, using a common 
reappraisal task in which participants were instructed to downregulate their 
responses to negative photos. They found that both distancing and reinterpretation 
training resulted in reductions over a two-week period in self-reported negative 
affect. Additionally, participants who used distancing also showed a longitudinal 
decrease in negative affect on baseline trials on which they responded naturally, 
i.e. did not use any strategy. This suggested that the effects of distancing training 
may extend beyond trials in which participants were explicitly instructed to 
regulate by, in effect, “spilling over” to baseline trials where negative affect was 
also reduced. Only the distancing group showed such a reduction over and above 
the reduction seen in the no-regulation control group, suggesting that effects were 
not attributable to habituation. A number of other studies have also found that 
taking a self-distanced perspective when recalling a frustrating experience reduces 
the intensity of negative affect and blood pressure responses (Ayduk & Kross, 
2008; Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005). Neurally, 
distancing oneself from aversive photos has been found to modulate amygdala 
activity, an area associated with emotional reactivity, and engage brain networks 
implicated in cognitive control (Koenigsberg et al., 2010).  
 
Despite the clear effectiveness of distancing as an emotion regulation 
strategy, very few studies have looked at sub-strategies within distancing. Denny 
and Ochsner (2014) recently identified three distancing sub-strategies: thinking of 
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oneself as an objective impartial observer (e.g., “I don’t know any of the people 
involved”), using spatial distancing (e.g. “it is happening far away”), and using 
temporal distancing (e.g. “it happened a long time ago”). However, previous 
studies have not directly compared the efficacy of these three types of distancing, 
or looked at whether specific strategies may be easier to implement than others.  
To understand which strategies are effective and why, it is necessary to carefully 
isolate specific strategies, and perform a direct comparison. Thus the first aim of 
the present study was to move beyond the umbrella terms of reappraisal and 
distancing, and broaden our understanding of how the ability to regulate emotions 
varies with these different distancing sub-strategies. Relatedly, whilst many 
empirical studies of reappraisal more broadly and distancing specifically have 
examined strategy efficacy, such studies have measured this purely with 
participants’ numerical ratings, and have not asked participants what they are 
actually thinking. By assessing the ability of participants to implement the 
instructed strategies through random manipulation checks, we can also assess the 
ease with which they can use the different strategies. This is important not just to 
ensure participants are following instructions, but also because ease of use is an 
important consideration in terms of real-world applicability.  
 
A second research question concerned the role of interoceptive awareness 
(see section 1.5.2 for more detail). Early theories of emotion suggest that a 
prerequisite of successful emotion regulation is the awareness of one’s emotional 
state (Craig, 2004; Damasio, 1994; James, 1884). It might therefore be 
hypothesised that interoceptive awareness, i.e. awareness of one’s internal bodily 
signals, will facilitate the regulation of emotional responses; if bodily changes 
(e.g. heart rate) can be detected more accurately, this may in turn create 
advantages in the discrimination and deployment of appropriate strategies to 
regulate different emotional states. For example, Barrett, Gross, Christensen and 
Benvenuto (2001) found that individuals with highly differentiated emotion 
experience, who could clearly distinguish among a variety of negative and 
positive discrete emotions, were better at regulating their negative emotions 
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relative to individuals who experienced emotions in an undifferentiated manner 
(although awareness of bodily states was not measured directly). 
 
Indeed, previous research has found a relationship between emotion 
regulation efficacy and self-related awareness. Herwig et al. (2010) found that 
when participants were asked to be aware of their current emotions and bodily 
feelings, amygdala activity significantly decreased in comparison to awaiting a 
photo (neutral condition) or thinking about personal goals.  Therefore making 
oneself emotionally aware in this manner can attenuate emotional arousal. 
Furthermore, in a large-scale study consisting of over 400 participants, Kever, 
Pollatos, Vermeulen and Grynberg (2015) found that greater interoceptive 
awareness, measured using a heartbeat perception task (detailed in section 1.6.1 
and below), was associated with greater habitual use of reappraisal. According to 
the Process Model, reappraisal attenuates emotional response tendencies early on, 
before giving rise to developed responses. Therefore Füstös et al. (2013) 
hypothesised that interoceptive awareness would most likely show the strongest 
association with this particular strategy as it supports the detection of early bodily 
reactions in response to emotional stimuli, thus facilitating the implementation of 
reappraisal. Using a standard protocol for investigating reappraisal (e.g. Denny & 
Ochsner, 2014; McRae et al., 2010; Ochsner et al., 2004), Füstös et al. (2013) 
found that interoceptive awareness, measured using a heartbeat perception task, 
was positively correlated with the downregulation of subjective negative affect 
when using reappraisal. This was accompanied by a reduction of 
electrophysiological responses, which were positively correlated with 
interoceptive awareness. As part of characterising sub-strategies within 
reappraisal, the second aim of the present study was to investigate whether the 
findings regarding interoceptive awareness and reappraisal still hold when looking 
at distancing specifically. Furthermore we were also interested in whether 
relationships between distancing and interoceptive awareness would differ 
between the three distancing sub-strategies. 
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Finally, we investigated whether distancing efficacy and interoceptive 
awareness would be modulated by key affective variables, specifically trait 
aggression and everyday reappraisal use. As discussed in section 1.5.1.1, 
aggression has been shown to be associated with poor emotion regulation. For 
example, Martin and Dahlen (2005) found a negative correlation between self-
reported reappraisal and trait anger. Also less adaptive emotion regulation 
strategies, such as blaming others, rumination and catastrophising have been 
found to be positively associated with anger arousal and anger-eliciting situations 
(Besharat et al., 2013) (see Chapter 1 section 1.5.1.1 for more detail). In contrast, 
habitual usage of adaptive strategies such as reappraisal has been associated with 
better emotional and social outcomes (Gross & John, 2003; Troy, Wilhelm, 
Shallcross, & Mauss, 2010). However, to date no study has explored the 
relationships between distancing performance in an experimental task, affective 
measures of aggression, and habitual reappraisal use. 
To assess and compare the efficacy of the three distancing sub-strategies 
(temporal, spatial, and interpersonal) we used an adaptation of a standard 
experimental protocol used to investigate reappraisal (e.g. Denny & Ochsner, 
2014; McRae et al., 2010; Ochsner et al., 2002, 2004), whereby participants view 
negative and neutral photos and rate their distress and arousal following either the 
specific distancing instruction or passive viewing. Throughout the task 
participants were also instructed to write down how they implemented the 
particular instruction for a random selection of trials as a manipulation check. It 
was predicted that subjective ratings of arousal and distress would be lower in 
distancing conditions relative to the passive viewing conditions. However, as 
previous studies have not compared different distancing sub-strategies, a 
directional prediction as to which strategy would be the most effective or easy to 
implement was not made. Furthermore, based on literature investigating 
reappraisal more generally, it was hypothesised that those high in interoceptive 
awareness would be better at downregulating their negative emotions when using 
distancing, as would those who have lower levels of aggression and who use 
reappraisal more frequently in everyday life. 
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4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
An a priori power analysis indicated that 63 participants were needed to 
have 80% power for detecting an effect size of d=.36 for the difference in efficacy 
between reappraisal and no strategy, when employing the traditional α=.05 
criterion of statistical significance. This effect size was based on a meta-analytic 
review by Webb, Miles and Sheeran (2012), who combined the effect sizes of 99 
studies using reappraisal as an emotion regulation strategy. To investigate whether 
this sample size had sufficient power to detect individual differences, implied 
power was computed using a d=.50 (two-tailed, based on a medium effect size), 
which suggested approximately 96% power to detect an effect for a bivariate 
correlation. We therefore decided on a sample size of ~63 participants. 
 
Sixty-five participants were recruited from the Royal Holloway University 
of London participant pool and were either paid £5 or given course credit for their 
participation. One participant was excluded after inspection of the manipulation 
check revealed intense feelings of distress towards the stimuli and a failure to 
adhere to task instructions, leaving 64 participants (19 males) aged between 18 
and 38 (mean age=21.42, SD=3.54). One participant did not complete the 
questionnaire measures but were included in all other analyses. There were no 
specific exclusion criteria.  
 
4.2.2 Behavioural task and stimuli  
The distancing task was an adaptation of a standard protocol for 
investigating reappraisal that has been used in several prior studies (e.g., Denny & 
Ochsner, 2014; McRae et al., 2010; Ochsner et al., 2002, 2004; Wager et al., 
2008). During the task, participants completed five conditions, which included 
‘Look Neutral’ (participants rate natural reactions to neutral photos), ‘Look 
Negative’ (participants rate natural reactions to negative photos), and three 
distancing conditions. These were: ‘Impartial Observer Negative’ (negative 
pictures where the participant is instructed to view themselves as an impartial 
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observer, e.g. “it’s a scene from a movie, so the gun is not directed at me”), 
‘Spatial Distancing Negative’ (negative photos where the participant is instructed 
to spatially distance themselves, e.g. ”it’s happening in a country far away”), and 
‘Temporal Distancing Negative’ (negative photos where the participant is 
instructed to temporally distance themselves e.g. “it happened a long time ago”). 
Each condition comprised ten different photos. The photos were taken from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS) database and sorted into five sets 
(four negative and one neutral) which were matched on valence and arousal 
ratings from 1 – 9 (1 being very distressed and 9 being very happy for the distress 
rating scale; and 1 being very calm and 9 being very aroused for the arousal rating 
scale). Each of the four sets of negative photos was randomised to one of the four 
negative conditions anew for each participant. For the purpose of clarity, distress 
ratings were reversed to match the arousal ratings whereby 1= both low distress 
and low arousal.  The mean distress and arousal ratings for the four negative sets 
were 7.77 (SD=0.47) and 6.22 (SD= 0.57) respectively; the ratings between each 
of the negative sets did not significantly differ from each other (ps>.78). The 
average distress and arousal ratings for the neutral set were 4.89 (SD=0.32) and 
3.16 (SD=0.57) respectively. Stimuli were presented in two blocks, with each of 
the five conditions presented in a random order, followed by a short break, 
followed by the second block with each of the five conditions presented in a 
different random order. Each condition within each block comprised 5 photos, 
therefore a total of 50 photos were presented throughout the whole experiment. 
The order in which the photos were presented within each condition was 
randomised across participants, and participants saw each photo only once.  
 
Prior to the task, participants were presented with task instructions 
detailing the different conditions and the scales used for the ratings. For each 
distancing condition they were shown an example of a negative photo (different to 
those used in the task) along with an example of how they could implement the 
particular strategy. For example, for Spatial Distancing participants were shown a 
photo of a dead animal on dry and barren land accompanied with an example of 
how they could implement the instruction: “this is not England, it is always 
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raining here so droughts do not happen here and animals do not die of thirst and 
hunger”. Participants were also given relevant examples for Temporal Distancing 
(photo of dead soldiers: “this happened 100 years ago during WWI, I wasn’t even 
born then”) and Impartial Observer strategies (photo of people walking away from 
plane crash: “I don’t know any of the people involved”). Before starting the 
experiment, participants were asked if they understood all instructions and if they 
had any questions. In the task, each condition began with the corresponding 
‘Look’ or specific distancing instruction that participants had to employ and then 
each photo was displayed for six seconds (see Figure 4.1). After each photo, 
participants were asked to rate their levels of distress followed by arousal on Self-
Assessment Manikin (SAM) scales rated 1-9 on the keyboard. During each 
distancing condition in each block there was a manipulation check in which 
participants were prompted to write down what the previous picture was (memory 
check), and what they thought of to make themselves feel less negative about the 
photo. This was to check whether participants were paying attention and fulfilling 
task instructions appropriately. It also enabled us to look at whether there were 
differences between the strategies in how easily participants were able to 
implement task instructions. There were six manipulation checks in total: two for 
each of the three distancing conditions, with one manipulation check occurring at 
random within each block. The task was presented and responses were recorded 
using Psychtoolbox for Matlab (version R2013a).  
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4.2.3 Interoceptive awareness and analysis   
As described in Chapter 1 section 1.6.1, the most common method of 
assessing interoceptive awareness is the ability to perceive one’s heartbeats 
accurately (Dunn et al., 2007; Critchley et al., 2004). Heartbeat perception was 
measured using the Mental Tracking Method (Schandry, 1981). Participants 
completed the interoceptive awareness heartbeat perception task first to avoid 
carryover effects of emotion into the heart rate data if it were to be conducted 
after the distancing task or questionnaires.  Participants were instructed to start 
silently counting their own heartbeat when they heard an audio tone until they 
heard the tone again. The experiment consisted of three different time intervals of 
25s, 45s and 60s, separated by 10s resting periods, presented in the same order 
across participants. Following each interval, participants were asked to verbally 
report the number of counted heartbeats. Throughout, participants were not 
permitted to take their pulse, and no feedback on the length of the counting phases 
was given.  Heart rate was monitored with the RS800CX Polar watch and the H3 
POLAR heart rate sensor placed under the participants’ wrists. Interoceptive 
awareness was calculated as the mean score of the three heartbeat perception 
intervals according to the following transformation (as in Füstös et al., 2013):  
1/3 ∑ 1 – ([recorded heartbeats – counted heartbeats])/ recorded heartbeats)  
This equation measures the correspondence between the actual recorded 
heartbeats and subjective judgment (counted heartbeats). The interoceptive 
awareness score varies between 0 and 1 with higher scores indicating greater 
interoceptive awareness. 
Several studies have shown that clinical anxiety and state and trait anxiety 
influence interoceptive sensitivity (see Domschke, Stevens, Pfleiderer & Gerlach, 
2010, for a review), as well as emotion regulation in general (Goldin, Manber-
Ball, Werner, Heimberg, & Gross, 2009). Therefore state and trait anxiety 
(measured using The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; Spielberger et al., 1983) was 
controlled for when looking the relationships between interoceptive awareness 
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and distancing performance, in line with previous studies examining interoceptive 
awareness (Pollatos, Traut-Mattausch, Schroeder & Schandry, 2007)   
4.2.4 Questionnaire measures  
	
4.2.4.1 Assessment of aggression 
 The Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry, 1992) was 
administered, as in Chapter 3 (see section 3.2.2.4 for details). Analyses focused on 
Total Aggression score as there were no specific hypotheses for the individual 
subscales, and because variance for some of the subscales (e.g. Physical 
Aggression) was low as a result of the university-based sample tested in the 
present study.   
 
4.2.4.1 Assessment of emotion regulation  
 The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) is a 
10-item questionnaire consisting of two subscales corresponding to two different 
emotion regulation strategies: cognitive reappraisal (6 items) and expressive 
suppression (4 items). The items assess strategy use in everyday life and are rated 
on a 7-point-Likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree (Appendix 1d).  
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4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Distancing efficacy 
 A repeated measures ANOVA on the recorded self-report ratings revealed 
a significant main effect of distress ratings (F(4, 252)=182.12, p<.001, partial 
η 2=.74). Planned comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) revealed that photos 
presented during the Look Neutral condition (M=3.00, SD=1.72) were rated as 
significantly less distressing relative to those presented in the Look Negative 
condition (M=6.76, SD=1.26, t(63)=-15.08, p<.001) and all three distancing 
conditions (ps<.001). All distancing conditions were rated as significantly less 
distressing than the Look Negative condition (Impartial Observer: M=6.49, 
SD=1.20, t(63)=2.86, p=.006; Spatial Distancing: M=6.47, SD=1.23, t(63)=3.42, 
p=.001; Temporal Distancing M=6.43, SD=1.28, t(63)=3.64, p=.001). There were 
no significant differences in distress ratings between the three distancing 
conditions (ps>.58, see Figure 4.2a).  
 
There was also a significant main effect of arousal ratings (F(4, 
252)=169.08, p<.001, partial η 2=.73). Photos during the Look Neutral condition 
(M=1.87, SD=1.08) were rated as significantly less arousing relative to Look 
Negative (M=5.44, SD=1.56, t(63)=-17.13, p<.001) and all three distancing 
conditions (ps<.001). All distancing conditions were rated as significantly less 
arousing relative to the Look Negative condition (Impartial Observer: M=5.12, 
SD=1.54, t(63)=2.45, p=.017; Spatial Distancing: M=4.99, SD=1.60, t(63)=4.09, 
p<.001; Temporal Distancing:, M=4.94, SD=1.56, t(63)=4.55, p<.001). There 
were no significant differences in arousal ratings between the three distancing 
conditions (ps>.15, see Figure 4.2b).  
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Figure 4.2. Average a) distress and b) arousal ratings across all conditions. 
**p<.001 *p<.05. 
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4.3.2 Distancing: Ease of use 
 In order to investigate the ease with which participants were able to 
implement distancing as a regulatory strategy when instructed, the present study 
employed a manipulation check whereby each participant was asked to describe 
how they had used an instructed strategy on six different occasions (following two 
random Temporal Distancing trials, two random Spatial Distancing trials and two 
random Impartial Observer trials). Examples of participants’ written answers are 
presented in Table 4.1. Two independent coders with training in the reappraisal 
and distancing literature (one of whom is the author) coded the qualitative 
responses on whether they reflected: a) implementation of the correct strategy; b) 
implementation of any distancing strategy (both correct and incorrect) and c) 
implementation of any strategy that would count as reappraisal, whether correct or 
incorrect, distancing or non-distancing. Inter-rater reliabilities were moderate to 
high: for a) kappa=.78, p<.001, b) k=.62, p<.001, and c) k=.67, p<.001. 
Agreement was then reached between the coders by re-reading the written 
answers together to reach a consensus, after which percentages of trials falling 
into categories a), b) and c) were calculated (see Table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2. Strategy use reported during manipulation check trials (as a percentage of the 
total number of manipulation check trials across all participants). 
Percentage of trials implemented 
for each category: 
    
All Distancing Conditions 
a) Correct distancing strategy 
Total 
43% 
Impartial 
38% 
Spatial 
39% 
Temporal 
52% 
b) Any distancing strategy 52% 52% 47% 58% 
c) Any reappraisal strategy 
(distancing or non-distancing)  
   87%      85%     87%      88% 
 
Chapter 4	
	
	
121 
While these findings refer to only a subset of six out of 30 trials, they 
revealed that participants did not find it very easy to implement the instructed 
strategy, particularly for the Impartial Observer and Spatial Distancing conditions. 
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the group’s mean correct 
implementation of each strategy (scores ranging from 0-2 manipulation checks) 
revealed a significant main effect of Condition (F(2, 128)=3.70, p=.027, partial 
η2=.06). Pairwise comparisons showed that Temporal Distancing (M=1.05, 
SD=.78) was significantly easier to implement than Spatial Distancing (M=.79, 
SD=.80; (t(64)=-2.53, p=.014) and Impartial Observer Strategies (M=.75, SD=.83; 
t(64)=-2.20, p=.031). There was no significant difference between Impartial 
Observer and Spatial Distancing (p=.79). Interestingly, inspection of the overall 
data on strategy implementation showed that, where participants were unable to 
implement the instructed strategy, they nonetheless did use more general 
reappraisal strategies to reduce their distress and arousal on 87% of trials. 
 
4.3.3. Relationships between distancing and individual difference measures 
 The following analyses are conducted using measures of distancing 
efficacy (calculated as the difference in distress/arousal ratings between Look 
Negative and the distancing conditions). Higher scores on this variable indicate 
greater efficacy. Two participants were excluded from analyses using distress 
ratings for having difference scores three standard deviations above the group 
mean. One of these same participants was also excluded from analyses using 
arousal ratings for the same reason. The results above were not affected by 
including these participants. Relationships between the different individual 
difference measures are reported in Table 4.3, and are largely in line with 
expectations, i.e. aggression and anxiety are positively correlated with each other 
and negatively correlated with reappraisal use in everyday life. 
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Table 4.1.  A selection of participants’ written answers during the manipulation checks. 
	
 
Strategy  
 
Examples of written answers scored as either correct use of each 
type of distancing or scored as reappraisal (though not the 
instructed distancing strategy). Description of photos participants 
responded to are in parentheses.   
 
Impartial 
Observer 
 
° “I imagined myself as a photographer, there to observe but not 
take part and interfere.” (Starving child) 
° “I was impartial by thinking I did not know anyone on the 
plane.” (Plane crash) 
° “I thought of myself seeing it on the news and not really having 
any way of stopping it.” (Man with guns pointed at him) 
 
Spatial 
Distancing 
° “I thought that it is not in the UK, if you died here you would 
have a proper funeral and be buried in a coffin.” (Man burying 
a body in a ditch) 
° “Gun crime is much less prevalent in the UK, compared to 
somewhere like America for example.” (Car being held at 
gunpoint) 
° “I live in a society where this would not happen.” (Child half 
buried) 
 
Temporal 
Distancing  
° “Air travel is safer now so it’s unlikely to happen to me.” 
(Plane crash) 
° “This happened a long time ago so the man has probably 
recovered by now, or has passed away and is resting in peace.” 
(Man’s face beaten and covered in blood) 
° “It happened too long ago for me to do anything about it. The 
situation was out of my hands and if I could have been there to 
help then I would have tried to help the man.” (Man burnt 
alive) 
 
Reappraisal  ° “I couldn’t see any people so maybe no one got hurt.” (Outdoor 
fire) 
° “The soldiers are already doing everything possible to help the 
man.” (Soldiers helping an injured man escape) 
° “I pictured the man taking a photo of himself and not actually 
using the knife for anything other than the photo.” (Man 
holding a knife). 
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Table 4.3. Bivariate correlations between the individual differences measures. 
  
 
Total 
Aggression 
(Buss-Perry) 
Trait 
Anxiety 
(STAI-T) 
State 
Anxiety 
(STAI-S) 
Reappraisal 
(ERQ) 
Total Aggression -    
Trait Anxiety  .59** -   
State Anxiety .56** .70** -  
Reappraisal  -.47**    -.48**      -.45** - 
Interoceptive 
awareness 
(Hearbeat 
perception task) 
     -.11 .07 -.12 .14 
     (**p<.001) 
4.3.4 Interoceptive awareness 
Controlling for State and Trait Anxiety scores, interoceptive awareness 
was not significantly correlated with overall distancing efficacy (Look Negative – 
mean distress rating for all three distancing conditions) (r(60)=.13, p=.32). 
However when looking at individual distancing sub-strategies, the relationship 
between interoceptive awareness and Temporal Distancing efficacy was 
significant (r(60)=.29, p=.027; Figure 4.3) and in the predicted direction (i.e. 
positive), although note this result did not survive correction for multiple 
comparisons across the three separate correlations conducted.  The relationships 
between interoceptive awareness and Impartial Observer/Spatial Distancing 
efficacy were non-significant (r(60)=.028, p=.84; r(60)=-.022, p=.87, 
respectively). Steiger’s Z tests revealed that the difference between the correlation 
coefficients for Temporal Distancing and Impartial Observer (Z=1.96, p=.050) 
and Temporal Distancing and Spatial Distancing (Z=2.22, p=.027) was 
significant. Anxiety was controlled for, to be consistent with prior literature on 
interoception (Pollatos et al., 2007), however there was no difference in results 
when anxiety was not controlled for. 
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Together these findings suggest that 1) of the three distancing strategies, 
only Temporal Distancing was significantly associated with interoceptive 
awareness and 2) Temporal Distancing was significantly more strongly positively 
associated with interoceptive awareness than either of the other two distancing 
strategies. It is worth noting in this context that Temporal Distancing also seemed 
to be significantly easier for participants to implement accurately than the other 
two strategies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Positive correlation (r(60)=.29, p=.027) between interoceptive 
awareness score and Temporal Distancing efficacy (Look Negative – Temporal 
Distancing distress ratings). The greater the interoceptive awareness score, the 
greater the reduction in subjective distress relative to baseline (Look Negative) 
when using Temporal Distancing.  
 
There was no significant relationship between interoceptive awareness and 
overall distancing efficacy as measured by arousal ratings (r(60)=-.046, p=.73), or 
between interoceptive awareness and any of the three distancing sub-strategies (all 
ps>.085). There were also no significant correlations between interoceptive 
awareness and the questionnaire measures.  
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4.3.5 Distancing and questionnaire measures  
 There were no significant relationships between any measure of distancing 
efficacy and our questionnaire measures of aggression and reappraisal.  
 
4.4 Discussion 
 The present study represents the first evidence examining the efficacy and 
ease of use of three distancing sub-strategies of emotion regulation. Consistent 
with our predictions, task results revealed a significant down-regulation of 
negative affect (both distress and arousal ratings) during all three distancing 
conditions relative to responding naturally to negative photos. There were, 
however, no significant differences between the three distancing conditions. 
Inspection of written responses revealed that participants found implementing the 
different distancing strategies quite difficult and often used more general 
reappraisal strategies instead. Temporal distancing, however, tended to be more 
accurately implemented. Additionally, greater interoceptive awareness was 
associated with greater temporal distancing efficacy, but was not associated with 
the two remaining distancing sub-strategies. Finally, contrary to predictions, 
distancing efficacy was not related to aggression but those who scored highly on 
aggression (and anxiety) used reappraisal less in everyday life. 
 
The results of the behavioural task revealed that all three of the distancing 
sub-strategies led to reductions in self-reported negative affect relative to passive 
viewing of negative stimuli. This supports the existing literature, which has shown 
that reappraisal and distancing are effective at downregulating negative affect at 
behavioural, physiological and neural levels (e.g. Ayduk & Kross, 2008; Denny & 
Ochsner, 2014; Koenigsberg et al., 2010; Ochsner et al., 2012; Schartau et al., 
2009). While previous reappraisal studies have given participants the option to 
use several strategies within reappraisal (including variations of distancing, e.g. 
McRae et al., 2008), the difference in the efficacy of these strategies was not 
examined, but rather they were explored as a single reappraisal strategy. The 
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present study therefore adds to these findings by teasing apart ‘distancing’ into 
sub-strategies and comparing their relative efficacy. Despite the different 
operationalisations of distancing, i.e. the manipulation of both the perceived 
spatial and temporal distance to the negative event and viewing the negative event 
as an objective, impartial observer, there were no significant differences between 
these three sub-strategies in terms of strategy efficacy.  
 
However, the findings from the manipulation check revealed that 
participants used the correct strategy on fewer than half of the manipulation check 
trials, often resorting to more general reappraisal strategies, suggesting that 
implementing specific strategies appears to be more difficult than free reappraisal.  
It could be argued that free reappraisal may be more difficult than following a 
specific strategy as participants have to be more creative. Conversely, it may be 
difficult to apply a single rigid strategy across multiple different stimuli. 
According to the Extended Process Model (Sheppes et al., 2015 see section 1.2), 
following identification of one’s emotion state, selecting an appropriate regulatory 
strategy is a key stage of the emotion regulation process. Therefore participants 
may find it difficult to override this selection process in favour of the rigidly-
imposed experimental instruction. Despite this, temporal distancing was 
successfully implemented more often compared to spatial distancing and impartial 
observer strategies. Imagining that an event has happened in the distant past may 
be easier to implement as an emotion regulation strategy as it may help 
participants realise that the situation is beyond their control; they cannot change 
the past or do anything to help, which may contribute to reducing emotional 
reactions to the situation (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000). It is important to note, however, that 
these findings cannot be generalised to the remaining 80% of trials that we did not 
obtain qualitative data for. Nonetheless, to our knowledge no other prior studies 
of either reappraisal or distancing have directly assessed how, or the ease with 
which, participants are implementing the experimental instructions, thus 
extending the existing literature.  
 
Chapter 4	
	
	
127 
Our second prediction was that greater interoceptive awareness would be 
associated with greater down-regulation of negative affect. While interoceptive 
awareness was not related to distancing efficacy as a whole, temporal distancing 
was significantly more positively correlated with interoceptive awareness than 
spatial distancing and impartial observer strategies (neither of which were 
significantly correlated with interoceptive awareness), suggesting that greater 
sensitivity for one’s bodily state facilitates the regulation of emotional responses 
when using temporal distancing. The finding is in line with previous studies that 
have shown that interoceptive awareness facilitates the use of reappraisal as an 
emotion regulation strategy using a similar task consisting of aversive photos 
(Füstös et al., 2013). Our findings further indicate that this relationship only holds 
for a specific type of distancing, suggesting that temporal distancing may be 
particularly effective for individuals with high interoceptive awareness. This 
could be due to increased measurement error for impartial observer and spatial 
distancing strategies, as reflected by the significantly lower rates of 
implementation success relative to temporal distancing. However, across all three 
conditions, participants tended to use reappraisal to a similar extent even if they 
were unable to implement the instructed strategy. Since generic reappraisal has 
been positively associated with interoceptive awareness in previous studies 
(Füstös et al., 2013), it is unlikely that differences in strategy implementation rates 
can alone explain the effect. This suggests that there may be something specific to 
temporal distancing underlying this relationship. As mentioned above, temporal 
distancing seems to be effective as participants realise that although the situation 
was distressing at the time, there is nothing they can do now, thereby by 
diminishing their current emotional reactions. Those high in interoceptive 
awareness tend to be better at discriminating their emotional states (Craig, 2004), 
therefore they may be quicker and more effective at realising that their emotional 
states change and diminish over time. As proposed by James (1884), and more 
recently Barrett (2017), the perception of bodily reactions may be the crucial 
component for mediating the emotional experience. However, it is important to 
note that the correlation between temporal distancing efficacy and interoceptive 
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awareness would not survive correction for multiple comparison across the three 
correlations conducted in that analysis. 
 
Surprisingly the subjective distress findings did not extend to the 
subjective arousal data. Studies have shown that participants tend to find the 
arousal rating less clear-cut than the distress rating (e.g. Schmidtke, Schröder, 
Jacobs & Conrad, 2014) and the consensus is that there is an “absence of a clearly 
defined concept of ‘arousal’” (Ribeiro, Pompéia & Bueno, 2005, p. 214). 
Therefore measurement of the distress ratings may be more accurate, which is 
why we observed associations with distress but not arousal.  
 
Furthermore, we did not replicate Kever et al.’s (2015) finding of higher 
interoceptive awareness being associated with greater habitual reappraisal and 
suppression use. Despite using the same questionnaire and the same heartbeat 
perception measure, our absence of this finding is most likely attributable to their 
significantly larger sample size (over 400 participants) and thus greater power. 
Indeed, for our correlation (r=.14) to be significant (to p<.05), we would have 
needed at least 393 participants, mirroring Kever et al.’s (2015) sample size and 
effect size (r=.17).    
 
Contrary to predictions, there were no significant relationships between 
self-reported everyday reappraisal use and distancing. This could be because 
reappraisal as measured by the ERQ questionnaire and reappraisal performed in 
daily life are very different from the specific instructions given in the 
experimental setting. While neuroimaging studies have found a significant 
relationship between everyday reappraisal use and activation patterns of brain 
areas associated successful emotion regulation during an experimental task (e.g. 
Drabant, McRae, Manuck, Hariri & Gross, 2009), the processes underlying 
distancing may be sufficiently different to reduce these associations.  
  
We also found no supporting evidence for our prediction that aggression 
would be associated with poorer distancing efficacy. Although previous studies 
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that have shown that individuals high in aggression have difficulty regulating 
emotions (e.g. Besharat et al., 2013; Cohn et al., 2010; Martin & Dahlen, 2005), 
these studies have measured emotion regulation using questionnaires, not 
experimental tasks, and therefore it is difficult to compare findings. Indeed, we 
did find that habitual reappraisal use was reduced in those high in aggression, 
which further supports our assumption that reappraisal as measured by the ERQ is 
different from distancing performance on this specific experimental task.  Given 
that our sample consisted of undergraduate students, the lack of relationship 
between distancing efficacy and aggression could at least in part be due to a lack 
of variation in aggressive behaviour. Therefore the findings with regard to 
aggression would need to be extended to a general population sample or one with 
clinically relevant aggressive behaviour. 
 
 Another limitation of the present study should be noted. Upon inspection 
of the written answers to the manipulation check, overall successful instruction 
implementation was low and not all participants were able to utilize certain 
strategies for certain photos, with most using alternative reappraisal strategies. A 
reason for this is that certain instructions may not be equally easy for all stimuli, 
for example, thinking that an event is happening far away may not be effective for 
someone who has friends and family in that particular ‘far away’ location (e.g. for 
the 9/11 twin towers photo, one participant noted that they have family in 
America and therefore this strategy did not help them). Additionally, based on the 
written responses, some photos were not distressing and/or arousing to certain 
participants, which meant they did not need to implement any strategy as they had 
no negative affect to regulate. Given that we had this written insight for only 20% 
of the task, exclusions based on these responses could not be justified. However, 
our manipulation check did suggest that measurement error could be relatively 
high in the current task. To our knowledge no previous reappraisal or distancing 
study has included a manipulation check like this, which leads to the concern that 
it is unknown how accurately participants are implementing instructions across 
studies.  
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 While this is the first study to investigate the sub-strategies of distancing, 
future studies could use a larger sample and provide more rigorous training to 
either tease apart the different effects of the distancing sub-strategies in more 
detail, or confirm our findings showing that there are no differences between the 
efficacies of the different types of distancing. Nonetheless, the findings 
demonstrate that psychological distancing is an effective emotion regulation 
strategy, and that temporal distancing efficacy in particular is modulated by 
individual differences in interoceptive awareness. 
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Chapter 5: Using temporal distancing to regulate emotion in 
adolescence: modulation by reactive aggression. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 4, distancing involves mentally changing the 
interpretation of an emotional event by increasing or decreasing one’s 
psychological distance from it (Kross et al., 2005; Ochsner et al., 2004). 
Distancing studies typically instruct participants to vary the perceived temporal 
(e.g. ‘it happened a long time ago’) or physical (‘it’s happening far away’) 
distance of an emotional event, or to adopt an impartial observer outlook on the 
event (Denny & Ochsner, 2014). All three of these operationalisations of 
distancing were equally effective at reducing subjective negative affect in our 
paradigm in Chapter 4, thus supporting the findings from behavioural, 
physiological and neuroimaging studies which have demonstrated the efficacy of 
distancing in adults (Ayduk & Kross, 2008; Denny & Ochsner, 2014; 
Koenigsberg et al., 2010) and children (Kross, Duckworth, Ayduk, Tsukayama, & 
Mischel, 2011). Temporal distancing, however, tended to be more accurately 
implemented than the other two distancing strategies suggesting that it is perhaps 
an easier strategy.  
 
One aim of the current study evaluates the degree to which a manipulation 
of the magnitude of temporal distance modulates emotional responses. While we 
were not specific about how participants implemented the strategy in Chapter 4 
(e.g. ‘think about events happening a long time ago’), the current study was more 
stringent in how temporal distancing was operationalised, particularly focussing 
on thinking about the future rather than the past. Recent studies have shown that 
thinking about whether a stressful life event would affect you in in the distant (as 
opposed to near) future reduces distress (Bruehlman-Senecal & Ayduk, 2015), 
and that use of this strategy in everyday life is associated with greater wellbeing 
(Bruehlman-Senecal, Ayduk, & John, 2016). However, existing experimental 
evidence derives from asking participants to regulate distress associated with only 
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one stressful event that participants had recently experienced. The present study 
sought to combine experimental and physiological approaches from the cognitive 
reappraisal literature with a novel manipulation of temporal distancing extent.  
 
A second objective was to examine the development of temporal 
distancing efficacy from adolescence to adulthood. Adolescence is a key time for 
the emergence of internalising and externalising conditions (Bask, 2015; Moffitt, 
1993; Paus et al., 2008). Many of these symptoms, such as reactive aggression, 
are associated with poor emotion regulation (Eisenberg, Spinrad & Eggum, 2010; 
Lewis et al., 2008). This may be at least in part due to on-going development of 
frontolimbic circuitry involved in regulatory processes (Ahmed et al., 2015; 
Casey et al., 2008; Sebastian et al., 2010; Somerville & Casey, 2010, see section 
1.5.3 for more detail). Experimental studies of reappraisal efficacy suggest 
development may be protracted. For example, McRae et al. (2012) found a linear 
improvement in reappraisal ability with age (10–22 years), accompanied by a 
concomitant age-related increase in left vlPFC response, associated with cognitive 
control. Regarding distancing specifically, Silvers et al. (2012) instructed 
participants to imagine being further away from the scene and to focus more on 
facts than emotional details (i.e. a combination of spatial and impartial observer 
aspects of distancing). There was a pattern of linear improvement in regulation 
success from ages 10-18, with a tapering thereafter. In an fMRI study consisting 
of 112 participants (aged 6–23 years) using the same paradigm, Silvers et al. 
(2016) found that during distancing age predicted reduced amygdala activation, 
with vlPFC recruitment mediating this relationship. 
 
Thus, a second aim of the present study was to isolate the developmental 
progression of effective temporal distancing. In the study by Bruehlman-Senecal 
and Ayduk (2015), the temporal distancing instruction required participants to 
imagine how they would feel about a recent event in the distant future, i.e. in 
several years’ time. However, episodic future thinking, i.e. the ability to ‘pre-
experience’ events before they happen and project oneself into the future 
(Schacter, Benoit, De Brigard, & Szpunar, 2015), continues to develop into 
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adolescence, along with underlying episodic memory and executive function 
skills (Gott & Lah, 2014). Relatedly, research investigating temporal discounting 
has found that adolescents opt for smaller immediate rewards over larger longer-
term rewards to a greater extent than do adults (Steinberg et al., 2009; Whelen & 
McHugh, 2009), suggesting that adolescents may be less able to take into account 
their future selves and anticipate consequences when making these types of 
decisions. Together, these data suggest that adolescents may be more ‘present-
oriented’ than adults, and may thus have more difficulty implementing a temporal 
distancing strategy.    
 
A final research question concerns the role of individual differences in 
aggressive behaviour. Adolescence is associated with a peak in reactive 
aggression (Moffitt, 1993), i.e. aggression occurring in response to a perceived 
provocation or threat (Berkowitz, 1993). In contrast, proactive aggression, which 
tends to be more stable over the lifespan, is a relatively non-emotional display of 
aggression that is unprovoked and used for instrumental gain (Dodge & Coie, 
1987). Studies investigating adults, adolescents and children have found that 
reactive aggression is associated with low frustration tolerance and high affective-
physiological arousal that is poorly regulated (Chase, O’Leary, & Heyman, 2001; 
Marsee & Frick, 2007; Vitaro, Brendgen, & Tremblay, 2002, see section 1.5.1.1). 
Poor emotion regulation is therefore particularly associated with reactive as 
opposed to proactive aggression (Eisenberg et al., 2010) and thus we would 
predict that reactive aggression would be specifically associated with difficulties 
in implementing reappraisal strategies such as temporal distancing. Experimental 
studies in adults suggest that while reappraisal is effective at reducing reactive 
anger (Fabiansson & Denson, 2012) and vengeance (Barlett & Anderson, 2011), 
high trait aggression is negatively associated with questionnaire-based measures 
of reappraisal (e.g. Martin & Dahlen, 2005). Moreover in a large-scale study of 
over one thousand adolescents, adaptive emotion regulation negatively predicted 
self- and peer-reported aggressive behaviour (Calvete & Orue, 2012). However, 
the relationship between self-reported aggression in everyday life and instructed 
reappraisal ability (in this case temporal distancing) is unknown in both adults and 
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adolescents. In the present study, we combine an experimental manipulation of 
reappraisal and characterisation of aggression subtypes to test how age, individual 
differences in temporal distancing ability and aggression in daily life interact.  
 
The present study investigated the efficacy of temporal distancing as an 
emotion regulation strategy across the transition from adolescence to adulthood, 
and examined the role of individual differences in aggressive behaviour. To do so, 
we adapted a standard protocol for investigating reappraisal of emotional images 
(e.g., Denny & Ochsner, 2014; McRae et al., 2012; Ochsner et al., 2002, 2004). 
We report a novel version with stimuli comprising written stressful ‘everyday’ 
scenarios, to facilitate episodic future thinking. Similar to the task by Bruehlman-
Senecal and Ayduk (2015), participants were instructed to take a distant-future 
perspective, a near-future perspective, or to react naturally to each scenario, and 
then to rate their distress and arousal. The relative difficulty of distancing over 
simply reacting could distract from the distress elicited, therefore the near-future 
condition was included to control for the cognitive processes involved in taking a 
distant perspective. Skin conductance was measured to provide a more objective 
physiological measure to complement self-report ratings. We predicted: 1) Distant 
future versus near future distancing would be an effective emotion regulation 
strategy as indexed by self-report and skin conductance data (i.e. lower self-
reported ratings and skin conductance responses during the Distant condition). 2) 
The efficacy of temporal distancing would increase with age from adolescence to 
young adulthood. 3) Reactive, but not proactive, aggression would peak in 
adolescence and be associated with reduced efficacy of temporal distancing. 
 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants  
Eighty-four participants were recruited from Harvard University 
Secondary School Program and the local Boston community, using opportunity 
sampling. Data for one participant were excluded from all analyses due to a 
failure to adhere to task instructions leaving a total of 83 participants (50 females, 
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age range 12-22 years: 12 participants aged 12-14; 33 aged 15-17; 38 aged 18-22). 
One participant did not complete the questionnaire measures, and two participants 
were excluded from the skin conductance response (SCR) analyses due to 
experimenter error in one case and a non-responsive dataset (no SCR>0.05 
µSiemens) in the other. Participants received course credit or were paid $15 for 
their participation in the study. Before study participation, participants and their 
legal guardians provided written assent and consent under a protocol approved by 
the Committee for Use of Human Subjects at Harvard University. 
 
5.2.2 Behavioural task and stimuli 
The stimuli consisted of scenarios (short sentences) that were either 
negatively valenced (N=30; e.g. “You fail an important exam”) or neutral (N=10; 
e.g. “The main hall is being repainted”) (see Appendix 2 for an adapted version of 
the stimuli (used in the fMRI study in Chapter 6)). Some of these scenarios were 
adapted from Salemink and Wiers (2012). Prior to the main experiment, stimuli 
were piloted for valence, arousal and the length of time over which the scenarios 
were judged to impact a person’s life with a sample of 16 participants (aged 16-
27). Based on the pilot data, the scenarios were sorted into four sets (three sets 
containing negative scenarios and one set containing neutral scenarios). Negative 
sets were matched on valence and arousal ratings from 1–9 (1=very happy, 
9=very distressed for the distress rating and 1=very calm, 9=very anxious/stressed 
for the arousal ratings). Average distress and arousal ratings of the 30 negative 
scenarios were 6.56 (SD=1.03) and 6.58 (SD=1.26) respectively; the ratings 
between each of the negative sets did not significantly differ from each other 
(ps>.99). The average distress and arousal ratings for the neutral set were 2.78 
(SD=0.62) and 3.15 (SD=1.95) respectively.  There were significant differences 
between the neutral set and all three negative sets for valence (ps<.001) and 
arousal (ps<.01). The negative sets were also matched on the time over which 
scenarios would impact a person’s life (1= up to tonight/tomorrow, 6= up to 5 
years). Average impact time rating across the three negative sets was 2.38 
(SD=0.10) and ratings between each of the negative sets did not significantly 
differ from each other (ps>.99).  Each of the three sets of 10 negative scenarios 
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was randomised to one of the three negative conditions (Read, Near Future, 
Distant Future) for each participant. The neutral set was always paired with the 
‘Read’ instruction.  
 
As an additional stimulus control measure, the three negative sets were 
matched for type of stressor and social content (each set contained two scenarios 
from each of the following: social rejection, embarrassment, anger/frustration, 
physical pain and threatening future existence). The remaining neutral set 
contained scenarios that drew on features from a random selection of 10 negative 
scenarios e.g. the neutral scenario “your friend has blonde hair” drew on features 
from the negative scenario “you have a serious argument with your friend” 
(matched for social content). Stimuli were presented in blocks, with 5 stimuli 
from the same condition in each block. Participants completed two runs of the 4 
conditions, presented in a different random order each time.  The order in which 
the scenarios were presented within each condition was randomised across 
participants, and each participant saw each scenario only once. 
 
Participants viewed these scenarios within four conditions. They included 
‘READ [neutral]’ (participants read and rated natural reactions to neutral 
scenarios), ‘READ [negative]’ (participants read and rated natural reactions to 
negative scenarios), ‘Think of whether these situations would still affect you in 
the DISTANT future’ (negative scenarios where the participant was instructed to 
use distancing (further details below)) and ‘Think of whether these situations 
would still affect you in the NEAR future’ (negative scenarios where the 
participant was instructed to use distancing, but only to consider the near future: a 
control for the cognitive processes involved in distancing). Prior to beginning the 
task, participants were asked to read the task instructions and were shown 
examples of negative scenarios (different from those used in the task) and specific 
instructions for each condition. The task was also verbally explained to them and 
it was reiterated that for Near and Distant conditions, they had to project 
themselves into the future to consider how each scenario would likely affect them 
at the chosen time point, and then consider and rate how they currently felt after 
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projecting themselves. This was to increase the likelihood that participants would 
all be using the same strategy in the same way. Participants were not given 
examples of what ‘near’ and ‘distant’ meant as what is regarded as the ‘near’ or 
‘distant’ future may differ between individuals. They were given a timescale 
during the manipulation check (see below), which they could use to guide them. 
 
At the beginning of every five trials, the corresponding READ or specific 
distancing instruction (5 seconds) was presented, followed by the scenario which 
was displayed on screen for 7 seconds (see Figure 5.1 for trial structure). After 
each scenario, participants rated their distress and arousal on SAM scales rated 1-
9 (low to high) on the keyboard. As a manipulation check, participants were also 
asked to rate the distance in time adopted on each trial for Near Future and Distant 
Future conditions on a timescale (1=tonight/tomorrow, 2=one week, 3=one 
month, 4=six months, 5=one year, 6=two years, 7=three years, 8=five years, 
9=ten years from now). This also enabled us to examine whether the timeframe 
adopted varied with regulatory efficacy, age and aggression. Participants were 
given a fixed duration of 7 seconds for each rating (separated by a 0.5 second 
fixation cross). The task was presented and responses were recorded using 
Psychtoolbox for Matlab (version R2015a). 
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5.2.3 Skin conductance and analysis 
Prior to the task, two skin conductance electrodes were placed on the distal 
phalanges of the middle and index fingers of the participant’s non-dominant hand, 
attached with a Velcro strap. This arm was also strapped onto the table to ensure 
that participants kept still throughout the task. A skin conductance recording 
system (GSR100C Biopac, Goleta, CA) together with AcqKnowledge 4.0 
(Biopac; Goleta, CA) software continuously sampled skin conductance data at 
100 Hertz during the task.  
 
A 0.05Hz high-pass filter was applied to the tonic electrodermal activity 
(EDA) signal to yield phasic EDA. Skin conductance responses (SCR) in the 
following analyses refer to SCRs that were elicited in the 11 seconds following 
scenario onset (comprising the 7 secs during which each stimulus was presented 
plus 4 seconds; see Figure 5.1 (responses later than 4 secs after the stimulus offset 
are usually considered a non-specific response (Boucsein et al., 2012)). A 
minimum threshold detection level of 0.04 µSiemens was applied during this 
period. For all SCRs identified during this time window (i.e. for each trial), the 
peak amplitude was recorded and the average peak height relative to the pre-
response baseline across trials of the same condition was used as the dependent 
variable (amplitude). SCR data were not normally distributed and therefore were 
square root transformed prior to statistical analysis in line with previous similar 
studies (e.g. Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Wolgast, Lundh & Viborg, 2011).    
 
5.2.4 Developmental analysis 
As in prior work, age was invoked as a continuous predictor of 
developmental differences to maximise statistical power and to mitigate the need 
to create semi-arbitrary boundaries between age groups (e.g. Somerville et al., 
2013). Age was invoked as a linear predictor of change, calculated by mean-
centring each participant’s actual age. As some previous studies have shown a 
non-linear pattern of emotion regulation development between adolescence and 
	 Chapter 5	
 
 
140 
adulthood, suggestive of mid-adolescence as a time of maximal developmental 
‘mismatch’ between emotional reactivity and regulatory processes (e.g. Silvers et 
al., 2012), the quadratic predictor (age2) was also included in statistical analyses 
(computed by squaring mean-centred age). These predictors were uncorrelated as 
regressors (r(81)=.030, p=.79) and were therefore placed in the same regression 
model. 
 
5.2.5 Questionnaire measures  
The Reactive Proactive Aggression questionnaire (RPQ; Raine et al., 
2006) consists of 23 items, and measures reactive (11 items e.g. “become angry 
when others threatened you”) and proactive (12 items; e.g. “Had fights with 
others to show who was on top”) aggression in child and adolescent samples. 
Each item is rated as 0 (never), 1 (sometimes), or 2 (often) for frequency of 
occurrence (Appendix 1e). 
  
Participants also completed the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), as aggression and anxiety 
are typically moderately correlated and this allowed us to examine whether results 
concerning aggression would hold after controlling for anxiety. 	
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Hypothesis 1: Distancing efficacy 
5.3.1.1 Behavioural data 
 
Distress 
 A repeated measures ANOVA revealed the hypothesised main effect of 
Condition on distress ratings (F(3, 246)=374.19, p<.001, partial η 2=.82). Pairwise 
comparisons were conducted showing that Distress ratings followed the pattern: 
Read Neutral (M=2.89, SD=1.31) < Distant Future (M=5.97, SD=1.41) < Near 
Future (M=6.54, SD=1.14) < Read Negative (M=6.78, SD=.84), (all ps<.05, see 
Figure 5.2a). The results suggest that distancing was effective relative to using no 
strategy, and that a greater temporal scope of distancing was more successful at 
reducing distress.  
 
 There was also a positive correlation between distancing success (defined 
as ratings for Read Negative – Distant Future; McRae et al., 2012) and subjective 
reports of mean distance in time adopted during Distant Future trials (M=4.37, 
SD=1.45, range=1.30-8.67; r(81)=.38, p<.001, see Figure 5.3a), i.e. participants 
who were more effective in reducing their distress tended to project themselves 
further into the future. This remained significant after controlling for age 
(r(81)=.37, p=.001). The correlation between distancing success using Near 
Future distancing (Read Negative - Near) and time adopted during this condition 
(M=2.68, SD=1.07, range=1-6) was non-significant (r(81)=.11, p=.33). The 
difference between these correlation coefficients was marginally significant 
(Z=1.81, p=.063; Raghunathan, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1996). 
 
Arousal  
 A repeated measures ANOVA revealed the hypothesised main effect of 
Condition on arousal ratings (F(3, 246)=481.46, p<.001, partial η 2=.85). Arousal 
ratings followed the pattern: Read Neutral (M=1.76, SD=.65) < Distant Future 
(M=5.06, SD=1.52) < Near Future (M=5.65, SD=1.37) < Read Negative (M=6.02, 
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SD= 1.04) (all ps<.005, see Figure 5.2b). Thus, distancing was effective in 
reducing arousal as well as distress, relative to control conditions.  
 
 There was also a positive correlation between distancing success (defined 
as above but using arousal ratings) and distance in time adopted during the Distant 
Future condition (r(81)=.35, p=.001, see Figure 5.3b). This remained significant 
after controlling for age (r(81)=.35, p=.001). The correlation between distancing 
success and time adopted during the Near Future condition was non-significant 
(r(81)=-.023, p=.83). The difference between these correlation coefficients was 
significant (Z=2.46, p=.011). 
 
5.3.1.2 Skin Conductance Data 
 A repeated measures ANOVA on the mean peak amplitude of SCRs 
revealed a significant main effect of Condition (F(3, 240)=2.92, p=.035, partial 
η 2=.035). Scenarios presented during the Read Neutral condition (M=.54 µS, 
SD=.25) elicited significantly lower amplitudes of SCRs relative to the Read 
Negative condition (M=.61, SD=.23, p=.023) and the Near Future condition 
(M=.62, SD=.26; p=.021, see Figure 5.4) but was not significantly different from 
the Distant Future condition (M=.58 SD=.24; p=.16). There were no significant 
differences between Read Negative and either Near Future (p=.72) or Distant 
Future (p=.28) conditions, neither was there a difference between Distant and 
Near conditions (p=.12).  
 
 There were no significant correlations between SCR distancing success 
and distance in time adopted during the Distant Future condition (r(79)=.058, 
p=.61) or the equivalent for the Near Future condition (r(79)=.004, p=.97).  
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Figure 5.2. Mean ratings for a) distress and b) arousal for all conditions 
(**p<.001. *p<.05). 
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Figure 5.3. Scatterplots depicting the relationship between distance in time 
adopted during the distant future condition (x-axis: Likert scale (1= 
tonight/tomorrow, 9=ten years)) and distancing success (y-axis: reduction in a) 
affect, and b) arousal, relative to free viewing). 
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Figure 5.4. Mean peak skin conductance amplitude for each condition. 
 
5.3.2 Hypothesis 2: Developmental effects 
	
5.3.2.1 Distancing task 
In line with previous studies (e.g. McRae et al., 2012; Silvers et al., 2012), 
regression analyses were performed to test for age effects on emotional reactivity 
(defined as ratings for Read Negative – Read Neutral) as well as distancing 
success.  
 
 The regression equation for emotional reactivity was not significant as 
measured by distress (F(2,80)=.23, p=.80) or arousal (F(2,80)=.99, p=.38) ratings. 
Linear and quadratic relationships between age and emotional reactivity were all 
non-significant (ps>.80).  
 
 The regression equation for distancing success was also non-significant as 
measured by distress (F(2,80)=.51, p=.60) and arousal (F(2,80)=.42, p=.66) 
ratings. Linear and quadratic relationships between age and distancing success 
were all non-significant (ps>.66).  
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 The correlation between age and distance in time adopted during Distant 
Future (r(81)=.032, p=.77) was non-significant, but was marginally significant for 
the Near Future condition (r(81)= -.202, p=.065). 
 
5.3.2.2 SCR data 
 Correlation analyses between age and SCR data also revealed non-
significant relationships between age and SCR measures of emotional reactivity 
(r(79)=-.089, p=.43) and distancing success (r(79)=.031, p=.78). 
 
5.3.2.3 Aggression and anxiety measures 
 Aggression scores for the adolescents in the present sample (Proactive 
Aggression: M=1.32, SD=.27; Reactive Aggression: M=2.24, SD=.45) were 
similar to that of previous studies in typical adolescents (Calvete & Orue, 2012; 
Proactive Aggression: M=1.28, SD=.38; Reactive Aggression: M=1.86, SD=.42). 
  
There were both significant linear (r(80)=-.24, p=.033) and quadratic 
relationships between age and reactive aggression: (F(2,79)=3.74, p=.028). The 
quadratic relationship was an inverted U (see Figure 5.5), showing a peak during 
mid-adolescence (15.4 years). However there was neither a linear (p=.54) nor 
quadratic (p=.41) relationship between proactive aggression and age.  
  
There was no significant linear relationship between Trait Anxiety and age 
(p=.68) however there was a significant quadratic relationship (F(2,79)=3.93, 
p=.024), with the peak during late adolescence (17.6 years). 
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Figure 5.5. Scatterplot showing that reactive aggression peaked during mid 
adolescence in the present sample. 
 
5.3.3 Hypothesis 3: Distancing success and reactive aggression 
 Reactive aggression was negatively correlated with distancing success, as 
measured by distress ratings (r(80)=-.28, p=.010; Figure 5.6a). This relationship 
remained significant after controlling for proactive aggression (r(80)=-.22, 
p=.047), age (r(80)=-.27, p=.013), and trait anxiety (r(80)=-.25, p=.027), all of 
which showed significant positive correlations with reactive aggression (ps<.05). 
Furthermore, the effect remained significant when controlling for gender, showing 
that gender did not modulate the relationship (F(2, 79)=3.56, p=.033). To 
investigate whether the negative relationship between reactive aggression and 
distancing success was driven by baseline reactivity or the distancing condition 
itself we examined correlations between reactive aggression and distress ratings 
during the Distant Future and Read Negative conditions separately (see Figure 
5.6b). There was a positive relationship between reactive aggression and distress 
levels during the Distant Future condition (r(80)=.312, p=.004), but no 
relationship in the Read Negative condition (r(80)=.144, p=.20). While a Steiger’s 
Z test did not show a significant difference between the slopes (Z=-1.77, p=.077), 
the pattern of results seen in Figure 5.6b suggests that the significant negative 
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relationship between distancing success and reactive aggression was driven by the 
Distant Future condition. Indeed, inspection of the slopes reveals that for those 
highest in reactive aggression, distress in the Distant Future condition did not 
differ from distress during Read Negative (no strategy).    
 
Given the negative relationship between distancing success and reactive 
aggression, and the positive relationship between distancing success and distance 
in time adopted, we conducted an exploratory analysis to examine the relationship 
between reactive aggression and distance in time adopted during the Distant 
Future condition. This showed a marginal negative correlation (r(80)=-.213, 
p=.055), i.e. those high in reactive aggression projected themselves less far into 
the future.  
 
There was no significant relationship between reactive aggression and 
distancing success as measured by arousal ratings (r(80)=-.19, p=.091). There 
were also no significant relationships between proactive aggression and distancing 
success using either distress or arousal ratings (all ps>.19).    
 
There were no significant correlations between reactive aggression and 
SCR measures of emotional reactivity or distancing success (ps>.96). 
 
Finally, we looked for interactions between age and distancing success in 
predicting reactive aggression, and between age and reactive aggression 
predicting distancing success using the PROCESS toolbox for SPSS. However 
neither analysis was significant (b = .062, 95% CI [-.28, .40], t=.36, p=.72; b= 
.012, 95% CI [-.01, .03], t=1.38, p=.17, respectively). 
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Figure 5.6. a) Relationship between Reactive Aggression and Distancing Success; 
b) Relationships between distress ratings for Distant Future and Read Negative 
conditions and Reactive Aggression. 
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5.4 Discussion 
 The present study investigated the efficacy of temporal distancing 
(thinking how one would be affected by a given scenario in the distant future) as 
an emotion regulation strategy across adolescence, and the role of individual 
differences in reactive aggression. Consistent with our hypotheses, temporal 
distancing was an effective emotion regulation strategy as indicated by subjective 
ratings and, to a lesser extent, skin conductance responses. However, efficacy did 
not vary with age between adolescence and adulthood. Finally reactive, but not 
proactive, aggression was associated with reduced efficacy of temporal 
distancing. 
 
5.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Distancing efficacy  
 In line with the first prediction, subjective ratings indicated that temporal 
distancing (Distant Future) was an effective emotion regulation strategy over and 
above no strategy (Read Negative) and taking a near future perspective, as 
measured by both distress and arousal ratings. There was no significant difference 
in skin conductance between the Distant Future and Read Negative conditions, 
however the pattern of results was in the predicted direction. Also while SCRs 
were significantly higher in the Read Negative and Near Future conditions 
relative to reading neutral scenarios, responses did not significantly differ between 
taking a distant-future perspective and reading neutral scenarios. Since the present 
study was conducted, a study in adults comparing reappraisal, distraction and no 
strategy, found similar null findings of SCR (Kinner et al., 2017). Together these 
findings replicate and significantly extend the existing literature by showing that 
temporal distancing (specifically projecting oneself into the future) is effective as 
an emotion regulation strategy using an empirically rigorous task. Crucially, 
participants who projected themselves further into the future benefited most from 
this strategy. These findings build confidence in the effectiveness of future-
oriented regulation strategies. 
 
 It could be argued that the mere act of projection into the future is a 
distraction from the distress elicited, leading to reduced behavioural and 
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physiological responses.  We included the Near Future condition specifically to 
control for the intensity of task demands. The behavioural data showed that 
distress and arousal were significantly lower during the Distant Future condition 
relative to Near Future, a condition matched as far as possible for all cognitive 
processes except distance in time adopted (including following instructions, using 
episodic future thinking and generating mental imagery). This suggests that 
adopting a distant perspective specifically is effective over and above any more 
general effects seen in the Near Future condition; a conclusion bolstered by the 
correlation discussed above between distancing success and distance in time 
adopted.  
 
 There are a number of reasons why temporal distancing may be effective. 
According to Construal Level Theory, adopting a distant perspective on stressful 
events de-emphasises their concrete and situation-specific features and instead 
characterises them abstractly (Liberman & Trope, 2008). This can be applied to 
temporal distancing whereby adopting a distant future perspective on stressful 
events can highlight one’s awareness of the impermanence and relative 
insignificance of their reactions to these events, thereby reducing distress caused 
in the present. Another potential mechanism for temporal distancing efficacy is 
that psychologically healthy people tend to view their distant future as more 
positive (Heller, Stephan, Kifer, & Sedikides, 2011) and expect their lives and 
emotional experiences to be more stable relative to their view of their near future 
(Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002; Wakslak, Nussbaum, Liberman, & Trope, 
2008). Indeed Bruehlman-Senecal and Ayduk (2015) found that the extent to 
which participants focused on the impermanent nature of their stressor (measured 
using a questionnaire) mediated the relationship between temporal distancing and 
reduced distress. With regards to the present study, the specific instructions and 
prior examples given to participants was intended to ensure that they were using 
episodic future thinking (actually projecting themselves into the future using 
mental imagery) as opposed to using cognitive rationalisations (‘this probably 
won’t affect me in future’) or other strategies to reduce their distress. This 
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emphasis on participants ‘pre-experiencing’ their future reactions may have 
helped them to realise the impermanent nature of the stressors presented. 
 
5.4.2 Hypothesis 2: Developmental effects 
The second hypothesis was that temporal distancing efficacy would 
increase with age between adolescence and adulthood as previous studies have 
shown that this period is associated with on-going development in emotion 
regulation abilities (e.g. McRae et al., 2012) and the brain systems which subserve 
them (e.g. Casey et al., 2008; Giedd et al., 1999). However, the data suggest that 
the efficacy of temporal distancing is both high and stable across the age range 
tested, i.e. 12-year-old adolescents were just as effective at the task as 22-year-old 
adults. Only two studies to date have investigated distancing across development 
(Silvers et al., 2012; 2016) and they found that distancing efficacy improved with 
age until approximately 18 years (Silvers et al., 2012). Both of these studies used 
event-related designs whereas the present study used a block design, which was 
perhaps easier for the younger participants. However, the Silvers et al. studies also 
used a very different task, requiring a combination of spatial and interpersonal 
distancing to regulate distress when viewing aversive images. It is likely that the 
cognitive processes underlying this strategy differed from those involved in 
temporal distancing as implemented here in important ways. As discussed above, 
our temporal distancing instruction required episodic future thinking which relies 
on component processes including working memory, relational memory, visual-
spatial processing and apprehension of time (D’Argembeau, Ortoleva, Jumentier, 
& Van der Linden, 2010), as well as self-consciousness, which has been found to 
predict feelings of experiencing the imagined events (D’Argembeau et al., 2010).  
Additionally, scene construction, which refers to the generation, maintenance and 
visualisation of complex scenes, has also been implicated in future thinking 
(Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). Existing evidence on the developmental trajectory 
of episodic future thinking is scarce. Gott and Lah (2014) found that episodic 
future thinking continues to develop between late childhood (8-10 years) and mid-
adolescence (14-16 years). However, it may be that episodic future thinking in our 
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adolescent sample (minimum age of 12) was sufficiently developed to meet the 
requirements of our task.  
 
 Temporal discounting research (e.g. Steinberg et al., 2009) suggests that 
adolescents tend to be less future-focused than adults at least when making 
decisions between immediate and future rewards. We might also expect 
adolescents to be less able to project themselves into the future simply because 
they have less of an idea what their future will look like. However, in the present 
study there was no correlation between age and distance in time adopted during 
the distancing conditions. Again this suggests that, at least when instructed, 
adolescents are able to implement the instruction to distance, with equivalent 
behavioural and physiological consequences regardless of age. This was 
particularly interesting given that individual differences associated with emotional 
reactivity and regulation, namely reactive aggression and anxiety, did show 
developmental change in line with previous accounts (e.g. Moffitt, 1993, Casey et 
al., 2008, Ernst, 2014). This suggests that temporal distancing could well be a 
fruitful strategy to focus on in helping adolescents to manage everyday stressors, 
regardless of age-specific change in emotional reactivity. 
 
5.4.3 Hypothesis 3: Distancing success and reactive aggression 
 In line with the final hypothesis, reactive (but not proactive) aggression 
was negatively correlated with temporal distancing efficacy as measured by 
distress ratings. To our knowledge, this is the first study to demonstrate this 
association across adolescence using an experimental task as prior research has 
only looked at reactive aggression in relation to general emotion dysregulation 
using questionnaire measures (e.g. Marsee & Frick, 2007; Vitaro et al. 2002; Xu 
& Zhang, 2008). Interestingly, baseline distress ratings on the Read Negative 
condition did not vary across different levels of reactive aggression. Instead, the 
negative correlation was driven by a lower reduction of distress during the Distant 
Future (temporal distancing) condition relative to Read Negative in those high in 
reactive aggression, while those lower in reactive aggression were able to reduce 
their distress relative to baseline (Read Negative) on this condition.  
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Intriguingly, we found tentative evidence that those higher in reactive 
aggression projected themselves less far into the future during the Distant Future 
condition, which may underpin reduced efficacy. Participants high in reactive 
aggression may therefore benefit from training in how to apply cognitive 
strategies such as temporal distancing more effectively, which may in turn reduce 
reactive aggression over time. Fabiansson and Denson (2012) found that 
instructed reappraisal was effective in reducing self-reported anger during an 
economic bargaining task and had longer lasting effects on lowering anger than 
when using a distraction strategy. However, it is still an open question as to 
whether such training would impact more trait-like reactive aggression over the 
longer term. If so, training this strategy could be of considerable benefit to 
individuals who react aggressively to everyday stressors. 
 
In conclusion, placing negative events into a broader temporal perspective 
facilitates the down-regulation of subjective and physiological negative affect. 
Temporal distancing is effective and easily implemented for adults and young 
adolescents alike and thus may be promising as a potential strategy for 
adolescence stress reduction.  However this strategy may be of limited efficacy 
for those with high levels of reactive aggression, potentially due to difficulties in 
implementing the instruction to project oneself into the distant future. Future work 
could explore this link further, extending findings to a sample with clinically 
relevant levels of reactive aggression, and investigating whether training in this 
strategy could represent a potential avenue for intervention. 
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Chapter 6: Neural mechanisms of temporal distancing 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The behavioural and physiological data presented in Chapter 5 suggest 
that adopting a temporally distant perspective on stressors is an effective strategy 
in reducing self-reported distress and arousal, and to some extent, physiological 
arousal. However, the neural processes underlying the efficacy of this strategy 
have yet to be identified.  
 
6.1.1 Regulation and reactivity 
As discussed in Chapter 1 section 1.4, neuroimaging studies have 
predominantly examined reappraisal very generally, instructing participants to 
freely reappraise aversive stimuli in whichever way they wish. These studies have 
found that circuits associated with cognitive control are implemented, such that 
prefrontal and cingulate cortices modulate activity in regions implicated in 
emotional reactivity, such as the amygdala (Ochsner et al., 2012). In the first 
neuroimaging study of reappraisal, Ochsner et al. (2002) found that relative to 
passively viewing negative stimuli, reappraisal increased activation in dorsal and 
ventral regions of the lateral PFC and dorsomedial PFC, while decreasing 
activation in subcortical areas such as the amygdala. Moreover, engagement of 
prefrontal regions, particularly ventrolateral PFC, was inversely correlated with 
amygdala activation. Subsequent studies using functional connectivity analysis 
(Banks, Eddy, Angstadt, Nathan, & Phan, 2007) and mediation analysis (Wager et 
al., 2008), have supported the finding that these prefrontal regions are involved in 
attenuating responses in regions implicated in emotional reactivity. More recently, 
in the largest meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of reappraisal to date, Buhle 
et al. (2014) identified 48 studies comparing neural responses during reappraisal 
vs. no-regulation and found extensive activation of the dorsomedial PFC 
(dmPFC), dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC), ventrolateral PFC (vlPFC) and posterior 
parietal lobe, areas which are associated with working memory, inhibition and 
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self-reflective processes related to identifying and regulating one's affective state 
(Amodio & Frith, 2006; Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009; Olsson & 
Ochsner, 2008). Reappraisal also modulated activity in bilateral amygdala, though 
no other significant activations in other subcortical regions were found in the 
meta-analysis (Buhle et al., 2014). 
 
Although temporal distancing is a form of reappraisal, as discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5, the cognitive processes required are likely to be more 
specialised than those involved in the ‘free’ reappraisal studies discussed above. 
While no study to date has investigated the neural mechanisms of temporal 
distancing, a few fMRI studies have explored distancing in general. For example, 
it was found that using self-distancing (i.e. viewing a scene objectively) to down-
regulate emotions to negative social pictures, engages the dorsal anterior cingulate 
cortex (dACC), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), lateral prefrontal cortex, 
precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex, intraparietal sulci, and middle/superior 
temporal gyrus, which are brain networks implicated in cognitive control, social 
perception and perspective-taking (Koenigsberg et al., 2010). A recent study by 
Dörfel et al. (2014) in which participants were instructed ‘to take the position of a 
noninvolved observer’, also found activity in regions implicated in cognitive 
control such as the right dlPFC, right superior frontal cortex and bilateral inferior 
parietal cortex. It could be argued however, that distancing oneself from an 
emotional stimulus by reducing its personal relevance is different to adopting a 
temporally distant perspective (as implemented in Chapter 5). Thus while we 
might still predict the involvement of cognitive control circuitry in implementing 
a deliberate intention to regulate, we might also predict the recruitment of 
circuitry required for ‘episodic future thinking’ which is the ability to project the 
self forward to pre-experience an event (Atance & O’Neill, 2001).  
 
6.1.2 Future thinking 
Projecting oneself forward (and backward) in time can be defined as 
‘mental time travel’ (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007) and over the past decade, a 
growing number of neuroimaging studies have detected a common neural network 
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involved in mental time travel (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 
2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007). Typically these studies involve participants 
remembering real past experiences (relying on episodic autobiographical memory) 
and imagining or simulating possible future experiences (episodic future thinking) 
using cue-word tasks (e.g. birthday). These studies have found that both past and 
future episodic thinking activate similar circuitry including medial temporal and 
frontal lobes, posterior cingulate and retrosplenial cortex, and lateral parietal and 
temporal areas (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; Addis, Roberts, & 
Schacter, 2011; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Botzung, Denkova, & Manning, 
2008; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007; Viard et al., 
2011). This is not surprising as there are several cognitive processes that are 
common to both past and future thinking. For example both are associated with 
self-referential processing, which has been shown to engage the medial prefrontal 
cortex (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001; Kelley et al., 2002; 
Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004). The ability to visualise spatial scenes is also needed 
to mentally construct past or future events, and this process has been found to be 
associated with the posterior cingulate cortex (Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 
2007; Szpunar et al., 2007; Szpunar, Chan, & McDermott, 2009). The 
hippocampus has also been implicated in both past and future thinking (Addis et 
al., 2007; Botzung et al., 2008; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar et al., 2007; Viard et 
al., 2011), as some argue that past and future events build on similar information 
stored in episodic memory, and thus novel events can be created by using this 
stored information (Schacter & Addis, 2007).  
 
However, thinking of the past and projecting to the future do differ with 
respect to temporal orientation, and this has been shown to be accompanied by 
neural differences. For instance, in a study by Addis et al. (2007) participants 
were instructed to construct a past or future event within a specified time period (a 
week, a year, 5–20 years) following a word cue, and then mentally elaborate on 
the generated events. Greater neural activity in frontopolar regions, such as the 
right frontopolar cortex and left vlPFC, which are involved in prospective 
thinking and generation processes (Burgess, Quayle, & Frith, 2001; Poldrack et 
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al., 1999), was found when participants imagined future events compared with 
remembering past events. These findings are in line with earlier patient studies 
which have found that damage to the frontopolar cortex, particularly ventromedial 
PFC (vmPFC), is associated with deficits in awareness to the future consequences 
of actions (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). Addis et al. (2007) 
also found greater engagement of the hippocampus during future thinking relative 
to remembering the past. Interestingly, in a later study, greater activation of the 
right anterior hippocampus for constructing future relative to recollecting past 
events was only observed in imagined future events that were specific, as opposed 
to routine or general events (Addis, Cheng, Roberts, & Schacter, 2011). These 
findings suggest that the process of creating novel and specific future events 
differentially activates the hippocampus compared with more general types of 
event simulation and recall. 
 
Several other studies have also demonstrated differential activation 
between recalling the past and constructing future events (see Zheng, Luo, & Yu, 
2014, for a review), however nearly all of these studies have investigated the role 
of self-projection in time to the past and future but have not examined future vs. 
present thinking. In one study by Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin and 
Buckner (2010), participants were asked questions about hypothetical events that 
they would experience either in the future (Future Self) or the immediate present 
(Present Self), as well as parallel questions that required general semantic 
knowledge about the present or future which avoided reference to the participant 
(control conditions). Increased activation during Future Self trials was observed 
selectively in regions comprising the medial temporal lobe subsystem, including 
bilateral parahippocampal cortex, hippocampal formation, vmPFC, posterior 
inferior parietal lobule, and retrosplenial cortex.  In contrast, a number of regions 
within and outside the dmPFC subsystem were recruited more during Present Self 
trials: i.e., dmPFC, temporoparietal junction, lateral temporal cortex, and temporal 
pole. However, the authors do highlight that it is not clear that this contrast 
isolated temporal factors as there were other differences between the future and 
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present conditions, such as greater use of mental imagery in the Future Self 
condition.  
 
6.1.3 Current study 
In the current study we used the same paradigm as Chapter 5 to investigate 
temporal distancing, using an event-related design optimised for fMRI. Firstly we 
investigated whether temporal distancing would reduce neural responses in 
regions which typically respond during emotional distress, in particular amygdala 
(Buhle et al., 2014); and subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC; Drevets, 
Savitz, & Trimble, 2008), with which the amygdala is densely interconnected 
(Johansen-Berg et al., 2008). Moreover using a similar paradigm to the task used 
in Chapter 4, Kanske, Heissler, Schönfelder, Bongers and Wessa (2011) found 
that activation in the bilateral amygdala and the sgACC was increased when 
passively viewing emotional photos relative to reappraising the photos, indicating 
a reduction of activation in these areas through reappraisal. 
 
Second, we examined whether the neural networks underpinning temporal 
distancing are the same as those regulatory regions found to be engaged during 
reappraisal more generally (e.g. vlPFC, vmPFC, dlPFC, dmPFC, as in Buhle et 
al., 2014), and/or whether this particular type of distancing would engage regions 
involved in episodic future thinking (e.g. hippocampus, vmPFC, posterior inferior 
parietal lobule, retrosplenial cortex, as in Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010) relative to 
no strategy use. 
 
Third, we explored whether the extent to which individuals project 
themselves into the future influences distancing efficacy. We were able to explore 
temporal extent in two different ways: 1) The Near Future condition enabled us to 
explore whether any regions reflected Distant (as opposed to Near) future 
thinking, while controlling for the cognitive processes involved in temporal 
distancing per se. This may help shed light on why it is that thinking of the distant 
future is more effective for emotion regulation than thinking of the near future 
(see Chapter 5). We might expect that regions associated with thinking of the 
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‘future self’ in previous studies (e.g. Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010) may be more 
active in the Distant Future condition, and that we may find this activity to be 
associated with improved subjective emotion regulation. 2) The mean distance 
projected into the future (for both Distant and Near Future conditions, as assessed 
in Chapter 5) allowed us to investigate the relationship between length of future 
projection and recruitment of regulatory processes (involving for example, dlPFC 
and vlPFC). We predicted that those who projected further into the future 
(measured with behavioural ratings) would exhibit greater activation in regions 
associated with future thinking. One more speculative prediction was that we 
might also see reduced activation in regions associated with cognitive control 
aspects of reappraisal, with future thinking potentially reducing the demand on 
cognitive control mechanisms.   
 
Finally, in line with findings in Chapter 5 and previous research (e.g. 
Blair, 2010; Coccaro et al., 2007; Sebastian et al., 2014; Viding et al., 2012), we 
predicted that those higher in reactive aggression would exhibit greater activation 
of the amygdala and/or sgACC in response to reading negative scenarios 
compared to both reading neutral scenarios and implementing temporal distancing 
for negative scenarios. In contrast, these individuals might be predicted to show 
reduced engagement of regions involved in cognitive control during temporal 
distancing (Coccaro et al., 2007; Goldin et al., 2009), with the opposite pattern 
predicted for psychopathic traits (Harenski et al., 2009). Finally, based on the 
findings by Drabant et al. (2009), in which participants who reported using 
reappraisal more often in everyday life exhibited decreased amygdala activation 
and greater activity in prefrontal regions in response to viewing negative facial 
expressions, we predicted that greater habitual reappraisal use would be 
associated with diminished amygdala activity and heightened prefrontal activity 
during temporal distancing.   
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6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
Twenty six (8 males) healthy right-handed adults (average age of 22.8, 
SD=3.1) were recruited from Royal Holloway University of London, and received 
£15 for participation. The study was approved by the Departmental Ethics 
Committee at Royal Holloway, University of London. Participants underwent a 
screening process prior to participating to ensure that they were safe to go inside 
the MRI scanner and had no reading impairments. 
 
6.2.2 Experimental task and stimuli 
 The stimuli and experimental task were similar to that of Chapter 5 but 
adapted for fMRI. The same sets of stimuli (3 negative and 1 neutral set) were 
used; however scenarios were shortened so that the sets were also matched for 
number of words to control for visual input and word-reading (see Appendix 2). 
As with Chapter 5 each of the three sets of negative photos was randomised to one 
of the three negative conditions (Read Negative, Distant Future, Near Future) for 
each participant.  
 
 Prior to beginning the task, participants were asked to read the task 
instructions (see Appendix 3) which contained examples of how to implement 
instructions for each condition, and complete a short 4-minute practice run 
consisting of 12 stimuli (3 for each condition) that were different to those used in 
the experimental task. The task was also verbally explained to them and it was 
reiterated that for Near and Distant Future conditions, they had to project 
themselves into the future to consider how each scenario would likely affect them 
at the chosen time point, and then consider and rate how they currently felt after 
projecting themselves. This was to increase the likelihood that participants would 
all be using the same strategy in the same way. Only distress ratings were taken 
(not arousal) as similar results for both distress and arousal were found in 
Chapters 4 and 5, and omitting the arousal rating allowed us to limit time spent 
inside the scanner. 
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 Each trial began with a scenario (4 seconds), followed by a black screen 
(0.5 s), then the instruction (1 s: ‘READ’, ‘NEAR’, or ‘FAR’ (the Distant Future 
condition was renamed ‘far’ to approximate the length of the other two 
instructions)) and then a green cross in the center of the screen (8 s), which was 
presented when participants were instructed to implement the particular strategy 
(see Figure 6.1 for trial structure).  For the ‘READ’ instruction, participants were 
told that during the green cross screen they should think about how the scenario 
makes them feel at that present moment in time. The modelling of events in the 
analysis was different to that of Chapter 5; participants were specifically 
instructed to only start implementing the instruction from the onset of the green 
cross, rather than during the reading of the scenario, which could introduce 
reading-related activation. The green cross was followed by a white fixation cross, 
which represented a jittered inter stimulus interval (ISI) of 2-6 seconds, generated 
on an exponential number generator, so that the majority of the ISIs were shorter 
in length, with very few being 5 or 6 seconds long. The variable ISI was followed 
by the 4-point distress rating (1=low distress, 4=very distressed) which was 
presented for 3 seconds. As a manipulation check, participants were also asked to 
rate the distance in time adopted on each trial for Near Future and Distant Future 
conditions on a timescale (1=one day, 4=five years from now), presented for 4 
seconds. A jittered ISI with the same parameters as above was presented at the 
end of each trial. Participants made their responses using an MRI compatible 
button box using the four fingers of their right hand. All timings were determined 
from a behavioural pilot consisting of 10 participants. The task was presented and 
responses were recorded using Psychtoolbox for Matlab (version R2015a). 
 
 Following the task, participants also completed a manipulation check 
measure outside of the scanner where they were asked to write what they thought 
of during the green cross for a random selection of scenarios they had seen during 
the task. Participants were shown two scenarios from each condition (8 in total). 
Inspection of their responses revealed that all participants implemented each 
instruction correctly.   
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6.2.3 Questionnaire measures 
 In line with Chapters, 2-4, aggression was measured using adult-specific 
questionnaires: The Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-III Short Form (SRP-III-SF; 
Paulhus et al., in press) and Buss Perry Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry, 
1992), in contrast to the adolescent measure used in Chapter 5. Although the 
questionnaires used are different, similar constructs are measured across studies. 
As with Chapter 5, participants were asked to complete the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983) and the Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003).  
 
6.2.4 fMRI data acquisition 
 A 3T Siemens MRI scanner was used to acquire both T1-weighted 
structural images and multislice T2*-weighted echo planar volumes with blood 
oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) contrast. The T2* echo planar imaging 
(EPI) sequence was optimised to decrease dropout in the OFC (Weiskopf et al., 
2006), and used the following acquisition parameters: 48 2mm slices acquired in a 
descending trajectory with a 1mm gap, TE=30ms; TR=3100ms; flip angle=78°; 
field of view=192mm; matrix size=64x64, yielding functional 3 x 3 x 3mm 
voxels. Functional data were acquired in a single scanning session of 
approximately 18 minutes per run, in which approximately ~350 volumes were 
acquired. The acquisition of a ~3 min T1-weighted anatomical image occurred in 
between the two functional runs for each participant.  
6.2.5 Data analysis 
Behavioural data were analysed as described in Chapter 5. Mean distress 
ratings were calculated for the Read Neutral, Read Negative, Distant Future and 
Near Future conditions, and then scores for Reactivity (Read Negative - Read 
Neutral) and Distancing Success (Read Negative - Distant Future) were also 
computed. 
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Imaging data were analysed using SPM8 software 
(www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first four functional image volumes from each 
run were discarded to allow for T1 equilibrium effects. Pre-processing included 
rigid-body transformation (realignment), slice timing correction, normalisation 
into the standard space defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
template with a voxel size of 3x3x3mm, and smoothing with a Gaussian filter of 
8mm full width at half maximum to increase the signal-to-noise ratio and to 
facilitate group analyses. 
 
 Statistical analysis involved the creation of statistical parametric maps 
representing a statistical assessment of hypothesised condition-specific effects 
(Friston et al., 1994), which were estimated with the general linear model. For 
each participant, the conditions of interest were implementation of each strategy 
condition (8 second green cross period for Read Neutral, Read Negative, Distant 
Future, Near Future).  
 
 Effects were modelled using a box-car convolved with a canonical 
hemodynamic response function for the 8 second trial epoch during which 
participants implemented the instructed strategy while the green fixation cross 
was on screen. The remainder of the trial (scenario, instruction, ratings and blank 
screens) was included as a nuisance regressor, with all conditions included within 
the same regressor such that it was orthogonal to the regressors of interest. The 
two jittered ISIs (fixation crosses) were left unmodelled and formed an implicit 
baseline. The six realignment parameters (derived from spatial realignment) were 
also included as nuisance regressors in order to account for any variance due to 
head movement. In addition, scans in which there was movement of greater than 
half a voxel (1.5mm) in any direction were visually inspected for distortion. No 
distortion was found and so all data were included for analysis. Finally, data were 
high-pass filtered at 128sec to remove low-frequency drifts. First-level analysis 
was conducted on the contrasts of interest (Read Negative > Read Neutral 
(Reactivity), Read Negative > Distant Future (No strategy compared to using 
Distancing i.e. unregulated responding), Distant Future > Read Negative 
Chapter 6 
	
	
166 
(Regulation), Distant Future > Near Future (Regulation, controlling for cognitive 
processes associated with distancing) for each participant. As we did not have 
specific hypotheses for the remaining contrasts (Near Future > Distant Future, 
Read Negative > Near Future and Near Future > Read Negative), these are 
reported in Appendix 4. These individual contrasts were then entered into a one-
sample t-test to perform a random-effects group analysis. 
 
 At the whole brain level, results were considered significant at the voxel 
level using a statistical threshold of p<.05 after Family-Wise Error (FWE) 
correction for multiple comparisons. 
 
 
Regions of Interest   
Anatomical regions of interest (ROI) masks were defined using the 
Brodmann areas atlas implemented in Wake Forest University PickAtlas toolbox 
within SPM (Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette, 2003). Based on previous 
studies, Brodmann areas were used to define each ROI (Andrews-Hanna et al., 
2010; Lee & Siegle, 2012). As we did not have any laterality-related hypotheses, 
the masks combined homologous regions on the left and right hemispheres. Our 
ROIs were divided into three categories: Emotional Responsivity (encompassing 
Reactivity (Read Negative > Read Neutral) and Unregulated Responding (Read 
Negative > Distant)): amygdala, sgACC (BA 25)); Reappraisal (Distant > Near & 
Distant > Read Negative: vlPFC (BA 47), vmPFC (BA 10), dlPFC (BA 46), 
dmPFC (BA 9)), and Future Thinking ((Distant > Near & Distant > Read 
Negative: hippocampus, vmPFC, posterior inferior parietal lobule (BA 39), 
retrosplenial cortex (BA 29, 30)). Inferences within the masks were made using a 
statistical threshold of p<.05 after FWE-correction at the voxel level. 
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6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Behavioural data 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA on the recorded distress ratings 
revealed a main effect of Condition (F(3, 75)=218.38, p<.001, partial η 2=.90). 
Replicating the results of Chapter 5, all conditions were significantly different 
from each other with distress ratings following the pattern: Read Neutral (M=1.06, 
SD=.10) < Distant Future (M=2.00, SD=.37) < Near Future (M=2.39, SD=.37) < 
Read Negative (M=2.94, SD=.40), (all ps<.005, see Figure. 6.2).  
 
 However, distancing success and distance in time adopted during Distant 
Future trials did not significantly correlate (r(24)=.143, p=.487). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Mean distress ratings. All conditions were significantly different from 
each other (p<.005, Bonferroni corrected). 
 
  
6.3.1.1. Relationships with questionnaire data 
There were no significant relationships between Distancing Success and 
the questionnaire data. Behavioural reactivity (Read Negative – Read Neutral) 
was positively associated with Trait Anxiety (r(24)=.42, p=.037), i.e. those higher 
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in trait anxiety had higher emotional reactivity to the negative scenarios relative to 
neutral scenarios. 
 
6.3.2 fMRI data 
6.3.2.1 Whole brain analyses 
Results surviving familywise error (FWE) correction for the contrasts 
Read Negative > Distant Future (No strategy compared to using Distancing) and 
Distant Future > Read Negative (Regulation) are presented in Table 6.1.  Regions 
activated to a greater extent when using no strategy relative to Distant Future 
included bilateral occipital lobe and bilateral temporal lobe, including the middle 
and superior temporal gyrus. The Distant Future > Read Negative contrast 
revealed several significant clusters, most of which were in parietal and prefrontal 
regions, such as the inferior parietal lobule, inferior frontal gyrus and middle 
frontal gyrus, as well as the posterior insula and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. 
 
Results from the contrasts Read Negative > Neutral (Reactivity) and 
Distant Future > Near Future (Regulation, controlling for cognitive processes 
involved in distancing) did not survive FWE-correction. We reasoned that the lack 
of response in the Reactivity contrast might be because this analysis was based on 
the 8 second ‘implementation period’, while strongest emotional reactivity might 
occur during scenario presentation. We therefore also analysed the BOLD 
response during the 4 second scenario viewing period separately (negative 
scenarios > neutral scenarios). However this analysis also failed to yield FWE-
corrected significant results (although at uncorrected levels (p<.005, k>10), 
activations for this contrast were seen in the right occipital lobe, left middle 
frontal gyrus and left ventral anterior cingulate gyrus).  
 
As mentioned above, results from the contrasts Near Future > Distant 
Future, Read Negative > Near Future and Near Future > Read Negative are in 
Appendix 4. Whole brain regressions were also conducted to explore correlations 
with the behavioural distress and distance in time adopted ratings and 
questionnaire data, however no regions survived FWE-correction.  
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Table 6.1. Peak cluster activations in brain regions from each contrast reaching 
significance at p<.05 (FWE-corrected at the whole brain level) BA=Brodmann area; 
L/R=laterality (left/right); Peak=co-ordinates of the peak voxel from the whole brain 
analysis (XYZ co-ordinates refer to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) standard 
space); t=t-value; k=cluster size (number of 3x3x3mm voxels: where cells are empty, 
activations are part of above clusters); FWE=familywise error. 
 
Brain	Regions	
Peak	 	 Cluster	
BA	 L/R	 x	 y	 z	 T	 	 k	 p	(FWE)	
Read	Negative	>	Distant	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Cuneus	 -	 L	 -21	 -94	 -2	 6.97	 	 171	 <0.001	
Middle	Occipital	Gyrus	 -	 R	 27	 -91	 -8	 6.25	 	 152	 <0.001	
Middle	Occipital	Gyrus		 18	 R	 24	 -94	 1	 6.05	 	 -	 -	
Superior	Temporal	Gyrus		 22	 L	 -54	 -7	 -11	 6.28	 	 137	 <0.001	
Middle	Temporal	Gyrus		 21	 L	 -54	 5	 -17	 6.04	 	 -	 -	
Superior	Temporal	Gyrus		 22	 L	 -54	 -40	 7	 5.30	 	 31	 <0.001	
Middle	Temporal	Gyrus		 21	 R	 57	 -7	 -11	 5.72	 	 50	 <0.001	
Superior	Temporal	Gyrus		 38	 R	 48	 11	 -20	 4.96	 	 -	 -	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Distant	>	Read	Negative	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Inferior	Parietal	Lobule	 40	 R	 51	 -37	 49	 6.33	 	 445	 <0.001	
Inferior	Parietal	Lobule	 40	 R	 45	 -43	 49	 6.28	 	 -	 -	
Postcentral	Gyrus	 3	 R	 57	 -22	 40	 5.20	 	 -	 	
Inferior	Parietal	Lobule	 40	 L	 -48	 -37	 43	 6.29	 	 729	 <0.001	
Postcentral	Gyrus	 40	 L	 -48	 -34	 55	 5.98	 	 -	 -	
Postcentral	Gyrus	 2	 L	 -54	 -28	 40	 5.94	 	 -	 -	
Lingual	Gyrus	 18	 R	 3	 -73	 1	 5.74	 	 112	 <0.001	
Insula	 13	 L	 -42	 -4	 13	 5.67	 	 145	 <0.001	
Insula	 13	 L	 -39	 -1	 4	 5.38	 	 -	 -	
Putamen	 -	 L	 -30	 -16	 1	 4.98	 	 -	 -	
Culmen	 -	 R	 24	 -52	 -20	 5.23	 	 106	 <0.001	
Fusiform	Gyrus	 19	 R	 24	 -67	 -14	 5.06	 	 -	 -	
Inferior	Frontal	Gyrus	 9	 R	 54	 8	 28	 5.21	 	 30	 <0.001	
Middle	Frontal	Gyrus	 10	 R	 42	 50	 10	 5.01	 	 33	 <0.001	
Middle	Frontal	Gyrus	 6	 R	 30	 8	 61	 4.90	 	 9	 0.005	
Insula	 13	 R	 45	 -1	 13	 5.20	 	 10	 0.004	
Middle	Frontal	Gyrus		 10	 R	 36	 59	 -8	 4.83	 	 3	 0.016	
Cerebellar	Tonsil	 -	 R	 18	 -58	 -50	 4.72	 	 3	 0.016	
Medial	Frontal	Gyrus		 6	 L	 -6	 -4	 52	 4.69	 	 5	 0.010	
Middle	Frontal	Gyrus		 11	 R	 30	 50	 -11	 4.67	 	 2	 0.021	
Thalamus,	Pulvinar	 -	 L	 -21	 -25	 13	 4.64	 	 1	 0.029	
Postcentral	Gyrus		 3	 R	 60	 -16	 22	 4.63	 	 4	 0.013	
Middle	Frontal	Gyrus		 10	 L	 -39	 56	 7	 4.60	 	 1	 0.029	
Claustrum	 -	 R	 36	 2	 1	 4.60	 	 1	 0.029	
Superior	Frontal	Gyrus		 9	 R	 42	 35	 34	 4.57	 	 4	 0.013	
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Brain	Regions	
Peak	 	 Cluster	
BA	 L/R	 x	 y	 z	 T	 	 k	 p	(FWE)	
Distant	>	Read	Negative	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Claustrum	 -	 R	 30	 17	 4	 4.54	 	 1	 0.029	
Cingulate	Gyrus		 32	 R	 6	 23	 43	 4.54	 	 1	 0.029	
Precentral	Gyrus		 44	 R	 51	 11	 7	 4.54	 	 1	 0.029	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Distant	>	Near	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
None	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
 
6.3.2.2 Regions of interest analyses 
Unregulated Responding  
Significantly increased BOLD responses for Read Negative relative to 
Distant Future were found in our regions of interest for reactivity: the amygdala 
(left: x=-27, y=-7, z=-17; t=3.39; k=3; p=.039, FWE-small volume corrected 
(SVC); and the subgenual ACC (right: x=3, y=17, z=-14; t=5.55; k=19; p=.013 
FWE-SVC see Figure 6.3; left: x=-3, y=26, z=-17; t=5.58; k=15; p=.015 FWE-
SVC).  
 The contrast estimates across each of these clusters were averaged using 
the MarsBaR tool for SPM (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/), and the resulting 
parameters were then used to correlate with the behavioural measures of 
Reactivity, Distancing Success and distance in time adopted. Activation in sgACC 
clusters was marginally positively correlated with Distancing Success (right: 
(r(24)=.39, p=.052; left: (r(24)=.37, p=.065).  
 
Regulation  
As shown in Table 6.1, temporal distancing (Distant Future > Read 
Negative) was associated with enhanced recruitment of the frontal and parietal 
lobes relative to no strategy. However we were also interested in whether similar 
activations would be found in prefrontal regions commonly found in reappraisal 
studies. As shown in Table 6.2, there were several significant clusters within all of 
our reappraisal-related ROIs (vlPFC, vmPFC, dlPFC, dmPFC). None of the ROI 
regions were significantly activated for the Distant Future > Near Future contrast.  
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Table 6.2.  Peak cluster activations in the regions of interest for the Distant > Read 
Negative contrast reaching significance at p<.05 (FWE-corrected within ROIs) 
BA=Brodmann area; L/R=laterality (left/right); peak voxel=co-ordinates of the peak voxel 
from the whole brain analysis (XYZ co-ordinates refer to Montreal Neurological Institute 
(MNI) standard space); t=t-value; k=cluster size (number of 3x3x3mm voxels: where cells 
are empty, activations are part of above clusters); FWE=familywise error. Regulation 
ROIs: vlPFC, dlPFC, dmPFC; Future thinking ROIs: Posterior inferior parietal lobule. 
Overlapping ROIs: vmPFC. 
	
Brain	Regions	
Peak	 	 Cluster	
BA	 L/R	 x	 y	 z	 t	 	 k	 p	(FWE)	
Distant	>	Read	Negative	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Ventrolateral	PFC	 47	 R	 48	 14	 1	 5.61	 	 18	 0.008	
	 	 R	 42	 17	 -5	 4.99	 	 -	 -	
	 	 L	 -33	 17	 -8	 4.27	 	 2	 0.033	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Dorsolateral	PFC	 46	 R	 42	 47	 10	 6.41	 	 23	 0.009	
 	 R	 45	 41	 16	 5.25	 	 -	 -	
	 	 R	 39	 35	 16	 4.58	 	 -	 -	
	 	 R	 48	 50	 7	 6.07	 	 2	 0.042	
	 	 R	 42	 50	 19	 5.08	 	 1	 0.048	
	 	 L	 -42	 47	 10	 4.43	 	 2	 0.042	
	 	 L	 -48	 47	 4	 4.41	 	 1	 0.048	
	 	 L	 -42	 38	 22	 3.94	 	 1	 0.048	
	 	 L	 -39	 50	 19	 3.80	 	 1	 0.048	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Dorsomedial	PFC	 9	 R	 57	 11	 34	 6.66	 	 25	 0.004	
	 	 R	 51	 5	 28	 5.93	 	 -	 	
	 	 R	 42	 35	 34	 5.79	 	 28	 0.003	
	 	 R	 6	 32	 34	 5.55	 	 10	 0.013	
	 	 L	 -57	 8	 34	 4.90	 	 7	 0.017	
	 	 L	 -39	 26	 37	 4.50	 	 3	 0.027	
	 	 L	 -3	 32	 37	 4.45	 	 2	 0.032	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Ventromedial	PFC	 10	 R	 45	 50	 7	 6.54	 	 39	 0.001	
	 	 R	 33	 62	 -5	 5.96	 	 -	 -	
	 	 R	 39	 59	 7	 5.30	 	 -	 -	
	 	 R	 42	 47	 16	 5.92	 	 19	 0.006	
	 	 R	 42	 44	 22	 5.53	 	 11	 0.011	
	 	 R	 39	 44	 31	 4.70	 	 -	 -	
	 	 R	 33	 50	 28	 4.62	 	 -	 -	
	 	 L	 -42	 53	 4	 5.44	 	 8	 0.015	
	 	 R	 30	 56	 22	 5.34	 	 9	 0.013	
	 	 L	 -33	 56	 19	 4.62	 	 1	 0.037	
	 	 L	 -36	 56	 -5	 4.57	 	 1	 0.037	
	 	 L	 -36	 56	 4	 4.34	 	 1	 0.037	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Posterior	inferior		
parietal	lobule	
39	 R	 36	 -79	 31	 4.77	 	 3	 0.029	
	 R	 39	 -67	 40	 4.58	 	 2	 0.033	
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Figure 6.3. Top: Read Negative > Distant Future for a) left amygdala and b) right 
subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC). Significant voxels at p< .05 FWE-
corrected are overlaid on a single-subject T1-weighted anatomical template. 
Bottom: Contrast estimates are shown relative to implicit baseline for the a) left 
amygdala ROI and b) sgACC ROI.   
 
Future Thinking  
The Distant Future > Read Negative contrast yielded two significant 
clusters within the posterior inferior parietal lobule (BA 39) as well as vmPFC, 
which was also a ROI for the reappraisal related regions (see Table 6.2). However 
there was no significant activation in the hippocampus or retrosplenial cortex. 
None of the ROI regions were significantly activated for the Distant Future > 
Near Future contrast.  
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Distance in time adopted  
In order to investigate whether the extent to which distance in time 
adopted correlated with regions implicated in reappraisal and future thinking 
during the Distant Future > Read Negative contrast, the contrast estimates of the 
cluster within each ROI where the peak voxel had the strongest t/z value were 
averaged using the MarsBaR tool for SPM (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/). 
These contrast estimates were then used to correlate with the distance in time 
adopted measure. We found that vlPFC (BA 47) activation in the Distant Future > 
Read Negative contrast was negatively correlated with distance in time adopted 
(r(24)=-.45, p=.021), showing that the further in time participants projected into 
the future, the less vlPFC responded during temporal distancing relative to no 
strategy use (see Figure 6.4). There were, however, no significant correlations 
between distance in time adopted and regions associated with future thinking. 
 
 
Questionnaire measures  
We predicted that more reactive forms of aggression and anxiety would be 
associated with increased activation in ‘reactivity’ regions. Left amygdala during 
the Read Negative > Distant Future contrast positively correlated with the 
Physical Aggression subscale of Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (r(24)=.43, 
p=.033). To investigate whether heightened reactivity in those high in physical 
aggression is what is driving this effect, post-hoc correlations were conducted. 
The relationship between Physical Aggression score and left amygdala activation 
during the Read Negative > implicit baseline contrast was non-significant (r(24)=-
.19, p=.37), but was significant during the Distant Future > implicit baseline 
contrast (r(24)=-.55, p=.005), suggesting (contrary to predictions) greater 
downregulation of amygdala by temporal distancing in those higher in Physical 
Aggression. However, it should be noted that this result would not survive 
correction for multiple comparison across all aggression subscales, and we did not 
have specific hypotheses regarding physical aggression over and above other 
aggression subscales. There were also no significant associations between the 
remaining subscales or Total Aggression score. 
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 There were no significant correlations between the reactivity ROIs and 
the STAI, SRP-III-SF and ERQ measures. None of the questionnaire measures 
significantly correlated with the reappraisal or future thinking-related ROIs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Top image: Right vlPFC (BA 47) cluster (Distant Future > Read 
Negative). Significant voxels at p< .05 FWE-corrected are overlaid on a single-
subject T1-weighted anatomical template. Bottom image: negative correlation 
(r(24)=-.45, p=.021), between average distance in time adopted rating and right 
vlPFC activation (Distant Future > Read Negative). Values on the x-axis 
correspond to the Likert scale ratings (1=one day, 4=five years). 
Right vlPFC 
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6.4 Discussion 
The present study was the first to investigate the neural bases of temporal 
distancing as an emotion regulation strategy. Behavioural findings broadly 
replicated those of Chapter 5, illustrating that temporal distancing is an effective 
strategy in reducing subjective negative affect. At the neural level, in line with 
predictions, temporal distancing reduced neural responses in the left amygdala 
and bilateral sgACC, relative to using no strategy. Furthermore, whole-brain 
analyses revealed that temporal distancing (relative to no strategy) engaged 
several parietal and prefrontal regions, such as bilateral inferior parietal lobule, 
inferior frontal gyrus, middle frontal gyrus and superior frontal gyrus. The ROI 
analyses were in accordance with this, with significant activations in all of our 
ROIs associated with reappraisal: vlPFC, dlPFC, vmPFC, dmPFC. We also found 
that the further in time participants projected into the future, the less vlPFC 
responded during temporal distancing relative to no strategy use. Finally, in 
contrast to findings of previous future thinking research (Addis et al., 2007; Addis 
et al., 2011; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Botzung et al., 2008; Okuda et al., 2003; 
Szpunar et al., 2007; Viard et al., 2011) there were no significant activations of 
the hippocampus or the retrosplenial cortex.  
 
6.4.1 Emotional Responsivity 
For Unregulated Responding (Read Negative > Distant) we expected to 
see activation in two ROIs, namely amygdala and sgACC. Indeed, during 
temporal distancing, participants showed decreased left amygdala and bilateral 
sgACC activation and reported proportional decreases in emotional distress 
relative to using no strategy. This is consistent with previous neuroimaging 
studies (e.g. Buhle et al., 2014; Dörfel et al., 2014; Ochsner & Gross, 2005, 2008), 
suggesting that temporal distancing is effective in attenuating emotional arousal. 
Furthermore behavioural distancing success (i.e. reduction of distress in the 
Distant Future relative to the Read Negative condition) was marginally correlated 
with sgACC, such that those reporting the greatest reduction in distress also 
showed the greatest reduction in sgACC during Distant Future relative to Read 
Negative. Although this finding was trending significance, it suggests that the 
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more effective participants were at reducing their subjective distress using 
temporal distancing, the greater the reduction of sgACC activity between using no 
strategy and using distancing. This indicates that effective temporal distancing can 
attenuate activation in a brain region that has been implicated in emotional 
distress (Drevets et al., 2008) and is in line with previous studies that have found 
reductions of subjective emotional state paralleled by reductions of sgACC 
activation through reappraisal (e.g. Kanske et al., 2011).  Perhaps surprisingly, we 
found no difference either in our ROIs or at the whole-brain corrected level for the 
Reactivity contrast (Read Negative > Read Neutral). The majority of studies 
examining emotion regulation use photos or videos as stimuli, for example in 
Buhle et al.’s (2014) meta-analysis, 39 out of 48 studies used photos or film clips. 
Therefore it is possible that the emotion elicited from written scenarios is perhaps 
more subtle than that which is produced by the presentation of aversive photos, 
which may be why we did not find any significant differences between these two 
conditions. 
 
6.4.2 Regulation 
The neural processes underlying emotion regulation typically involve 
interactions between prefrontal, parietal and cingulate systems that implement 
cognitive control and inhibition processes. More specifically, the vmPFC, 
dmPFC, dlPFC, vlPFC, inferior parietal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex 
are considered brain regions that commonly support emotion control in general 
(Buhle et al., 2014; McRae et al., 2010; Ochsner et al., 2012). As temporal 
distancing is a form of reappraisal, it was predicted that these regions, particularly 
the prefrontal areas, would be activated during temporal distancing. These 
predictions were supported by the whole-brain and ROI analyses during temporal 
distancing compared to no strategy.  
 
The whole-brain analysis (Distant Future > Read Negative) revealed 
several significant clusters of activations, particularly the right middle frontal 
gyrus, which has been implicated in the selection and control of behavioural 
strategies, keeping strategies in mind throughout a task, inhibiting prepotent 
Chapter 6 
	
	
177 
responses, and regulating selective attention (Garavan, Ross, Murphy, Roche, & 
Stein, 2002; Koenigsberg et al., 2010; Miller & Cohen, 2001), which are all 
cognitive processes that underpin emotion regulation in general. Additionally the 
inferior parietal lobule has been implicated orienting and shifting attention 
processes (Wager et al., 2004) and has been suggested to direct attention away 
from the perceived stimulus towards the self during distancing (Dörfel et al., 
2014). Furthermore, the dACC, which is involved in monitoring and resolving 
conflict between opposing tasks (Botvinick et al., 2004; Mohanty et al., 2007), 
was also engaged during temporal distancing. This is in line with the findings of 
reappraisal and distancing studies (Kim & Hamann, 2007; Koenigsberg et al., 
2010; Ochsner et al., 2002). Taken together, the findings from the whole brain 
analysis suggest that the regions implicated in temporal distancing seem to be 
consistent with the neural correlates of emotion regulation (particularly 
reappraisal) in general.  
 
The ROIs commonly engaged during reappraisal (vlPFC, vmPFC, dlPFC, 
dmPFC) were also activated during temporal distancing relative to using no 
strategy.  This is not surprising as the vlPFC, for example, is associated with 
selecting goal-appropriate (and inhibiting goal-inappropriate) responses (Badre & 
Wagner, 2007; Thompson-Schill et al., 2005), such as using the instructed 
strategy and inhibiting emotional responses to the negative scenarios. Specifically, 
the anterior vlPFC (BA 47, which was the ROI we used) has been suggested to 
support controlled access to stored conceptual representations (Badre & Wagner, 
2007), which may be involved in thinking of the future self.  Additionally the 
dlPFC has been implicated in the updating and manipulation of stimuli in working 
memory (Wager & Smith, 2003). This executive process is common to all 
emotion regulation strategies, which require participants to keep in mind the goal 
of emotion regulation while manipulating the perceived emotional stimulus. 
Lastly, the medial PFC tends to be implicated in monitoring how emotional cues 
affect the self (Fossati et al., 2003; Ochsner et al., 2004). This information is 
particularly important in the present study as participants have to evaluate whether 
and/or how the particular scenario affects them in the present and consequently 
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imagine the future-self reflecting on the present-self. The present study extends 
previous work by using a more circumscribed task in which the type of strategy 
implemented is more restricted relative to free reappraisal, thus showing that 
during emotion regulation, cognitive control processes are relied upon regardless 
of strategy specificity.  
 
6.4.3 Future Thinking  
 As well as predicting the involvement of cognitive control circuitry in 
implementing a deliberate intention to regulate, the recruitment of circuitry 
required for future thinking was also predicted. There were significant activations 
in two of the predicted ROIs, namely vmPFC and posterior inferior partietal 
lobule, however the hippocampus and retrosplenial cortex were not significantly 
recruited during temporal distancing relative to no strategy. These regions of 
interest were based on the findings of Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010) as, to our 
knowledge, it is the only study to have compared thinking of the self in the future 
vs. the present (similar to the present study). However, the future-self questions 
asked during the task were about events “a few days from now”, for example, 
“Think about where you will be and who you will be with tomorrow afternoon 
during lunch. Who will you be eating lunch with: no one, your significant other, 
or someone else?”. As well as referring to the near future, rather than the distant 
future, the thought processes engaged in these types of questions are very specific. 
The scenarios utilised in the present study elicit much more abstract thinking and 
while they may be specific, such as how one would feel after failing an exam, it is 
perhaps much more difficult to think of how you would feel, compared to who 
you will go to lunch with tomorrow. A meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies 
using remembering and future thinking tasks suggests that details such as type of 
cue, task, and specificity of the retrieved and imagined information can all 
influence the exact location and pattern of activity in the hippocampus (Viard et 
al., 2012). Therefore the abstract nature of the distant future condition may 
explain why there was a lack of hippocampus engagement. Nonetheless, temporal 
distancing engaged the posterior inferior partietal lobule, which has been 
implicated in egocentric spatial processing (Aguirre & D’Esposito, 1999; 
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Andersen, Snyder, Bradley, & Xing, 1997) and the ability to visualise spatial 
scenes (Hassabis et al., 2007; Szpunar et al., 2009; Szpunar et al., 2007), which 
are necessary when constructing future events and imaging oneself in these 
events. This is not surprising given that the Distant Future condition requires 
participants to visualise themselves in the future, thus constructing future events. 
 
In Chapter 5 the extent to which individuals projected themselves into the 
future influenced distancing efficacy. Furthermore, in both Chapter 5 and the 
current study, behavioural ratings showed reduced distress for Distant vs. Near 
Future conditions. Thus, it was predicted that there may be different patterns of 
neural activity in the Distant Future condition compared to the Near Future 
condition. However, this was not the case. It is likely that differences between the 
conditions do exist, since clear behavioural differences were seen. However, it is 
possible that the current fMRI design was not sensitive enough to elicit a 
distinction at the neural level. The use of a consistently bigger time gap between 
the conditions (e.g. 1 day vs. 5 years) may address this, as in the current task 
participants were able to interpret the near and distant future in their own way, 
leading to greater between-subject variation in the interpretation of  ‘near’ and 
‘distant’ future. Indeed, in a recent fMRI study where participants imagined 
engaging in an activity either tomorrow versus five years from now, neural 
differences were found (Stillman et al., 2017). Thinking of the distant future 
relative to the near future activated the dlPFC and inferior frontal gyrus, in line 
with our findings for the Distant Future > Read Negative, as well as engaging the 
medial PFC, cerebellum, orbitofrontal cortex and middle temporal gyrus (Stillman 
et al., 2017). Thus using a larger time gap between conditions may have led to 
neural differences in the present study. Additionally, there were a limited number 
of trials per condition in the current task. Therefore utilising a greater number of 
trials may provide a clearer insight into whether the lack of a difference is 
attributable to low power or not. 
 
 Mean ratings of the distance projected into the future allowed us to 
investigate temporal extent in another way. In Chapter 5 we found that the further 
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into the future participants projected, the more effective they were at regulating 
negative affect. However this was not replicated in the present study, potentially 
due to the restricted rating scale used in the scanner environment (1-4 instead of 
1-9) and the smaller sample size. Furthermore while we did not find any 
correlations between distance in time adopted and responses in our future thinking 
ROIs, we did find that vlPFC activation during temporal distancing relative to no 
strategy was negatively correlated with distance in time adopted, suggesting that 
the further in time participants projected into the future, the less vlPFC was 
recruited. One tentative interpretation is that the further ahead one projects into 
the future, the less one needs to rely on inhibitory control regions, like the vlPFC. 
This could have potential implications for regulatory strategies, for instance if 
cognitive control systems are relatively weak, alternative strategies like temporal 
distancing may be helpful. While speculative, this opens potential avenues for 
future research to investigate whether this is the case. It must be noted however 
that this result would not survive correction for multiple comparisons across all 
the number of correlations conducted within the set of ‘Reappraisal’ ROIs. 
 
6.4.4 Individual Differences  
Contrary to predictions, we did not find any significant associations 
between the individual differences measures (aggression, anxiety, and habitual 
reappraisal use) and the behavioural or neural responses of temporal distancing. 
Again, this is perhaps due to the small sample size, which has limited power to 
detect individual differences.  
 
Although greater downregulation of amygdala activation by temporal 
distancing was found in those higher in physical aggression, this result would not 
survive correction for multiple comparisons across all aggression subscales in the 
questionnaire. Additionally, while we hypothesised a relationship with reactive 
aggression, we had no a priori hypothesis regarding physical aggression 
specifically. Moreover, the distribution of physical aggression was skewed in the 
sample, with most participants scoring 1.25-2.25 out of a maximum of 7 points. In 
order to investigate the relationship between aggression and the down-regulation 
Chapter 6 
	
	
181 
of amygdala activity by temporal distancing, a larger and less skewed sample 
needs to be recruited. 
6.4.5. Strengths, limitations and future directions  
 The present study is the first to investigate the neural correlates of 
temporal distancing, showing that it is effective at reducing responses in brain 
regions associated with emotional distress and recruiting cognitive control regions 
commonly implicated in other emotion regulation strategies, specifically 
reappraisal. A particular strength of the study was the task design, which enabled 
us to explore whether any regions reflected Distant (as opposed to Near) future 
thinking, while controlling for the cognitive processes involved in taking a distant 
perspective. However, despite a significant difference in the behavioural data, 
there was no difference between the Near and Distant Future conditions in the 
fMRI data. Furthermore, the lack of Reactivity results (i.e. a difference between 
Read Negative and Read Neutral conditions), either in the corrected whole-brain 
analysis or ROI analyses, was unexpected and fails to support previous studies 
(e.g. Buhle et al., 2014). Finally, as discussed above, contrary to predictions, there 
were no associations between temporal distancing efficacy and individual 
differences that would survive correction.  
 
 Using parametric modulation will be a fruitful direction for future research 
to address some of these limitations as it can be used to look at trial-by-trial 
changes. For example, regions can be identified where activation varies with the 
behavioural ratings within individual participants, such as the distress and 
distance in time adopted ratings.  This would be more sensitive than the analysis 
used at present (in which participants’ mean ratings for each condition were used 
in individual difference analyses), and could perhaps reveal the predicted effects 
that the current analysis failed to support.   
 
Overall, the present study adds to the neuroimaging literature on 
reappraisal by demonstrating that placing negative events into a broader temporal 
perspective - a specific and newly investigated strategy within reappraisal, is an 
effective emotion regulation strategy both at the behavioural and neural level. 
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Cognitive control regions typically implicated in reappraisal also seem to be 
implicated in temporal distancing, while some regions associated with future 
thinking are recruited as well. However, more fine-grained analysis techniques 
may be required in order to understand the processes that underpin the 
effectiveness of projecting further into the future. 
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Chapter 7: General Discussion 
 
7.1. Overview 
 The overall aim of the current thesis was to explore how the function and 
efficacy of implicit and explicit forms of emotion regulation are influenced by 
certain modulating factors. These included specific task demands, subtypes of 
aggression, interoception and age across the transition from adolescence to 
adulthood.  
 
 There is a substantial body of literature that suggests that emotion can 
capture our attention, even when we are unaware of it, and that the extent to 
which this occurs varies with subtypes of aggressive traits. However, there is 
currently limited research on whether the ability to implicitly regulate bottom-up 
attentional processing of emotion varies with psychopathic traits in a general non-
pathological sample. This was the key aim of Chapter 2. Chapter 3 followed this 
by exploring the conditions under which emotion can, and cannot, interfere with 
task performance by varying cognitive load. The focus of the thesis then moved 
onto explicit emotion regulation. Chapters 4 - 6 addressed a gap in the explicit 
emotion regulation literature, exploring the ease of use and efficacy of distancing 
sub-strategies, with a particular focus on temporal distancing. Specifically these 
chapters all investigated the role of aggression as well as whether distancing 
varies with interoceptive awareness (Chapter 4), whether temporal distancing 
shows developmental differences in adolescence (Chapter 5) and the neural 
mechanisms underlying temporal distancing (Chapter 6). 
 
The aim of this chapter is to succinctly summarise and answer the 
questions raised throughout the thesis, and to reflect upon how the findings fit into 
the wider implications of the field. Firstly, the main findings of each experimental 
chapter are presented in reference to the key research questions. Secondly, 
implications for the role of aggression in emotion regulation and the Process 
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Model (Gross, 1998) are discussed in light of the findings. Thirdly, limitations of 
the research are presented and avenues for future research are discussed. Finally, 
the chapter ends with the overall conclusions of the thesis. 
 
7.2 Chapter summaries: main research questions and findings 
	
7.2.1 Implicit emotion regulation 
	
7.2.1.1 Does attentional capture by emotional faces vary with psychopathic traits 
in a community sample? 
 Chapter 2 of the thesis aimed to explore how aggression, specifically 
psychopathic traits, influences the ability for emotion to capture attention 
implicitly. Whilst previous studies have demonstrated that emotional processing 
varies with levels of psychopathic traits (e.g. Seara-Cardoso et al., 2012), few 
studies have investigated whether bottom-up attentional emotional processing 
varies continuously with these traits in an adult community sample. Using a 
gender-discrimination visual search paradigm in which emotion was irrelevant to 
the task (Hodsoll et al., 2011), angry and fearful faces interfered with search, 
indicated by slower reaction times relative to neutral faces, as predicted. Most 
importantly, emotional capture by fearful faces was reduced in those with higher 
levels of affective-interpersonal psychopathic traits, associated at the extreme end 
of the continuum with low affective reactivity and empathy. However, a 
moderation analyses revealed that this was only the case when lifestyle-antisocial 
psychopathic traits were low, consistent with evidence suggesting that these two 
facets of psychopathic traits display opposing relationships with emotional 
reactivity (Hicks & Patrick, 2006). This extended the findings of previous studies 
by showing a continuous effect in a community (as opposed to clinical or 
selective) sample. Overall, the findings demonstrated that normative variation in 
‘high-level’ individual differences in psychopathic traits influence automatic bias 
to emotional stimuli at the very early stages of emotion processing.  
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7.2.1.2 Can increasing cognitive load reduce emotional interference? If so, what 
factors may drive this effect? 
Following on from Chapter 2, which demonstrated that emotion can 
capture attention even when it is task-irrelevant, a key question in Chapter 3 was 
to establish whether this task-irrelevant information can be filtered out under 
different task conditions. In this study, four behavioural experiments were 
conducted using a gender-discrimination task consisting of high and low cognitive 
load trials, where perceptual inputs were matched across conditions. The findings 
of Experiment 1 were in line with previous studies (e.g. Sebastian et al., 2017); 
when emotion and cognitive load conditions were blocked, emotion captured 
attention (or at least resulted in increased RT interference) under low cognitive 
load but not high cognitive load. One interpretation is that when trials are more 
demanding (high load condition), processing resources may be ‘pre-allocated’ to 
resolving the cognitive conflict, thereby reducing the capacity for processing the 
emotional information or even actively suppressing this processing. However, 
during low load trials, greater attentional capacity is available, leading to 
processing of the emotional information which then interferes with task 
performance. Given the blocked nature of the experiment, it was suggested that a 
top-down anticipatory strategy (i.e. expectation of a high or low load trial, with or 
without emotional content) could be contributing to the findings. To test if this 
was the case, the following experiments randomised trial order to see if removing 
the ability to anticipate trial type in advance would result in emotion interference  
effects on both low- and high-load trials. Indeed this was the case; the effect seen 
in Experiment 1 disappeared in the following experiments as top-down 
expectancies could only be generated on a trial-by-trial basis, as opposed to across 
an entire block. Thus the experiments in Chapter 3 demonstrate that top-down 
anticipatory control mechanisms are an important factor in the extent to which 
cognitive load impacts on emotional processing. This suggests that when 
perceptual inputs are matched, high cognitive load per se does not reduce 
emotional interference. This is in line with attentional load theory as laid out by 
Lavie (2005), which suggests that high perceptual load reduces the extent to 
which emotion interferes with task performance, but that cognitive (e.g. executive 
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load does not. This study helps in understanding why some studies have reported 
perceptual load type effects despite using cognitive tasks (e.g. Mitchell et al., 
2007, Sebastian et al., 2017).   
 
7.2.2 Explicit emotion regulation 
	
7.2.2.1 Is distancing an effective emotion regulation strategy? Do efficacy and 
ease of use vary between distancing subtypes?  
 These questions were addressed in Chapter 4. In this chapter, the aim was 
to move beyond the broad definition of reappraisal by investigating three sub-
strategies of psychological distancing (temporal distancing, spatial distancing, 
taking an impartial observer perspective), measuring their relative effectiveness 
and their ease of use. In keeping with one of the key broad themes of the thesis, 
individual differences in aggression were measured, as was interoceptive 
awareness, which has been found to facilitate reappraisal use (Füstös	et al., 2013). 
Findings showed that all three strategies were effective in reducing self-reported 
negative affect (distress and arousal) to negatively valenced photos (relative to no 
strategy); however there were no significant differences between the strategies.  
Qualitative data revealed that temporal distancing was accurately implemented 
more often than the other strategies, with participants often resorting to using 
more general reappraisal strategies when they were unable to implement the 
instructed strategy. Additionally, greater interoceptive awareness, which tends be 
related to better discrimination of emotional states (Craig, 2004), was associated 
with greater temporal distancing efficacy, but was not associated with the efficacy 
of the two remaining distancing sub-strategies. Overall the findings demonstrated 
that psychological distancing is an effective emotion regulation strategy, and that, 
temporal distancing in particular may be modulated by individual differences in 
interoceptive awareness. 
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7.2.2.2 Is temporal distancing an effective strategy and does it show 
developmental differences across adolescence? 
In Chapter 4 temporal distancing was operationalised as thinking of a 
distressing event as happening in the past, e.g. “it happened a long time ago”. 
However, research into adopting a temporally distant future perspective on 
stressors, e.g. “this too shall pass”, has recently been shown to effectively reduce 
distress in adults (Bruehlman-Senecal & Ayduk, 2015) and has been associated 
with greater well-being (Bruehlman-Senecal et al., 2016). Therefore Chapter 5 
investigated whether the extent to which individuals project themselves into the 
future influences temporal distancing efficacy. Modulating effects of age across 
adolescence and reactive aggression were also examined as 1) adolescence has 
been associated with reduced future-thinking and poor emotion regulation 
(Ahmed et al., 2015; Schacter et al., 2015; Steinberg et al., 2009), and so it might 
be predicted that temporal distancing might develop during this time; 2) reactive 
(but not proactive) aggression has been shown to peak in adolescence (Moffitt, 
1993) and is also associated with poor emotion regulation (e.g. Besharat et al., 
2013; Marsee & Frick, 2007). A novel experimental paradigm was developed 
using more relatable stimuli such as commonly occurring ‘everyday’ scenarios 
instead of photos (which was used in Chapter 4). Self-report data revealed 
significant down-regulation of negative affect during adopting a distant future 
perspective relative both to using no strategy and to taking a near future 
perspective, with a similar though non-significant pattern of skin conductance 
responses. Importantly, participants who projected further ahead into the future 
reported the greatest distress reductions. While temporal distancing efficacy did 
not vary with age (contrary to predictions), participants reporting greater reactive 
(but not proactive) aggression showed reduced distancing efficacy, and projected 
themselves less far into the future. Additionally reactive aggression peaked in 
mid-adolescence, in line with existing findings (Moffitt, 1993), although age and 
aggression did not interact to predict temporal distancing efficacy. The results 
showed that placing negative events into a broader temporal perspective facilitates 
the down-regulation of negative affect and demonstrated the importance of 
Chapter 7 
	
	
188 
temporal extent in effective temporal distancing; shedding light on a potential 
mechanism for poor emotional control associated with reactive aggression. 
 
7.2.2.3 What are the neural mechanisms underlying temporal distancing? 
In the final experimental chapter, the neural bases of temporal distancing 
were investigated using an fMRI-adapted version of the task used in Chapter 5. 
Behavioural findings replicated those of Chapter 5 and the neural results were 
largely in line with the neuroimaging literature on reappraisal more broadly 
defined in previous studies. During temporal distancing, participants showed 
decreased left amygdala and bilateral sgACC activation, and reported significant 
decreases in emotional distress relative to using no strategy. Temporal distancing 
engaged several parietal and prefrontal regions, such as bilateral inferior parietal 
lobule, inferior frontal gyrus, middle frontal gyrus and superior frontal gyrus. The 
ROI analyses further showed significant activations in cognitive control regions 
that are commonly associated with reappraisal (vlPFC, vmPFC, dlPFC, dmPFC), 
and some regions associated with future thinking (posterior inferior parietal 
lobule, vmPFC). It was also found that the further in time participants projected 
into the future, the less vlPFC responded during temporal distancing relative to no 
strategy use. One tentative interpretation is that the further ahead one projects into 
the future, the less one needs to rely on inhibitory control regions, like the vlPFC. 
The findings of this study extend previous work by using a more circumscribed 
task in which the type of strategy implemented is more restricted relative to free 
reappraisal, and thus the mental operations being performed are better specified. 
The results suggest that the neural circuitry important for temporal distancing 
overlaps to a certain extent with the cognitive control circuitry required for 
broadly defined reappraisal, in addition to the more specific engagement of 
regions involved in the mental construction of future events.  
 
Overall, the findings of these three studies suggest that temporal 
distancing is an effective emotion regulation strategy at behavioural, neural, and 
potentially physiological levels. The findings of the thesis as a whole also suggest 
that the effectiveness of different emotion regulation strategies can be 
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differentially modulated by individual differences in aggression subtypes. The 
following section discusses the role of aggression in light of the findings in more 
detail: a question that was central to the thesis.  
 
7.3 Main implications of the thesis 
7.3.1 What is the role of aggression in emotion regulation? 
 As discussed in Chapter 1 (section 1.5.1) several studies have suggested 
that individuals high in reactive forms of aggression have difficulty disengaging 
attention from hostile stimuli and thus are poor at implicitly regulating their 
emotions. Additionally they tend to use maladaptive emotion regulation strategies, 
such as rumination. In contrast, those characterised by proactive forms of 
aggression or psychopathy tend to perform better at implicit emotion regulation 
tasks, often showing reduced automatic orienting of attention to task-irrelevant 
stimuli and thus reduced reaction time interference. The majority of research has 
investigated pathological samples, or compared groups at the extreme ends of the 
continuum. Therefore the aim of the present thesis was to investigate whether 
aggression plays a role in implicit and explicit emotion regulation in community 
samples.  
 
 As summarised above, Chapter 2 showed that affective-interpersonal 
psychopathic traits do play a role in the implicit processing of emotional faces, 
with a reduction of emotional capture with increasing levels of affective-
interpersonal psychopathic traits, though only when lifestyle-antisocial (reactive) 
traits were low. The results further support accounts suggesting that those high in 
affective-interpersonal psychopathic traits have difficulty processing fear (Blair et 
al., 2004; Veit et al., 2013), as the findings involving interpersonal-affective traits 
did not extend to the angry condition, despite anger capturing attention in the 
sample overall. Moreover this reduced interference by fearful faces (as indicated 
by faster RTs) in those high is these traits was significant for both distractor and 
target conditions, suggesting that emotion is not being processed, even when it 
appears in a task-relevant location. While results were not significant when using 
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difference in reaction times (emotion – neutral), the findings are consistent with 
the small number of studies that have found similar effects (e.g. Maes & Brazil, 
2015). The findings of Chapter 2 are particularly salient as they show that the 
effects of psychopathic traits on the implicit processing of emotion, particularly 
fear, are apparent even in a community (largely undergraduate student) sample. 
Therefore, although clinically elevated levels of psychopathic traits tend to be rare 
in the general population, continuities in the implicit regulation of emotion 
nonetheless exist. 
 
 In terms of explicit emotion regulation, most studies investigating the role 
of aggression in emotion regulation have measured regulation using self-report 
questionnaires, correlating these with self-reported aggression (e.g. Besharat et al., 
2013; Martin & Dahlen, 2005), or a history of aggressive acts (e.g. Roberton et 
al., 2014; Tager et al., 2010). Findings generally suggest that individuals 
characterised by reactive aggressive behaviours tend to have difficulty regulating 
their emotions using explicit strategies, or often use maladaptive strategies. 
Additionally, studies using anger provocation tasks have demonstrated that those 
who use more adaptive emotion regulation strategies in day-to-day life, such as 
reappraisal, are more effective at down-regulating and controlling their anger, at 
subjective and objective levels (Gerin et al., 2006; Mauss et al., 2007; Memedovic 
et al., 2010). However, only a handful of studies have investigated the role of 
aggression in experimental manipulations of emotion regulation, and those that 
have (e.g. Germain & Kangas, 2015) have only studied individuals high in 
aggression. Given the lack of research on whether the efficacy of instructed 
reappraisal (or strategies within reappraisal) varies with levels of reactive 
aggression in the general population, Chapters 4-6 aimed to address this.  
 
 Despite predictions, Chapter 4 failed to show any relationships between 
distancing efficacy and aggression. Self-reported habitual reappraisal use, 
however, was negatively associated with reactive aggression, supporting the 
previous literature on the negative relationship between self-reported reappraisal 
and aggression (e.g. Besharat et al., 2013; Martin & Dahlen, 2005; Mauss et al., 
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2007; Memedovic et al., 2010). Chapter 5 did find that individuals higher in 
reactive aggression were less able to effectively down-regulate their distress using 
temporal distancing (note that temporal distancing was operationalised differently 
across Chapters 4 and 5, see section above). Those high in reactive aggression 
were less able to project far into the distant future, which is a possible mechanism 
for why they were less effective at reducing negative affect using the strategy, as 
greater distance projected into the future was associated with greater temporal 
distancing efficacy. Interestingly the findings were not explained by high levels of 
emotional reactivity typically seen in individuals high in reactive aggression as 
baseline distress ratings did not vary with different levels of reactive aggression. 
Given that differences were found in temporal distancing ‘success’, but not 
emotional reactivity, suggests that training in using temporal distancing to 
regulate emotion, particularly projecting further into the future, may be a potential 
avenue for training and intervention for those high in reactive aggression.  
 
 Chapter 6 also failed to find any significant associations between 
aggression and behavioural or neural responses during temporal distancing. This 
was possibly due to the small sample size (N=26), which likely limited power to 
detect individual differences. However, it was found that higher physical 
aggression was associated with a greater difference in left amygdala activation 
between no strategy and temporal distancing, which runs counter to general 
reactive aggression predictions as it suggests that amygdala response was reduced 
more by temporal distancing in those higher in physical aggression. While this 
result is not in accordance with the findings of Chapter 5, the distribution of 
physical aggression was skewed in the sample, with overall scores being very 
low. In contrast, the distribution of reactive aggression in Chapter 5 was similar to 
previous studies (e.g. Calvete & Orue, 2012). Furthermore we did not have a 
priori hypothesis regarding physical aggression specifically, and this result would 
not survive correction for multiple comparisons given the correlations conducted 
on the three remaining aggression dimensions and total aggression score of the 
Buss-Perry Questionnaire.  
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 Overall the studies in this thesis have demonstrated several ways that 
aggression plays a role in the processing and regulation of emotion, demonstrating 
that differences can occur even in samples not normally characterised by high 
levels of aggression. This has key implications for the field of emotion regulation 
as individual differences, such as aggression, are often not taken into account 
despite clearly affecting emotion regulation efficacy. Considering the role of 
aggression in emotion regulation allows for training and treatment implications 
beyond the management and control of aggression. Training in adaptive emotion 
regulation with a view to preventing the onset or maintenance of externalising 
symptoms, such as aggression, would be of most practical importance.   
 
7.3.2 Implications for the Process Model 
 James Gross’ Process Model (1998) has been invaluable in the field of 
emotion regulation, simplifying a complex set of processes into five key steps. 
Typically emotions are viewed as unfolding over seconds (implicit emotion 
regulation) to minutes (explicit emotion regulation). Therefore each of the five 
steps in the model are differentiated by the time-point at which they unfold in the 
emotion-generative process and are each treated as potential targets for regulation 
(Gross, 2015). However, the Cognitive Change step is much broader than initially 
anticipated in the Process Model. Reappraisal is most commonly associated with 
the umbrella term of Cognitive Change, but as mentioned throughout the thesis, 
even the definition of reappraisal is very broad as there are several strategies 
within reappraisal. Fortunately there has been a move within the literature towards 
the notion of ‘one size does not fit all’. The emotion regulation strategy of 
distancing, which falls under reappraisal, was of particular interest in the current 
thesis. More and more studies are being published indicating that increasing 
psychological distance, either by manipulating spatial, temporal, or social (e.g. 
taking the viewpoint of others) distance, is an effective emotion regulation 
strategy as it leads to “bigger picture” representations of negative events 
(Liberman & Trope, 2008). The term ‘reappraisal’ is now used so broadly that it 
often encompasses the whole range of cognitive change strategies. However, 
distancing is only one strategy out of several that come under the reappraisal 
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definition, therefore more needs to be done in terms of creating a better definition 
of reappraisal and specifying strategies that fall into the reappraisal category, as 
these strategies may not all have similar underlying processes or outcomes in 
terms of efficacy. 
  
 In light of the findings of Chapter 4, another key implication for the 
Process Model is that emotion regulation strategies can also be used 
interchangeably and in combination. The qualitative data obtained in Chapter 4 
showed that in the experimental context participants do not necessarily use only 
the instructed specific strategy even when explicitly trained to do so, and often 
resort to more general reappraisal strategies, or attentional deployment (e.g. “I 
looked away from the photo”), or a combination of the instructed strategy and 
other forms of reappraisal. To our knowledge no other studies of reappraisal have 
asked participants to qualitatively report on what they were thinking during the 
task, which raises the possibility that previous studies investigating ‘reappraisal’ 
may actually be looking at the efficacy of an even broader range of processes than 
was previously assumed. The Process Model seems to assume that a single 
strategy is used at a time, in a unidirectional manner; therefore it perhaps does not 
reflect the complexity of real regulatory processes.  
 
 Another point that the model does not account for is using a combination 
of strategies in a particular sequence. For example, although reappraisal is often 
seen as an adaptive strategy, it does not seem to be very effective when applied in 
situations of high emotional intensity (Sheppes, Catran, & Meiran, 2009). Other 
strategies, such as distraction, may be more adaptive in such situations. For 
example, in the qualitative findings of Chapter 4, some participants distracted 
themselves from highly emotional photos by “listing the positive things that 
happened today”. Therefore skilful emotion regulation may not only involve using 
a combination of strategies, but also choosing the most adaptive sequence. For 
example when emotional intensity is high, distraction can be employed first to 
reduce the intensity of the emotion, and then reappraisal can be effectively 
implemented (Gross, 2015). To date, it is unknown which combinations of 
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strategies are most effective in certain situations. This avenue of research would 
be beneficial, and the adopting the Extended Process Model which includes 
additional steps of evaluating the emotional context and selecting the appropriate 
strategy (see Chapter 1 section 1.2 for more detail) may be more suitable in 
systematically exploring this.  
 
 A central theme throughout the thesis is the role of modulating factors in 
emotion regulation.  As discussed in Chapter 1 (section 1.5), certain factors can 
impact several points of the emotion regulation process. The findings of the 
current thesis add to this by demonstrating that even in a general sample, trait 
aggression can influence regulation, from the very early stages of emotional 
reactivity up to the implementation of explicit strategies. Similarly, interoceptive 
awareness is associated with effective use of temporal distancing in Chapter 4, 
and with more general reappraisal efficacy (Füstös et al., 2013). Several studies 
have shown that emotional awareness is useful for emotion regulation (e.g. Barrett 
et al., 2001; Gohm & Clore, 2002; Herwig et al., 2010), suggesting that 
difficulties at the very early perceptual stages may lead to unsuccessful emotion 
regulation. Interestingly, it has been posited that one of the mechanisms 
underlying the relationship between mindfulness training and the increased 
capacity for effective emotion regulation (see Chambers, Gullone & Allen, 2009, 
for a review) is the increased sensitivity and awareness of emotion-related bodily 
changes (Teper, Segal & Inzlicht, 2013). According to Teper et al. (2013), 
mindfulness increases responsivity to interoceptive signals, and this facilitates 
regulation early on in the time course of emotional processing (e.g. Attention 
Deployment stage), prior to intense emotional reactivity occurring. In effect, 
mindfulness training can improve interoceptive awareness and ultimately improve 
emotion regulation abilities. This may result in ‘skipping’ stages in the Process 
Model. Taking the example of anger, rather than focusing on the reasons behind 
the cause of anger, mindfulness focuses on the physical sensations of the initial 
signs of anger, such as increased heart rate. Attending to the somatic aspects at the 
beginning of the emotional experience can attenuate them before they develop 
into a full anger response, consequently reducing the need for cognitive change 
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strategies such as reappraisal (Farb, Anderson, Irving & Segal, 2014). 
Consequently, findings and theories such as these have important implications for 
the Process Model, which on its own may not capture the important modulating 
factors that interact with, and influence the regulatory processes. 
 
A final modulating factor that was investigated in Chapter 5 of the thesis 
was the development of emotion regulation across adolescence. During 
adolescence, brain regions involved in affect generation and regulation undergo 
protracted structural and functional development, therefore it is important to 
consider how emotion regulation abilities may consequently develop and change 
throughout this period. While it was found that adolescents were just as effective 
as adults at successfully implementing temporal distancing, several previous 
studies have shown adolescents are poor at more general forms of emotion 
regulation (Cohen et al., 2014; Hare et al., 2008; McRae et al., 2012; Silvers et al., 
2012). However, a key issue of the Process Model is that it does not account for 
developmental changes, and how the effectiveness or the ability to implement 
strategies vary with age. In a recent commentary by Riediger and Luong (2015), 
several issues were discussed in regards to this.  Specifically, a theoretical 
framework from the viewpoint of development would help in addressing future 
research on questions such as “how and why do individuals of various age groups 
differ in their emotion regulation goals and strategies?” and “How can we 
evaluate the short-term effectiveness and long-term adaptiveness of emotion 
regulatory efforts in different age groups?” (Riediger & Luong, 2015, p. 99).  The 
Extended Process Model (Sheppes et al., 2015) seems to have more scope for 
exploring developmental trends. For example, in the Identification stage, older 
adults may be better at perceiving different emotional states (the Perception 
substep in the model) and in turn evaluating the perception of the emotional state 
by comparing it to an emotional state that is appropriate in the given situation 
(Valuation substep). It is therefore important to further develop and specify 
theoretical models, such as the Process and Extended Process models of emotion 
regulation, with the purpose of understanding how individuals at any stage of 
development undergo the process of emotion regulation.   
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7.4 Limitations and future directions 
In addition to the limitations discussed within each chapter, this section 
discusses the key areas of limitation in the thesis and how future research may 
address these issues. While the issues noted below are not exhaustive, they do 
serve to discuss concerns that are relevant across the chapters. 
 
One limitation that applies to all of the studies conducted is that a 
correlational approach was used to investigate the role of modulating factors in 
emotion regulation. Therefore it cannot be concluded that, for example, 
psychopathic traits cause reduced emotion capture or reactive aggression causes 
poor temporal distancing efficacy, and vice versa. However, this limitation should 
be evaluated in view of the parallels between the results found throughout the 
thesis and the findings obtained in previous experimental studies. Therefore while 
strong conclusions cannot be made about the causal effects of the modulating 
factors investigated within the thesis, the associations found could shed light on 
which strategies are most effective for certain individuals and uncover new targets 
for interventions and training, such as the role of interoceptive awareness in 
mindfulness, as mentioned above.  
 
A related limitation concerns the use of cross-sectional designs, which is 
particularly limiting for Chapter 5’s developmental study. Using this approach 
meant that within-individual developmental changes could not be examined. 
Therefore future investigations may extend the current findings by using 
longitudinal designs, which will enable causal conclusions to be made. 
Investigating the same individuals over time would be particularly effective in 
early adolescence when situational and individual differences seem to play crucial 
factors in effective emotion regulation (Steinberg, 2005). Longitudinal studies can 
also shed light on which emotion regulation strategies have long-lasting effects. 
For example, in a study by Ayduk and Kross (2010) spontaneous interpersonal 
distancing was investigated longitudinally whereby participants were instructed to 
recall an upsetting experience and then asked whether they saw the experience 
replay through their own eyes or whether they watched the event unfold as an 
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outside observer. They found that the extent to which participants spontaneously 
self-distanced at time point 1 negatively predicted how upset they felt 7 weeks 
later when they recalled the same event, even after controlling for emotional 
reactivity at time point 1. The investigation into the longitudinal effects of 
temporal distancing would be a fruitful direction for future research, particularly 
looking at whether training adolescents to use this strategy would lead to long-
term improvements in their emotion regulation abilities. It has been suggested that 
adolescence is a period of heightened learning and flexibility (Casey et al., 2008; 
Steinberg, 2005). It could therefore be a critical phase for the development of 
adaptive emotion regulation strategies and in turn the implementation of 
interventions. Targeting this window of opportunity could have positive long-term 
consequences for mental health (Wekerle, Waechter, Leung, & Leonard, 2007).  
 
 The findings of Chapters 4-6 extend the literature by showing that 
temporal distancing is effective in a controlled lab environment. However, while 
using the same set of stimuli across participants is a strength as the content and 
intensity of the stimuli can be controlled, and is particularly important for fMRI 
designs (Chapter 6), where controlling for potential differences is vital, it does 
raise certain issues. For example, as shown in the qualitative data in Chapter 4, 
participants may not always be affected by certain stimuli, leaving no need to 
regulate. Using retrospective personal stressors, such as the study by Bruehlman-
Senecal and Ayduk (2015), may address this, however there is also the potential 
problem that a) the intensity of stressors can vary amongst participants, and b) the 
retrospective nature of the task means that the initial emotional reactivity can 
somewhat be attenuated. Thus, using lab-based experimental and retrospective 
measures may not capture the complex and varied contexts in which emotion 
regulation naturally transpires. In a recent study by Haines et al. (2016) the 
ecological momentary assessment (EMA) was used to measure reappraisal use in 
daily life and investigate whether more context-appropriate use of reappraisal is 
associated with greater well-being. Using an app on their smartphones, 
participants were prompted throughout the day over the course of one week to 
complete surveys about their reappraisal use and the degree to which they 
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perceived their environment as controllable. They found that individuals with 
greater well-being used reappraisal more often as situations became less 
controllable, whereas the opposite pattern was found for individuals with lower 
well-being. Therefore findings showed that the adaptiveness of emotion 
regulation strategies outside of a laboratory setting depend on situational factors. 
The advancement of technology has made it much easier for researchers to 
investigate emotion regulation in a more naturalistic fashion. Future studies using 
a similar method to Haines et al. (2016) investigating a wider range of strategies 
will advance our understanding of the rich processes involved in emotion 
regulation. While Chapter 5 has shown that adolescents can regulate emotion 
using temporal distancing when instructed to do so, it would be particularly 
valuable in examining whether they use this strategy in their everyday lives. 
 
 The final limitation concerns aggression. While we found effects of 
aggression on emotion regulation in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5, it is possible that 
the lack of aggression-related findings in the remaining studies was due to smaller 
sample sizes. On average, Chapter 3 consisted of 40 participants per experiment; 
Chapter 4 consisted of approximately 60 participants and Chapter 6 consisted of 
26 participants. Combined with the fact that participants were all university 
students, the variation in aggression is not very broad and may not be a very 
representative sample of the general adult population. In a recent study of over 
500 university students, it was found that reactive forms of aggression were low 
overall, particularly in high achieving students (Qaisy, 2014). The majority of 
participants recruited throughout the studies of the thesis were high achieving, 
particularly Chapter 6 where half of the sample consisted of PhD students. 
Furthermore, given the small sample sizes, investigation into sex differences was 
not feasible, however this would have been interesting given that aggression tends 
to be higher in males (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Future research would 
therefore benefit from using larger samples outside of a university context.  
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7.5 Conclusions  
 The field of emotion regulation research has flourished over the past two 
decades, however there are still many questions yet to be answered, particularly 
pertaining to the role of aggression. This thesis contributes to the field of emotion 
regulation in a number of key ways. The first experimental study demonstrated 
that task-irrelevant emotional faces have privileged access to attention, however 
individuals high in affective-interpersonal psychopathic traits, but also low in 
antisocial psychopathic traits, tend to display reduced attention capture by 
emotion, specifically fear. This is in line with accounts suggesting that those high 
in core psychopathic traits have a fear-processing deficit, with the findings of the 
thesis further extending this to a continuous community sample. The second 
experimental study demonstrated that top-down anticipatory control mechanisms 
are an important factor in the extent to which cognitive load impacts on emotional 
processing. In a series of four experiments, the circumstances under which 
cognitive load modulates the effects of emotion on task performance were 
clarified for the first time.  
 
 The remainder of the thesis moved away from the broad definition of 
reappraisal, which is the most common emotion regulation strategy investigated 
throughout the literature. Exploring the strategies within psychological distancing, 
it was found that temporal distancing was positively associated with awareness of 
internal bodily states, was an effective emotion regulation strategy across 
adolescence, and that individuals high in reactive aggression were less able to 
effectively implement this strategy to down-regulate their negative affect. The 
final experimental chapter used fMRI to examine the neural correlates of temporal 
distancing for the first time. A similar network of brain regions that are typically 
recruited in reappraisal, such as the amygdala and several prefrontal and parietal 
regions were engaged during temporal distancing, suggesting that a common 
cognitive control network underpins a range of cognitive emotion regulation 
strategies. 
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 Overall, the findings of this thesis show that individual differences, 
particularly subtypes of aggression, influence both implicit and explicit emotion 
regulation. As demonstrated, individual differences in emotion regulation are 
related to a broad range of significant wellbeing outcomes, and therefore there is a 
strong need to formulate and investigate interventions designed to carefully shape 
emotion regulation processes in helpful directions. 
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Appendices 
	
Appendix 1: Self-report questionnaires used in the thesis. 
 
1a) The Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-III Short Form (SRP-III-SF; Paulhus et 
al., in press). 
 
Please	rate	the	degree	to	which	you	agree	with	the	following	statements.		You	can	be	
honest	because	your	name	will	be	detached	from	the	answers	as	soon	as	they	are	
submitted.	
	 Disagree	
Strongly	 Disagree	 Neutral	 Agree	
Agree	
Strongly	
1.	I’m	a	rebellious	person.	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
2.	I	have	never	been	involved	in	delinquent	
gang	activity.	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
3.	Most	people	are	wimps.	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
4.	I’ve	often	done	something	dangerous	just	
for	the	thrill	of	it.	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
5.	I	have	tricked	someone	into	giving	me	
money	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
6.	I	have	assaulted	a	law	enforcement	
official	or	social	worker.	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
7.	I	have	pretended	to	be	someone	else	in	
order	to	get	something.		 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
8.	I	like	to	see	fist-fights.	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
9.	I	would	get	a	kick	out	of	‘scamming’	
someone.	 	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
10.	It's	fun	to	see	how	far	you	can	push	
people	before	they	get	upset.	 	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
11.	I	enjoy	doing	wild	things.	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
12.	I	have	broken	into	a	building	or	vehicle	
in	order	to	steal	something	or	vandalize	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
13.	I	don’t	bother	to	keep	in	touch	with	my	
family	any	more	 	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
14.	I	rarely	follow	the	rules.	 	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
15.	You	should	take	advantage	of	other	
people	before	they	do	it	to	you.	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
16.	People	sometimes	say	that	I’m	cold-
hearted.	 	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
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	 Disagree	
Strongly	 Disagree	 Neutral	 Agree	
Agree	
Strongly	
17.	I	like	to	have	sex	with	people	I	barely	
know.	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
18.	I	love	violent	sports	and	movies.	 	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
19.	Sometimes	you	have	to	pretend	you	like	
people	to	get	something	out	of	them.	 	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
20.	I	was	convicted	of	a	serious	crime.	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
21.	I	keep	getting	in	trouble	for	the	same	
things	over	and	over.	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
22.	Every	now	and	then	I	carry	a	weapon	
(knife	or	gun)	for	protection.	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
23.	You	can	get	what	you	want	by	telling	
people	what	they	want	to	hear.	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
24.	I	never	feel	guilty	over	hurting	others.	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
25.	I	have	threatened	people	into	giving	me	
money,	clothes,	or	makeup.	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
26.	A	lot	of	people	are	“suckers”	and	can	
easily	be	fooled.		 	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
27.	I	admit	that	I	often	“mouth	off”	without	
thinking.	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
28.	I	sometimes	dump	friends	that	I	don’t	
need	any	more.	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
29.	I	purposely	tried	to	hit	someone	with	
the	vehicle	I	was	driving.	 □	 □	 □	 □	 □	
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1b) The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, 
Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). 
 
State Anxiety:  
Read	each	statement	and	then	select	the	answer	that	reflects	how	you	feel	right	now,	
that	is,	at	this	moment.	There	are	no	right	or	wrong	answers.	Do	not	spend	too	much	
time	on	any	one	statement	but	give	the	answer	which	seems	to	describe	your	present	
feelings	best.	
	 Not	at	
all	 Somewhat	
Moderately	
so	
Very	
much	so	
1.	I	feel	calm	 □	 □	 □	 □	
2.	I	feel	secure	 □	 □	 □	 □	
3.	I	am	tense	 □	 □	 □	 □	
4.	I	feel	strained	 □	 □	 □	 □	
5.	I	feel	at	ease	 □	 □	 □	 □	
6.	I	feel	upset	 □	 □	 □	 □	
7.	I	am	presently	worrying	over	possible	
misfortunes	 □	 □	 □	 □	
8.	I	feel	satisfied	 □	 □	 □	 □	
9.	I	feel	frightened	 	 □	 □	 □	 □	
10.	I	feel	comfortable	 	 □	 □	 □	 □	
11.	I	feel	self-confident	 □	 □	 □	 □	
12.	I	feel	nervous	 □	 □	 □	 □	
13.	I	am	jittery	 □	 □	 □	 □	
14.	I	feel	indecisive	 	 □	 □	 □	 □	
15.	I	am	relaxed	 □	 □	 □	 □	
16.	I	feel	content	 □	 □	 □	 □	
17.	I	am	worried	 □	 □	 □	 □	
18.	I	feel	confused	 	 □	 □	 □	 □	
19.	I	feel	steady		 □	 □	 □	 □	
20.	I	feel	pleasant	 □	 □	 □	 □	
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Trait Anxiety: 
Read	each	statement	and	then	select	the	answer	that	reflects	how	you	generally	feel.	
There	are	no	right	or	wrong	answers.	Do	not	spend	too	much	time	on	any	one	
statement	but	give	the	answer	which	seems	to	describe	how	you	generally	feel.	
	
	 Not	at	
all	 Somewhat	
Moderately	
so	
Very	
much	so	
21.	I	feel	pleasant	 □	 □	 □	 □	
22.	I	feel	nervous	and	restless	 □	 □	 □	 □	
23.	I	feel	satisfied	with	myself	 □	 □	 □	 □	
24.	I	wish	I	could	be	as	happy	as	others	seem	
to	be	 □	 □	 □	 □	
25.	I	feel	like	a	failure	 □	 □	 □	 □	
26.	I	feel	rested	 □	 □	 □	 □	
27.	I	am	“calm,	cool,	and	collected”	 □	 □	 □	 □	
28.	I	feel	that	difficulties	are	piling	up	so	that	
I	cannot	overcome	them	 □	 □	 □	 □	
29.	I	worry	too	much	over	something	that	
really	doesn’t	matter	 □	 □	 □	 □	
30.	I	am	happy	 □	 □	 □	 □	
31.	I	have	disturbing	thoughts	 □	 □	 □	 □	
32.	I	lack	self-confidence	 □	 □	 □	 □	
33.	I	feel	secure	 □	 □	 □	 □	
34.	I	make	decisions	easily	 □	 □	 □	 □	
35.	I	feel	inadequate	 □	 □	 □	 □	
36.	I	am	content	 □	 □	 □	 □	
37.	Some	unimportant	thought	runs	through	
my	mind	and	bothers	me	 □	 □	 □	 □	
38.	I	take	disappointments	so	keenly	that	I	
can’t	put	them	out	of	my	mind	 □	 □	 □	 □	
39.	I	am	a	steady	person	 □	 □	 □	 □	
40.	I	get	in	a	state	of	tension	or	turmoil	as	I	
think	over	my	recent	concerns	and	interests	 □	 □	 □	 □	
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1c) Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry, 1992) 
 
Please rate each of the following items in terms of how characteristic they are of 
you. Use the following scale for answering these items. 
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Extremely	
uncharacteristic	
of	me	
Somewhat	
uncharacteristic	
of	me	
Neither	
uncharacteristic	
nor	characteristic	
of	me	
	
Somewhat	
characteristic	
of	me	
	
Extremely	
characteristic	
of	me	
	
1) Once in a while I can't control the urge to strike another person. 
2) Given enough provocation, I may hit another person. 
3) If somebody hits me, I hit back. 
4) I get into fights a little more than the average person. 
5) If I have to resort to violence to protect my rights, I will. 
6) There are people who pushed me so far that we came to blows. 
7) I can think of no good reason for ever hitting a person. 
8) I have threatened people I know. 
9) I have become so mad that I have broken things. 
10) I tell my friends openly when I disagree with them. 
11) I often find myself disagreeing with people. 
12) When people annoy me, I may tell them what I think of them. 
13) I can't help getting into arguments when people disagree with me. 
14) My friends say that I'm somewhat argumentative. 
15) I flare up quickly but get over it quickly. 
16) When frustrated, I let my irritation show. 
17) I sometimes feel like a powder keg ready to explode. 
18) I am an even-tempered person. 
19) Some of my friends think I'm a hothead. 
20) Sometimes I fly off the handle for no good reason. 
21) I have trouble controlling my temper. 
22) I am sometimes eaten up with jealousy. 
23) At times I feel I have gotten a raw deal out of life. 
24) Other people always seem to get the breaks. 
25) I wonder why sometimes I feel so bitter about things. 
26) I know that "friends" talk about me behind my back. 
27) I am suspicious of overly friendly strangers. 
28) I sometimes feel that people are laughing at me behind me back. 
29) When people are especially nice, I wonder what they want. 
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1d) Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003). 
For each item please answer as honestly and accurately as possible. 
	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	
Strongly	
Disagree	
Disagree	 Somewhat	
Disagree	
	
Neutral	
	
Somewhat	
Agree	
	
Agree	 Strongly	
Agree	
	
1) When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I 
change what I’m thinking about.  
2) I keep my emotions to myself.  
3) When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I change 
what I’m thinking about.  
4) When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them.  
5) When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way 
that helps me stay calm.  
6) I control my emotions by not expressing them.  
7) When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking 
about the situation.  
8) I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in.  
9) When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them.  
10) When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking 
about the situation. 
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1e) Reactive and Proactive Questionnaire (RPQ; Raine et al., 2006)  
	
There	are	times	when	most	of	us	feel	angry,	or	have	done	things	we	should	not	have	
done.	Rate	each	of	the	items	below	by	crossing	the	box	around	either	never,	sometimes	
or	often.	Do	not	spend	a	lot	of	time	thinking	about	the	items	–	just	give	your	first	
response.	Make	sure	you	answer	all	the	items.		
 
How	often	have	you	…		 	 Never	 Sometimes	 Often	
1.	Yelled	at	others	when	they	have	annoyed	you	 □	 □	 □	
2.	Had	fights	with	others	to	show	who	was	on	top			 □	 □	 □	
3.	Reacted	angrily	when	provoked	by	others	 □	 □	 □	
4.	Taken	things	from	others	 □	 □	 □	
5.	Become	angry	when	frustrated		 □	 □	 □	
6.	Vandalised	something	just	for	fun	 □	 □	 □	
7.	Had	temper	tantrums			 	 □	 □	 □	
8.	Damaged	something	because	you	felt	mad	 □	 □	 □	
9.	Had	a	fight	just	to	be	cool		 	 □	 □	 □	
10.	Hurt	others	to	win	a	game		 	 □	 □	 □	
11.	Become	angry	when	you	don’t	get	your	way		 	 □	 □	 □	
12.	Used	force	to	get	others	to	do	what	you	want		 	 □	 □	 □	
13.	Become	angry	or	mad	when	you	lost	a	game		 	 □	 □	 □	
14.	Become	angry	when	others	threatened	you		 	 □	 □	 □	
15.	Used	force	to	obtain	money	or	things	from	others	 □	 □	 □	
16.	Felt	better	after	hitting	or	yelling	at	someone		 	 □	 □	 □	
17.	Threatened	and	bullied	someone		 	 □	 □	 □	
18.	Made	obscene	phone	calls	for	fun		 	 	 □	 □	 □	
19.	Hit	others	to	defend	yourself			 	 	 □	 □	 □	
20.	Got	others	to	gang	up	on	somebody	else	 □	 □	 □	
21.	Carried	a	weapon	to	use	in	a	fight	 □	 □	 □	
22.	Become	angry	or	mad	or	hit	others	when	teased	 □	 □	 □	
23.	Yelled	at	others	so	they	would	do	things	for	you	 □	 □	 □	
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Appendix 2: Scenario stimuli used in Chapter 6. 
The following list comprises the sets of scenarios used in the fMRI study in 
Chapter 6, adapted from the scenarios created for Chapter 5.  
 
Set 1 (neutral) 
− Your friend has blue eyes and blonde curly hair 
− The person next to you is using a red pen 
− You pass a colleague as you walk up the stairs 
− You ask your superior a question and they answer 
− You see your doctor walking down the street 
− The main hall in the science building is being repainted 
− You put your hockey stick in the cupboard 
− You overhear someone taking on the phone about the weather 
− You use the computer to do your work 
− You put on your jumper in the morning  
 
Set 2 (negative) 
− You catch someone talking about you behind your back 
− Someone makes a nasty comment about your looks 
− As you’re walking onto the stage you trip and fall 
− After giving an important presentation you realise your fly is undone 
− You fail one of your most important exams 
− You fail to qualify for the sports team 
− Your finger gets trapped in a door and breaks 
− Whilst playing hockey someone hits you hard with their stick 
− You get splashed by dirty water by a passing car 
− Your computer crashes before you’ve saved your work 
 
Set 3 (negative) 
− You have a serious argument with your best friend 
− Your workmates throw a party but don’t invite you 
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− You address your superior by the wrong name 
− You get a nosebleed in public and everyone stares at you 
− Your doctor tells you that your eyesight has gotten worse 
− You miss an important interview because your car breaks down 
− You are in a fight and get punched in the face 
− You stub your toe really hard on the table leg 
− You get blamed for something you didn’t do 
− You’re meeting your friend but they’re over an hour late 
 
Set 4 (negative) 
− Your best friend starts ignoring you for no reason 
− Someone steals your bag and runs away 
− You spill your drink in a fancy restaurant  
− You accidently send a rude joke to your superior 
− Your hair starts falling out because of ongoing stress 
− Someone copies your work but you get in trouble, not them 
− You’re in a car crash and end up with serious injuries 
− Someone runs into you and knocks you over on purpose 
− You forget your keys and get locked out of your house 
− You find that someone has ripped your favourite top 
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Appendix 3: Instructions given to participants in Chapter 6. 
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Appendix 4: Peak cluster activations in brain regions reaching significance at 
p<.05 (FWE-corrected at the whole brain level) for contrasts with no specific 
hypotheses in Chapter 6. BA=Brodmann area; L/R=laterality (left/right); peak 
voxel=co-ordinates of the peak voxel from the whole brain analysis (XYZ co-
ordinates refer to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) standard space); 
k=cluster size (number of 3x3x3mm voxels: where cells are empty, activations are 
part of above clusters); FWE=familywise error. 
Brain	Regions	
Peak	 	 Cluster	
BA	 L/R	 x	 y	 z	 t	 	 k	 p	(FWE)	
Near	>	Distant	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
None	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Read	Negative	>	Near		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Lingual	Gyrus	 17	 L	 -21	 -94	 -5	 7.29	 	 156	 <0.001	
Middle	Occipital	Gyrus	 18	 R	 24	 -94	 -2	 6.77	 	 184	 <0.001	
Middle	Occipital	Gyrus	 -	 R	 27	 -88	 -8	 6.76	 	 -	 -	
Superior	Temporal	Gyrus	 22	 L	 -54	 -7	 -11	 6.24	 	 92	 <0.001	
Middle	Temporal	Gyrus	 21	 R	 51	 -10	 -14	 5.40	 	 40	 <0.001	
Middle	Temporal	Gyrus	 21	 R	 51	 8	 -20	 5.28	 	 -	 -	
Superior	Temporal	Gyrus	 22	 L	 -54	 -40	 7	 5.00	 	 10	 0.002	
Fusiform	Gyrus	 37	 R	 39	 -43	 -17	 4.70	 	 1	 0.024	
Medial	Frontal	Gyrus	 25	 L	 -3	 26	 -17	 4.64	 	 1	 0.024	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Near	>	Read	Negative	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Inferior	Parietal	Lobule	 40	 R	 45	 -40	 52	 7.44	 	 827	 <0.001	
Inferior	Parietal	Lobule	 7	 R	 36	 -64	 46	 5.74	 	 -	 -	
Superior	Parietal	Lobule	 7	 R	 33	 -64	 58	 5.68	 	 -	 -	
Inferior	Parietal	Lobule	 40	 L	 -45	 -43	 46	 6.87	 	 981	 <0.001	
Postcentral	Gyrus	 2	 L	 -51	 -28	 31	 6.83	 	 -	 -	
Postcentral	Gyrus	 2	 L	 -42	 -31	 37	 6.67	 	 -	 -	
Lingual	Gyrus	 18	 L	 0	 -73	 -2	 6.24	 	 213	 <0.001	
Fusiform	Gyrus	 19	 L	 -24	 -70	 -14	 5.06	 	 -	 -	
Parahippocampal	Gyrus	 19	 L	 -27	 -58	 -5	 4.81	 	 -	 -	
Lentiform	Nucleus,	Putamen	 -	 L	 -30	 -19	 1	 5.98	 	 299	 <0.001	
Claustrum	 -	 L	 -33	 -1	 4	 5.73	 	 -	 -	
Insula	 13	 L	 -42	 8	 4	 5.25	 	 -	 -	
Middle	Frontal	Gyrus	 6	 R	 30	 8	 61	 5.85	 	 48	 <0.001	
Culmen	 -	 R	 21	 -49	 -20	 5.51	 	 78	 <0.001	
Cerebellum	 6	 R	 24	 -70	 -17	 5.24	 	 12	 0.001	
Inferior	Temporal	Gyrus	 37	 R	 54	 -49	 -11	 5.21	 	 21	 <0.001	
Medial	Frontal	Gyrus	 6	 L	 -6	 -4	 52	 5.18	 	 13	 0.001	
Insula	 13	 R	 42	 -1	 13	 5.16	 	 40	 <0.001	
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Brain	Regions	
Peak	 	 Cluster	
BA	 L/R	 x	 y	 z	 t	 	 k	 p	(FWE)	
Putamen	 -	 R	 33	 -1	 10	 5.04	 	 -	 -	
Culmen	 -	 L	 -24	 -61	 -32	 5.14	 	 13	 0.001	
Inferior	Frontal	Gyrus	 44	 R	 54	 8	 22	 5.11	 	 16	 <0.001	
Middle	Temporal	Gyrus	 19	 L	 -39	 -79	 16	 5.08	 	 7	 0.003	
Claustrum	 -	 R	 30	 17	 7	 4.94	 	 8	 0.003	
Middle	Frontal	Gyrus	 10	 R	 42	 47	 16	 4.93	 	 12	 0.001	
Middle	Frontal	Gyrus	 10	 L	 -33	 53	 -8	 4.78	 	 2	 0.016	
Cingulate	Gyrus	 32	 R	 6	 23	 46	 4.73	 	 4	 0.008	
Middle	Frontal	Gyrus	 9	 R	 39	 32	 37	 4.68	 	 3	 0.011	
Insula	 -	 R	 39	 14	 1	 4.64	 	 1	 0.024	
Lingual	Gyrus	 -	 L	 -21	 -64	 1	 4.63	 	 1	 0.024	
 
 
 
 
 
	
